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PREFACE
Because graphite and carbon fiber composites provide high
strength and stiffness relative to weight, they have the potential
'for widespread future use in the U.S. and abroad. The fibers, how-
ever, are electrically conductive and lightweight. Should the
fibers be released from the composite such as might occur in an
aircraft crash/fire, wherein the binding resin or matrix is burned
away, the fibers can become airborne and dispersed over large areas.
The settlement of the fibers on electrical and electronic equipment
i
may cause short circuits or malfunctions resulting in costly shut-
downs, fires, shock, etc.
This publication is a compilation of the presentations and the
pertinent questions and answers arising during a briefing for indus-
try and government held by NASA Langley Research Center on October 31
and November 1, 1978. The scope and status of the work being done
under the direction of NASA to assess the risks to the nation asso-
ciated with the accidental release of carbon/graphite fibers from
(civil aircraft were presented at this briefing.
This publication was prepared from tape transcriptions of the
'conference presentations with only minimal editing. Thus, there
is the possibility of a degree of incompleteness. Since material
presented in this report was taken from a variety of sources, vari-
ous units of measure are used. A conversion table is included after
the Contents. Use of trade names or names of manufacturers in this
report does not constitute an official endorsement of such products
or manufacturers, either expressed or implied, by NASA.
'Robert J. Huston
Conference Chairman
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INTRODUCTION
Graphite or carbon fibers in an epoxy matrix provide a
composite material having high strength and stiffness
relative to weight. Because low weight is such an important
consideration in aircraft structures, NASA has undertaken a
variety of activities intended to resolve problems involved
in applying these composite materials to aircraft structures.
NASA activities include laboratory studies as well as major
projects to give flight experience with composites in secondary
and primary structures on commercial aircraft. However,
because of their low density, small diameter, and high electrical
conductivity, graphite fibers raise issues beyond those
normally considered in structural design.
Since graphite fibers are electrical conductors, they can
cause short circuits, equipment malfunctions, or possible fires
if they get into electrical or electronic equipment. Furthermore,
because of their low density and small diameter, graphite
fibers carried aloft in a fire plume or otherwise can remain
airborne for considerable time, and hence can be transported
from the scene of an accident to the site of electrical or
electronic equipment 1 ' 2 . NASA has underway a project to
quanfity the risk associated with this electrical hazard,
and has also initiated exploratory investigations of alternate
materials which can reduce electrical hazards and yet retain
or enhance currently available graphite fiber composite
properties.
On October 31 and November 1, 1978, NASA Langley Research
Center held a briefing to inform both industry and government
of the scope and status of the work being done to assess the
risks associated with the release of carbon fibers from
accidents of civil aircraft. The briefing, which is documented
herein, presented the approach being taken to perform the
risk assessment and the analytical, test, and economic study
work being performed to provide a data base for the risk
assessment. Preliminary estimates were presented of the
risk associated with civil aircraft operations at a single
major hub airport and nationwide.
The briefing provided an interim report on the status
of the NASA-directed risk assessment work. Completion and
final reporting of the NASA work is scheduled for late fall
of 1979.
1A Report of Observed Effects on Electrical
Systems of Airborne Carbon/Graphite Fibers.
NASA TM 78652, 1978
2 Intergovernmental Committee, Compilers: Carbon
Fiber Study. NASA TM 78718, 1978
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UNIT CONVERSION FACTORS
to	 multiply by
meter	 2.540 x 10-2
To convert from
inch
foot
mile
pound
gallon
liter
feet per minute
miles per hour
I
miles per hour
pressure (psi)
temperature of
horsepower
Btu
meter
meter
kilogram
cubic meter
cubic meter
meters per second
meters per second
kilometers per hour
pascal
temperature K
watt
joule
3.048 x 10-1
1.609 x 103
4.536 x 10-1
3.785 x 10-3
1.000 x 10~3
5.080 x 10-3
4.470 x 10-1
1.609
6.895 x 103
T  = (TF + 459.67)/1.8
7.457 x 102
1.055 x 103
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WELCOME AND OVERVIEW	 1
R. 1R. Heldenfels
Director for Structures
NASA Langley Research Center
Welcome to the Langley Research Center. We are pleased that
you came to this briefing on the risks associated with the acci-
dental release of carbon fibers from civil aircraft. This is the
first formal report on our risk assessment activities. Hopefully
the information that you will receive in the next day and a half
will be useful in planning your future programs for the applica-
tion of carbon-fiber composites. We will appreciate hearing your
comments and suggestions for improving our program. Our basic
goal is to obtain a reliable estimate of the public risk that may
result from using carbon fibers on current and future civil air-
craft in the United States.
As you are aware, carbon-based fibers, often referred to
interchangeably as graphite or carbon fibers, have high strength
and stiffness that make them very attractive as the fibrous
component of a composite material. Such composites are being
used in an increasing number of applications because of their
performance and cost benefits. These current and projected appli-
cations include sporting goods, automobiles, aircraft, and
spacecraft in both the civil and military sectors. NASA, in
particular, has conducted and sponsored extensive research and
development to support the application of composite materials in
civil aircraft. This NASA activity has emphasized carbon-fiber
composites and it has been oriented primarily toward commercial
transport applications. Significant use of carbon-fiber compo-
sites is planned for most of the new commercial transports now
in the design stage.
However, because of their high electrical conductivity, free
carbon fibers that get into electrical equipment and settle on or
across electrical contacts or circuits can cause equipment mal-
functions or damage. Plants that manufacture or process carbon
fibers have experienced such problems but have solved them easily
by protecting or modifying the equipment involved. As long as
carbon fibers are part of a composite material (imbedded in a
matrix), they pose no known hazard. They can become an
electrical hazard if free fibers are released from the composite
in an accident.
Figure 1 is a photograph of some carbon fibers that were
released from a composite laminate placed in a fire. Note
particularly the length scale that is 1-mm long (0.04 in.) and
compare it with the diameter of the single fibers (0.008 mm).
These fibers are so small that they are very hard to see with
the naked eye. They are not easy to detect and people could be
unaware of their presence around electrical equipment.
CARBON FIBERS RELEASED INA FIRE
Figure 1
Figure 2 is a photograph of an electric arc that was created
by placing a carbon fiber across high voltage electrodes. It
illustrates the kind of result obtained when electrical equipment
is tested for vulnerability to carbon fibers. A subsequent talk
will discuss equipment vulnerability in detail.
A logical question is how much equipment damage has actually
resulted from the accidental release of carbon fibers? The
answer is not much! The problem was highlighted initially by
significant electrical power failures that resulted when a batch
of carbon fibers was placed in an incinerator and individual
fibers were subsequently dispersed over a large area. A few
military aircraft crash fires have released carbon fibers, but
no damage to electrical equipment has been specifically traced
to these accidents.
However, the risk of accidental release will increase with
the expected increase in carbon fiber use in both civil aircraft
and other applications. Consequently, a federal study of this
potential problem was conducted last year. The next talk will
2
FIBER INITIATED ARC
Figure 2
describe the background and results of that study and the
federal action plan that it produced. That action plan assigned
to NASA the responsibility for determining the risk associated
with accidental release of carbon fibers from civil aircraft.
NASA Headquarters subsequently assigned that task to the Langley
Research Center.
This briefing is a progress report on the risk assessment
activities conducted here at Langley with significant support
from many organizations in government, industry, and universities.
A number of laboratories in the Department of Defense have made
major contributions to our program. Thus far, we have concen-
trated on commercial transport aircraft as a source of released
fibers, but before we finish we will investigate the risk from
composite structures on all types of civil aircraft.
The question we are trying to answer and our approach is
outlined on figure 3. The question is: Is the potential damage
that may be created by the release of carbon fiber from an air-
craft accident significant compared to the benefits that accrue
from the use of composite materials in aircraft construction?
3
RISK OF CARBON FIBER RELEASE FROM CIVIL AIRCRAFT
QUESTION:	 IS THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE SIGNIFICANT COMPARED TO THE BENEFITS
FROM CARBON FIBER USE?
APPROACH:
1, RISK ANALYSIS METHODS AND DATA,
2, RISK ASSESSMENTS OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT APPLICATION SENARIOS,
3, COMPARISON OF DAMAGE COST PROBABILITIES AND BENEFITS FROM
APPLICATIONS,
Figure 3
Our first step is to collect and develop the risk analysis
methods and the experimental data required to deal with this
particular problem. Then we will conduct a risk assessment that
will define the probability of various degrees of damage from
current and projected applications of composite materials in
civil aircraft. The status of what we have done on these two
things will be reported at this meeting. This is a very complex
problem. It involves the probability of occurrence of many
things, such as the number and location of accidents, the amount
of carbon fiber on the aircraft, how much fiber is released, how
the fibers are disseminated, how far they go, what kind of
equipment is in the area where the fibers are deposited, and the
effect of these fibers on that equipment. Then we must estimate
the cost of equipment repair and replacement. Some of these
costs and probabilities are easy to define, but many involve
phenomena that are relatively unexplored. There is a great lack
of pertinent data. However, we are pushing ahead to collect the
data required and are trying to scope the problem as soon as
possible. When we have an acceptable risk assessment, we will
take the third step and compare the probable losses from this
phenomenon with other risks to which the public is subjected and
to the benefits that accrue to society from carbon-fiber
composite applications.
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An important consideration in our study is the character of
the carbon-fiber hazard compared to other potential hazards of
current public concern, such as those that arise from possible
failure of nuclear power plants or those that are associated with
accidents in the handling of liquified natural gas. Both the
nuclear and LNG hazards have the potential for causing substantial
loss of life as well as damage to property. Their risk assess-
ments are dominated, however, by loss of life. On the other
hand, the carbon-fiber hazard is primarily a producer of potential
property damage. Any loss of life that might result from release
of carbon fibers will be a secondary consequence of an equipment
failure. The carbon-fiber problem, therefore, should be of much
less public concern than many other hazards to which people are
often exposed because the fatalities will be few and most of the
damage can be repaired easily.
Another consideration that reduces the near-term concern is
the relatively small amount of carbon fiber currently in use on
civil aircraft. No civil aircraft that incorporates carbon-fiber
composite structural components has been involved in an accident.
A few military aircraft with carbon-fiber composite structures
have crashed and burned, but no carbon-fiber related damage has
been observed around those accident sites. On the other hand, a
crash fire of a military aircraft produced a variety of charred
materials that caused electrical failures near the fire. That
aircraft had no carbon-fiber composites on board. Thus, to date
we have meager experience with the consequences of carbon fibers
released from actual accidents. In addition, carbon fibers are
not the only potential source of electrical equipment failures
in the vicinity of an aircraft crash and fire.
We will be giving you much detailed information on our state
of knowledge of the carbon-fiber hazard, the progress we have
made, and the problems we have encountered with risk assessment.
But first I will make a few observations based on our experience.
1. The amount of data needed and the complexity of the pro-
blem continue to increase as we learn more about it, but we are
making progress.
2. The equipment we have tested for vulnerability appears
to be less vulnerable than anticipated. In many cases we found
that repair can be achieved by use of a vacuum cleaner.
3. Techniques are available to protect electrical equipment
from the carbon-fiber hazard if the manufacturers and owners of
this equipment are sufficiently motivated to do so.
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4. The most probable cost of the damage produced by acci-
dental release has been decreasing as we learn more about the
problem and refine our studies. Our interim results, to be
presented in a later talk, suggest that the carbon-fiber hazard
has the potential of adding only a very small increment to the
cost usually associated with aircraft accidents.
5. Estimated future annual costs of property damage that
could result from release of carbon fibers from civil aircraft
accidents appear to be small compared to the property damage that
regularly occurs from a variety of natural and man-made causes
in the United States.
We will present our plans and results in detail in this
briefing so that you can judge for yourself how optimistic the
outlook may be. But please tell us if you see places where we
have been unduly optimistic or pessimistic.
In conclusion, we have undertaken the difficult and complex
task of assessing the risks associated with the use of carbon-
fiber composites on civil aircraft. Our progress has been
somewhat slow, but we have made a commitment to obtain at least
an interim answer within the coming year. We will tell you what
we have learned and where we plan to go. We solicit your
comments, suggestions, and advice on how we can improve our
program. We appreciate your attendance, hope you find the infor-
mation we present useful, and hope that this briefing was a pro-
ductive use of your time.
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THE NATIONAL CARBON FIBER PROGRAM 	 2
Leonard Harris
NASA Headquarters
I hope my comments will give you a perspective as to
how some of us at NASA Headquarters view the graphite
phenomenon, not just in terms of the aerospace community
but of the total community involved in the use of advanced
carbon fiber composites. As Dick Heldenfels has already
pointed out, there has been a rapid growth in the use of
carbon fiber composites. The growth is quite outstanding.
It was only about 15 to 20 years ago that the Air Force,
and subsequently NASA, began spending considerable effort
in developing the basic materials from which this industry
has grown. In the prespective of just the civil aircraft
market, which figure 1 addresses, we are talking about an
application today of tens of thousands of pounds of graphite
annually and one which projects in the 1990's to a million
or more pounds per year of graphite fiber usage. This is
an exceptional growth for a new material.
ESTIMATED USE OF GRAPHITE FIBER FOR
NON-MILITARY AEROSPACE APPLICATIONS
Figure 1
But what accompanies such a rapid growth is the likeli-
hood of surprises, one of the likely perspectives of the
rapid growth of any new material. There have been surprises
other than the graphite phenomenon during the rapid development
7
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of advanced composites.
Looking further, there is a perspective that requires
a certain set of sequences to exist if the carbon fibers
that exist in a composite are to escape as free fibers.
Figure 2 is a photo from a crash of a U.S. Navy fighter.
The fibers are not carbon in figure 2, but the photograph
illustrates the potential problem in a crash fire situation in
which, under certain conditions, the fibers could become
freed from the resin matrix. It is this issue with which
this meeting is dealing - the quantification of the risk
and associated costs.
FIBER RELEASE IN AIRCRAFT  CRASH
Figure 2
About a year and a half ago, the government recognized the
rapid growth in the use of graphite reinforced composite mate-
rials and also recognized at about this same time that there
was a potential for the release of free fibers. Therefore, the
Director for the Office of Science and Technology Policy was
directed to determine what actions the government should take.
As a consequence, there was issued earlier this year a report
from the Department of Commerce which described the phenomenon
and a NASA technology publication which described some of its
technical details.
The government study resulted in an action plan for the
civil sector which is outlined in figure 3. The agencies
8
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Figure 3
involved, shown in the figure, are those which have specific
assignments with respect to the civil sector of the user
community. Shown on the top line, the Department of Commerce
relates to general civil use, the Department of Transportation
to potential automotive or truck applications, NASA to civil
aircraft, and the Department of Energy to the production
and distribution of power. The second line on the chart
represents the agencies that are involved in terms of health
and the environment, EPA, HEW, OSHA and the Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency. The latter agency has a role in infor-
mation distribution should a crash occur with a civil aircraft
containing carbon fiber. The OMB is involved in budgetary
issues and the Department of State in issues related to the
foreign market.
Figures 4 and 5 show more explicitly what the assignments
are. As shown in figure 4, the Department of Commerce has
an overall responsibility for the distribution of data to the
total community. They issued the initial press release on
the phenomenon earlier this year. The Department of Transpor-
tation has obvious interest with respect to the use of
graphite in automotive applications and that potential is
very great. Our interest at NASA is very straight-forward -
we are supporting the aerospace applications and the overall
technology associated with what one might do to modify the
9
CARBON FIBERS ACTION PLAN
AGENCY ACTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
AGENCY	 RESPONSIBILITIES
• INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
*MARKET SURVEY
DOC	 • DATA BASE MAINTENANCE
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EQUIPMENT
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Figure 4
CARBON FIBERS ACTION PLAN
AGENCY ACTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
AGENCY
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EPA - *ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY
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•ACCIDENT ASSISTANCEDCPA
• INCIDENT ANALYSIS
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DOS *INTERNATIONAL ADVISORIES
Figure 5
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material to alleviate the problem. The Department of Energy
is concerned with possible effects of fiber release on power
generation and transmission systems. Figure 5 shows the
responsibilities of the other involved agencies.
j
	
	
The NASA responsibilities are further defined in figure 6.
The first is the subject of this meeting - to quantify the
'risk associated with the use of graphite bearing composites,
in particular with respect to their use in aircraft. In
addition, we have an explicit responsibility for research on
materials modification which would eliminate the potential
for the release of free graphite fiber from composites.
NASA is also responsible for management support of the
national program.
CARBON FIBER ACTION PLAN
NASA RESPONSIBILITIES
• RISK ASSESSMENT/AIRCRAFT PROTECTION
• LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER
• MATERIALS MODIFICATION AND ALTERNATE MATERIALS
• AMES RESEARCH CENTER
• JET PROPULSION LABORATORY
• LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER
• LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER
• MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
•OSTP MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
• NASA HEADQUARTERS
Figure 6
Let me amplify for a moment that portion of the study
which we will not discuss further in this meeting. That is
the material modification program which is being conducted
jointly by the five NASA Centers indicated on figure 6 and
amplified on figure 7. There are two portions to the program.
The first has to do with what one might do for relatively
simple changes to existing materials systems so that the
risk would be significantly reduced. These tasks are pre-
dominantly being performed at Ames, Lewis and Langley Research
Centers in an in-house program supplemented with industrial
11
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Figure 7
and university contracts. In addition, we have a program
which involves all five Centers and is searching for longer
term solutions which might use different materials. These
latter approaches inherently have a longer lead time and might
provide new materials with different structural performance,
as well as alleviation of free graphite fibers.
In perspective then, the NASA roles are to quantify the
risk with respect to the commercial aircraft use of composites
and at the same time to find methods of modifying the mate-
rials so that the problem is not inherent with their use.
But there is a further perspective, since by and large the
development of composites and their early industrial utiliza-
tion were fostered by government participation, particularly
by the DOD and NASA. Our obligation transcends the limited
view of aerospace. A way of envisioning this is shown in
figure 8, which is a forecast of the potential market for
advanced composite materials. When first used, aerospace,
particularly DOD, applications clearly predominated. In
contrast, sporting goods clearly make up the larger part of
the current market. In the future, there will be an interim
period in which aircraft applications may again become
predominant, but in the long run, non-aerospace applications
will vastly exceed their use in aerospace. So we need to
leave a legacy of knowledge that assures the user that he
12
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'can use the material, that it has a benefit that is substan-
tial, and that the risk is low in utilization of the material.
jIn perspective, this legacy is what this meeting is about.
13
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RISK ANALYSIS APPROACH
Robert J. Huston
Manager, Graphite Fibers Risk Analysis Program Office
NASA Langley Research Center
I would like to introduce the presentation of this activity
at Langley by presenting an outline which you can use as a road
map of the work that you are going to hear about for the rest of
the day. Our program objective is identified in figure 1. We
have said it several times already, but basically it is to quantify
the national risks associated with accidental release of carbon
fibers (CF) from civil aircraft having composite structures.
Because of the sparsity of CF on current civil aircraft, we are
looking ahead 15 years. As a part of determining the national
risk, we will be looking for potential equipment damage on civil
aircraft and, therefore, we will assess the need, if any, to pro-
tect civil aircraft from accidentally released carbon fiber.
CARBON FIBER HAZARD RISK ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
QUANTIFY RISK ASSOCIATED WITH ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF CARBON FIBERS FROM
CIVIL AIRCRAFT HAVING COMPOSITE STRUCTURES
ASSESS THE NEED FOR PROTECTION OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT TO ACCIDENTALLY RELEASED
CARBON FIBER
Figure 1
What requirements do we have on a risk assessment?
First, as shown in figure 2, we must develop an accident
scenario and associated probabilities. This involves integrating
both known data and judgements from experts in a logical
15
framework. We must explicitly state the assumptions and the
source of the data so that we can assess the conservatism of
the data inputs and of the judgements. Second, we must
estimate public risk in a very systematic manner. Once an
estimate is made, we can then determine the significance of
any assumptions by sensitivity analysis, and we can quantify the
uncertainty in the risks through evaluation of our assumptions,
data, inaccuracies in the data, and the technical judgements
that have gone into the analysis. This systematic framework
also allows us the opportunity of evaluating risk reduction
strategies. We have already mentioned one such strategy,
the alternate materials program, which is a strategy to
develop alternates to current graphite epoxy composites
where the mechanism of release of graphite fibers from the
composite is modified or the airborne characteristics of
the fibers are changed in a favorable way. Other strategies
such as protection of a substantial portion of the electrical
equipment in the U.S. might be offered (as a ridiculous
option) but some acceptable option could be developed.
The final requirement on our risk assessment is that we
perform the analysis in such a manner that we can make
comparisons of the benefit of carbon fiber with the risk and
that we can assess the risk against other risks of which we
are familiar in other areas.
RISK ANALYSIS
DEVELOPS ACCIDENT SCENARIOS AND ASSOCIATED PROBABILITIES
INTEGRATES KNOWN DATA AND JUDGEMENT FROM EXPERTS IN A LOGICAL
FRAMEWORK
EXPLICITLY STATES ASSUMPTIONS
ESTIMATES PUBLIC RISK IN A SYSTEMATIC MANNER
DETERMINES SIGNIFICANCE OF ASSUMPTIONS BY SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
QUANTIFIES UNCERTAINTY
PERMITS EVALUATION OF RISK REDUCTION STRATEGIES
PERMITS COMPARISON WITH BENEFITS AND OTHER RISKS
Figure 2
Let us look now at the scenario that we have adopted as
of interest for the accidental release of carbon fiber from
16
civil aircraft. Figure 3 illustrates the scenario that we see
is important for the air transport aircraft. We are hypoth-
esizing accidents of civil aircraft, usually near major
airports, where the efflux from the burn of an aircraft
containing composite has an opportunity to be distributed
downwind and to contaminate the airport terminal facilities and
air traffic control and ground control approach systems.
This efflux has an opportunity of being carried into shopping
centers, banks, local businesses, and into the homes of
private individuals, where household appliances could be
affected by the released graphite fibers. We have to be
concerned with public service areas, such as telephone
exchanges and hospitals, as well as manufacturing and transportation
facilities. Of course, one item ties all of these together.
This network is the power distribution system of the various
utility systems.
RISK ANALYSIS SCENARIOS
COAL/ 01 L/ GAS
NUCLEAR POWER•	 \ ELECTRIC GENERATION
GENERATION
COMMERCIAL
— ,—_.POWEIi	 t
DI STRI BUT ION
SYSTEMS	 CONSUMER/> XAERONAUTI CAL
FACILITIES
_	 SHOPPING	 PUBLIC
a	 CENTER	 SERVICE
MANUFACTURING
TRANSPORTATION
i
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Figure 3
Another dimension of the risk analysis is illustrated
by the risk analysis flow chart shown in figure 4. Six
elements are associated with the physical phenomena of the
accidental release. I will go through this in a little more
'detail, step by step, and since this conference is organized
along the lines of this chart, I will only mention that
basically I am referring to the source of carbon fiber, the
potential dissemination of carbon fiber, the life of the
released fiber (which may result in a potential redissemination
that might cause a problem at a later time), the transfer of
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CF from the exterior of enclosures to the interior, and the
vulnerability of equipment associated with the various areas
of importance identified in the risk analysis scenario. In
the final step, we must relate the demographic data with the
density of equipment in homes and businesses to determine
cost impacts.
R I S K	 A N A L Y S I S	 F L O W
REDISSEMINATION
SOURCE
FIBER LIFE
DISSEMINATION
TRANSFER FUNCTION 	 I DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
VULNERABILITY
COST RISK
Figure 4
Looking at the element of source, figure 5, this first
area covers the release of carbon fibers. Within the context
of a risk assessment, we must determine the quantity of
released fibers and their character. In order to determine
the quantity of released carbon fibers, we must first project
the use of carbon composites in the future. You have seen
some projections earlier. We must then estimate the most
likely locations and magnitude of accidents as well as the
type of accident. It is important, in determining the
release of graphite fiber, to know whether the accident was
a crash burn, or a burn explode, or a total demolition at
contact. We have National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
data on accidents, but we are currently investigating, in depth,
the details of all U.S. built jet transport accidents on which
to base a better analysis. Fiber release is influenced by a
number of factors: fire size and temperatures, the length of the
fire, the nature and the character of composite material, and
where it is used in the aircraft. Finally, the character of the
released fibers must be determined. The character of the fibers
includes the mass of fiber released, the form (single fibers,
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clumps, clusters, and strips), and the length and diameters
of single fibers.
Figure 5
Given that fibers are released as single fibers or in
other forms, the fibers will be carried off by the fire
plume, as shown in figure 6. They will be carried up and
away from the location of the fire or, if by an explosion,
projected away from the source of the fire and then dispersed
downwind from the accident scene. This dispersion can be
characterized in several ways; one way is by looking at
footprints of concentration of fibers, or by exposure. Some
of the key elements involved in the dispersion estimates
include the fire plume development, which depends upon the
weather, the amount of fuel burned, and the rate of burn.
The items that affect the dispersion of the cloud of fibers
downwind from the fully developed fire plume include the
weather and the fall rate or settling rate of the released
fiber.
The footprints are presented in terms of exposure, as
defined in figure 7, since exposure has been found to be the
key parameter in the probability of failure of electrical
equipment.
One element that must be included in our final risk
assessment and has not been included to date is the long
term effects of released fibers, which conceivably could be
redisseminated by winds or through mechanical agitation.
Let me say simply that in addition to the potential for
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redissemination, we would expect that the character of
released fiber might change with time. Figure 8
shows an hypothesis about the change in character of the
length spectrum with time. A later speaker will discuss this
in more detail.
"FIBER LIFE"
REDISSEMINATION
NUMBER
OF FI BERS :::	 HYPOTHESI S
lb RELEASED
LENGTH
NUMBER
OF FIBERS
lb RELEASED
LENGTH
Figure 8
Eventually, the released carbon fiber will reach homes,
businesses, and factories, and we must estimate what interior
fiber concentration or exposure will result. Figure 9
illustrates the expected effect, though a number of factors
influence the actual values of what we call transfer function.
Some of the factors that affect the transfer function include
the use or nonuse of air-conditioning, the condition of
windows (opened or closed) in buildings, natural ventilation,
the fall rate of fibers, and generally the nature of air
circulation and what kind of filtration, if any, is used in
buildings.
Once fiber concentrations are carried to electrical
equipment, the electrical conductivity of the fiber can
result in a hazard to susceptible equipment. The probability
of failure for a couple of assumed examples is illustrated
in figure 10 and has been experimentally determined to
follow the exponential relationship cited on the definition
chart (figure 7).
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For the risk assessment, we must categorize susceptible
equipment into classes and categories appropriate for investigation
in risk models. This means that we must determine the
susceptibility and vulnerability of a wide range of equipment
in the very diverse areas covering household, business, and
industrial electrical equipment. Let me point out that the
values shown here are simply selected for illustration and
the subsequent speaker will show some data on a range of
civilian equipment that might be involved in a carbon fiber
problem. Let me also point out that this is plotted in a
little different form from that you sometimes see; that is,
the probability of failure is represented on a log plot,
which gives you an S- shaped curve in contrast to the ex-
ponential form on a linear plot that most researchers in
this area utilize.
Finally, we must combine the physical models with our
demographic model in such a way as to obtain a suitable
measure of risk. One such measure is the risk profile
illustrated in figure 11 which gives the annual probability
of exceeding a given dollar damage as a function of the
dollar damage. Since you are going to see a few of these
over the next couple of days, I thought it might be appropriate
to give you a simple example. Basically, at a point on the
abscissa representing, for example, a million dollars, or
whatever number you want to choose, the ordinate gives the
probability of exceeding the million dollars in a given
year. This representation might be unfamiliar to some who
have not studied risk analysis in the past but it has been
used as a typical measure in analyses that have been done in
the areas of nuclear power and liquid natural gas transportation.
Let me now outline our approach to the risk analysis
program. (See figure 12.) A central portion of our effort is
to develop an adequate data base for a credible analysis.
In many areas, before we can actually generate data, we must
perform what we call pathfinder studies to determine what
data should be obtained. These pathfinder studies, for
example, involve looking at specific types of electrical
equipment, determining in what manner they might be exposed
to carbon fibers, and determining what kind of test is
needed. We have the capability to assess the vulnerability of
electrical equipment by exposing the equipment in a fiber
chamber but in some cases we have found that other methods
can be used. They will be discussed in a later presentation.
When you first study a new area, you must quantify the new
area. We have found that it is necessary to go out and
physically survey hospitals, telephone exchanges, and factories
in order to determine in what area we need to make measurements.
The data and pathfinder studies are being used in our analysis
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effort to determine the risk to the United States as a
whole. Our first phase analysis effort has primarily been
one to develop an adequate methodology in which we have
confidence, and to make an interim risk estimate. This
activity of our risk analysis has resulted in two studies
that you will hear reported on tomorrow. We anticipate
continuing these first phase studies through most of the
rest of the calendar year. Our second phase efforts will
include evaluating studies that we have currently underway
and data that are expected to be generated in the near future.
Our plans in each area will be covered by subsequent speakers.
We will also be using data being developed by other government
agencies, such as the studies of the Department of Energy in
the power distribution area. Finally we anticipate performing
some tests to allow us an opportunity for verification of
the physical model used in the risk analysis. We are, at this
time, in the initial development of what could be described
as a contained end-to-end test which will be discussed by
the last speaker of the day. We are also assessing the need
for a full scale outdoor end-to-end test. One final item,
our program allows for us to evaluate the material characteristics
that are coming out of the alternate materials programs that
Dr. Harris described in the second presentation of this
conference. If necessary, we can assess the reduction in
risk that might be associated with any particular alternate
material.
We have a number of participants on the risk assessment
program, as shown on figure 13. Without going into detail,
I would like to just check off the list and try to indicate
where the work is going on. The Fire Products Division of
AVCO, in Massachusetts, is working with us on developing chamber
test methods for fire testing materials to determine the
characteristics of released graphite fibers. The Ballistic
Research Laboratory (BRL), at Aberdeen, Maryland, has been
working with us on vulnerability testing of equipment and on
transfer function measurements. We have been quite heavily
dependent upon that activity in the past for much of our
data. The Bionetics Corporation, Hampton, Virginia, has
been performing pathfinder studies and analysis that has led
us to identify many areas in which additional data are needed.
They have also identified areas where we can short cut some
of the laborious paths that we have had to follow to analyze
the risk. The commercial aircraft manufacturers, Boeing,
Douglas, and Lockheed, have been assisting us by supplying
information on potential uses of carbon composites in the
future and in details of aircraft accidents. They are studying
the airplane accidents of all jet airplanes that they have
built. They have detailed data on these accidents in their
files and are correlating that data with NTSB accident data
so that we can have a better understanding of how much of an
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aircraft actually burns. We need to know what the opportunity is
for a wing tip or an elevator to be involved in an actual fire.
In addition, as part of the risk analysis activity and as a part
of assessing the need for protection to civil aircraft, they are
studying the susceptibility of electrical equipment in their cur-
rent and future air transport aircraft to determine how vulnerable
aircraft are and what protection may be needed. In the source
area, the Dahlgren Naval Surface Weapons Center in Virginia has
been testing a number of material specimens, as well as aircraft
components, to determine released fiber characteristics. They are
also participating in our end-to-end test activity that you will
hear about this afternoon. The Dugway Proving Ground in Utah has
been assisting us in calculations of dissemination and in predic-
tion of the life and redissemination of fibers. The later data
have been obtained from measurements at a site where fibers were
released outdoors several years ago. The Jet Propulsion Laborator-,
has been looking at some innovative ideas for released fiber sensil
instrumentation. We have a considerable problem with instrumenta-
tion. Dick Heldenfels mentioned earlier that you can look right
at fibers and not see them. When fibers are in concentrations
high enough that you can see them, such as you may have in a
fiber chamber, you can hardly count them, and we actually have to
count the fibers to determine the number of fibers released. The
techniques to date have been primarily through manual counting. We-
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are trying to develop some instrumentation that will allow us to
do this a little faster. I should point out that Dugway Proving
Ground has been instrumental in providing this type of counting.
We have A. D. Little of Massachusetts, ORI of Maryland, and George
i Washington University assisting us in analysis. The National
(Bureau of Standards is assisting us in a study of household appli-
ances. Many household appliances can be tested by a simpler
,method than a carbon fiber chamber. The National Bureau of Standards
ihas been tasked in the national carbon fiber program, with responsi-
bility for evaluating household equipment, and is assisting NASA by
determining vulnerability. Science Applications Inc., of California,
under contract to the Ames Research Center, is supporting our pro-
gram by providing fire dynamics and plume models. Finally, TRW Inc.
of California has been analyzing data for us from the large scale
burn tests they performed for the Air Force at the Navy's China
Lake, California, facility. I should note that we are using data
generated by other programs, such as the alternate materials pro-
gram. The Ames Research Center has some burn facilities at their
installation and has been supplying us with data from these facil-
ities. In addition, we will take advantage of data generated by
,
other agency efforts in the federal program such as the Department
of Energy's activity on carbon fiber effects on power system
elements.
The agenda for the remaining presentations in the conference
Sis presented in figure 14.
BRIEFING OUTLINE
SOURCE
1	 CARBON FIBER AND COMPOSITE USAGE
-	 RICHARD PRIDE
1	 FIBER RELEASE MECHANISM
-	 DR, VERNON BELL
DISSEMINATION,	 FIBER LIFE,
	 REDISSEMINATION -	 DR. WOLF ELBER
TRANSFER FUNCTION, VULNERABILITY
-	 ISRAEL TABACK
END-TO-END TESTING
-	 RICHARD PRIDE
ANALYSIS
1	 OVERVIEW
-	 DR.	 KAREN CREDEUR
/	 PATHFINDER SURVEYS
-	 ANNEL BUTTERFIELD
1	 ORI STUDY STATUS
-	 DR.	 LEON POCINKI
1	 A.	 D.	 LITTLE STUDY STATUS
-	 DR, ASHOK KALELKAR
-	 DR,	 JOSEPH FIKSEL
CONCLUSIONS
-	 ROBERT HUSTON
QUESTION AND ANSWER PANEL
-	 SPEAKERS
Figure 14
27
Page intentionally left blank 
GLASS
BORON
GRAPHITE
PRD-49
M A T R I X
EPDXY
POLYIMIDE
ALUMINUM
STRENGTH COSTSTIFFNESS WEIGHT
F I LAMENT
4
CARBON FIBERS AND COMPOSITES
Richard A. Pride
NASA Langley Research Center
With the wide diversity of technical disciplines represented
at this Risk Analysis conference, it seemed appropriate to present
a paper discussing the basic nature of composite materials. Car-
bon fiber composites and their area of current and planned appli-
cation in civil aircraft will be discussed, specifically to set
the framework for the papers which follow dealing with various
aspects of the risk analysis. In the area of composites, there
are two elements, filaments and matrices, that have to be combined
to make these kinds of materials (figure 1). Glass filaments
have been available for a number of years and have been a part of
composite materials, getting widespread usage on the current gen-
eration of commercial transport aircraft in such things as fairings
and other lightly-loaded or non-load-carrying structures to a
large extent. Glass is not generally considered to be a high per-
formance fiber in the sense of the rest of the filaments listed
here; boron, graphite, and PRD-49, or Kevlar, as it is known today.
Of all these fibers or filaments that are currently in use in com-
posite materials, only the graphite is electrically conductive.
Therein lies the problem. Graphite filaments have very desirable
mechanical and physical properties and they are potentially cheap
COMPOSITE MATERIALS
FILAMENT
	 PRE-IMPREGNATED TAPE
	 LAMINATED STRUCTURE
Figure 1
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to produce, so they may be used in many applications where the
other filaments may not.
All of the filaments must be combined with matrix materials
in order to make up a structural composite material. There are a
variety of matrix materials around that are being used today in
different applications; however, the one that we are primarily
concerned with is epoxy. The epoxy matrix is the kind of material
that is used in most of the commercial applications of composite
materials. Polyimides and the aluminum-alloy matrices are gen-
erally used for special applications or for high temperature ap-
plications.
The first step is to combine a matrix and a filament into
what we call a preimpregnated tape. The filaments are collimated
into a parallel layup, and the matrix is worked in around them and
partially cured so that it will stay in place with subsequent
handling. For greatest ease in handling, the tape should have a
reasonable amount of tackiness to hold it in place in the lami-
nated structure. This tape material in which the fibers are all
running parallel then can be worked into a laminate--cut up and
stacked into multiple plies or layers so that the different layers
or plies of the material have the fibers in various orientations.
After a build up of a laminated structure of this type, it is pro-
cessed through a high temperature and high pressure curing cycle
in an autoclave. The final product then is a composite laminated
structure which has significant improvements over the existing
aluminum alloy structures in terms of such things as strength and
stiffness; it weighs significantly less, and it has the potential
for having a final cost, after manufacturing, of less than the
finished manufactured cost of aluminum hardware in the aircraft
business.
Of these types of improvements, the only one that has not been
adequately demonstrated to date is cost. There have been a number
of technology programs in existence for the last ten or twelve
years in which strength, stiffness, and weight savings have been
adequately demonstrated on parts by design, manufacture, and test.
The cost bubble on all these technology programs has always been
significantly more than the cost of an equivalent kind of item in
metal, but considering the fact that cost represents, in most of
these cases, a first item - a first article type of cost, it in-
cludes a lot of technology development and a lot of learning on
the part of the people who are designing and manufacturing these
articles. It is not surprising that these costs would be high.
The projections on cost based on these programs have always been
very attractive. Unfortunately, it is difficult to get good hard
data that will allow one to establish whether these projections
are real or not.
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There is one other area that has been of some concern in terms
of going to extended applications of composites in the aircraft
business and that is the long term durability. It is well known
that on a short term basis, the advantages of strength, stiffness,
and weight saving exist; the question is how well these advantages
will hold up in the 15 to 20 years that the composite part will
have to be in service if it goes on a commercial airplane. So,
the program that I am going to be talking about subsequently will
be addressing those two issues, the long term durability and the
cost item.
About six years ago, NASA started a program with the Boeing
Company in which the spoilers of the 737 transport aircraft were
selected for redesign with graphite-epoxy composite. The alumi-
num skins on those spoilers were replaced with graphite-epoxy
skins; the rest of the spoiler structure was retained exactly the
same as it was in the aluminum production spoilers. A flight arti-
cle was obtained which was qualified by test and certificated by
the FAA for its airworthiness. These spoilers, shown in fig-
ure 2, were roughly 0.6 x 1.3 m (22 x 52 inches) in planform, had
graphite-epoxy skin. aluminum honeycomb core. aluminum hinges and
an aluminum leading-edge spar. The total spoiler weight was ap-
proximately 6 kg (13 pounds), of which 35 percent is composite
material.
FLIGHT SERVICE DATA
'AIRCRAFT COMPONENT AIRLINE
4	 16 ALOHA
6	 24 LUFTHANSA
4	 16 NEW ZEALAND
NATIONAL
8	 32 PIEDMONT
1	 4 PSA
4	 16 VASP
INITIATED JULY 1973
COMPONENT DATA
22 x 521n., 7.5 sq ft
GRAPHITE/EPDXY/ALUMINUM HONEYCOMB,
ALUMINUM HINGES & SPAR
13 Ib 35% COMPOSITE
17% WEIGHT SAVED
4 PER AIRCRAFT
Figure 2
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A 17 percent weight saving on these spoilers was obtained by just
replacing the skins. Boeing manufactured 108 of these to be in-
stalled, four per aircraft, on 27 commercial airplanes. The ini-
tial installations were in the airlines that are listed in figure
2 on some of their fleet of 737 transport aircraft. Shortly after
the program started, PSA sold four of their 737's to a Brazilian
airline, VASP, with the graphite spoilers that were attached.
Subsequently, PSA sold their one remaining 737 with graphite-epoxy
spoilers to Frontier Airlines.
Spoiler flight service was initiated in 1973, and over 5
years of flight service have been achieved on most of these com-
ponents. Boeing composite engineers have periodically inspected
all of them on the aircraft. In addition, through a scheduled re-
moval system, selected spoilers are removed from service annually,
shipped back to the factory at Boeing, and thoroughly inspected by
ultrasonics. These spoilers are then tested to destruction to
determine if any changes have occurred in residual strength after
service, compared with the initial strengths that were established
in the original test program. After 5 years of this type of in-
spection, the graphite-epoxy spoiler is still looking good, the
durability is still good, and a long service life is projected.
Again, this was not a cost-type program, it was strictly a program
to generate confidence in the long term durability of these material;
Figure 3 shows another component of a similar nature, the
COMPOSITE UPPER AFT RUDDER FOR OC-10 TRANSPORT
GRAPHITE-EPDXY UPPER AFT RUDDER
Figure 3
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graphite-epoxy upper aft rudder, which is flying on eight DC-10
transport aircraft on selected airlines, also to establish some in-
formation about the long-term durability. A close-up of this rud-
der is shown in figure 4. The rudder is over 3.6 m (12 feet) tall.
The black portion of this rudder is all graphite-epoxy; there are
aluminum hinge fittings on it, the white portions on the leading
edge, the trailing edge, and at the top are fiber-glass fairings,
but all the rest of it is graphite-epoxy. It represents a rather
significant piece of hardware; it is manufactured in a rather
innovative type process that molds the complete graphite structure
in a single one-piece operation. This is the kind of manufacturing
that brings down the number of man-hours required in assembly of
pieces of sheet metal by riveting, and therefore projects a cost-
effective method of manufacturing for a finished piece of hardware
like this rudder. Of the eight rudders that are in service, some
have been flying as long as 2 1/2 years and the service experience
with these has been entirely satisfactory. They are also inspected
on a periodic basis by both airline maintenance and Douglas com-
posite engineers.
Figure 4
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The first civil production commitment to composites that has
occurred right from the very beginning of the design of a new air-
craft happens to be with the Sikorsky S-76 helicopter, shown in
figure 5. In this figure the three prototype helicopters that are
being used in the flight certification program are shown. The main
spar of the tail rotor is graphite-epoxy. There is a graphite-
epoxy reinforcement of the spar of the horizontal stabilizer. Ther
is also graphite-epoxy in a reinforcing mode in several of the
doors and fairings in the forward portion of the helicopter, and
there is a graphite-epoxy linkage in the root end of the main rotor
blade system. All in all, there is somewhere between 20 and 23 kg
(45 and 50 pounds) of graphite-epoxy composite in this production
commitment by Sikorsky to this new helicopter. It is expected to
have widespread usage, initially in the oil field support role,
and later branching out into a much larger area of civil applicatio:
Several years ago, NASA decided to try and accelerate the tech
nology development of key areas for fuel savings through the ACEE
(Aircraft Energy Efficiency) program. One part of this program is
the ACEE composite structures which is trying to establish a firm
base for manufacturing cost projections on selected components.
The ACEE composites program deals with two sets of civil aircraft
structures - secondary structures and medium primary structures.
FIRST PRODUCTION COMMITMENT OF GRAPHITE-EPDXY
TO CIVIL AIRCRAFT - SIKORSKY S-76 HELICOPTER
Figure 5
34
Components in the secondary structures area are shown in figure 6.
The elevator on the 727 was selected by Boeing as a demonstration
article for the manufacturing development program. Douglas selected
the upper aft rudder on the DC-10, because based on the experience
of the first 10 rudders that had been manufactured in the R&D pro-
gram, they believed that there were some significant changes which
could be made in their manufacturing technique, and which would do
an even better job of driving the manufacturing costs down on an
article of that type. Lockheed chose the aileron on the L-1011,
and that also is a graphite-epoxy component and is being worked
very hard at the present time in both design and manufacturing.
These three secondary structural components have some rather
interesting characteristics, as shown in figure 7. The design
weight of the composite part is the total weight of that part as
it would be installed on the aircraft. In the case of the elevator,
the weights are for only one-half of the elevator, which was all
that was in the early part of the development program. For a
flight article a complete ship set is needed, so those weights
would be doubled. There are some rather significant poundages in-
volved here as compared with the original flight service component
weights of the spoilers. The aileron weight is also a single,
left-hand unit weight. For a ship set for flight, a minimum of
two ailerons would be needed. The interesting thing here is the
expected weight savings of 25 to 33 percent, which has now been
verified in several of these articles. That is significant from
the standpoint that weight saving translates directly in a retro-
fit program into fuel savings, or into increased payloads. For
a new design with these kinds of materials and these kinds of
weight savings in hand right from the beginning, a synergistic
effect will produce even greater benefits than just the direct
weight savings on that particular component.
The last column of figure 7 gives the carbon-epoxy composite
weight in each of these components. In every case, the amount of
composite that is used is a relatively small part of the total
component weight. That is because of items like metal hinges and
fittings that just cannot be replaced in the present state of
technology, and in these kinds of secondary structures they ac-
count for a significant part of the total component weight. But
even for this situation, significant weight savings are obtained
on the total component. The carbon fiber weight in these components
is about 70 percent of the carbon-epoxy composite weight in the
last column. The epoxy matrix is the other 30 percent. One gram
of carbon fiber, if broken or cut into one centimeter lengths,
will produce about one million individual fibers, or one pound
will yield about one billion fibers. Even at small fractions of
fiber released in a fire accident, there may be large numbers of
single carbon fibers released from the kind of poundages of
structures that are shown.
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ACEE COMPOSITE SECONDARY STRUCTURES
COMPONENT
COMPOSITE DESIGN
ESTIMATED WT,
LB
EXPECTED
WT,	 SAVINGS
%
CARBOi^'-EPDXY
COMPOSITE ESTIMATED
WEIGHT,	 LB
727 ELEVATOR 211 26 49
DC-10 RUDDER 61 33 27
L-1011 AILERON 105 25 55
Figure 7
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BOEING 137 COMPOSITE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER
Turning next to the composite primary structural components,
figure 8 shows pictures of the selected components. For these
ACEE programs, the aircraft companies selected a horizontal stabi-
lizer on the 737, the vertical stabilizer on the DC-10, and the
vertical fin on the L-1011. These begin to get to be sizeable
pieces of structure, up to 7.6 m (25 feet) long. The estimated
weights on these components, given in figure 9, are significantly
greater than those for the secondary components. The weight
savings are not as great because it is primary structure and more
attention has to be paid to load-carrying capabilities, as opposed
to just stiffness. The weight savings are still very significant
in the 20 to 27 percent range, as opposed to the 25 to 33 percent
for the secondary structures. But a more significant factor is
the much larger percentage of the total component weight that is
carbon composite. As the components get larger, the metal fittings
become less in terms of the percentage of weight that is involved.
All six of these ACEE programs are still very active. They
are driving towards developing the manufacturing expertise on these
types of components that will be building multiple components and
are tracking the costs throughout all the operations in manufac-
turing so that a reasonable type of learning curve can be obtained.
The preliminary indications are that in almost every case, at some
reasonable number of units downstream, these composite components
would become cost effective; that is, they would be cheaper to make
a
DOUGLAS DC 10 COMPOSITE VERTICAL STABILIZER' ' LOCKHEED L 1011 COMPOSITE VERTICAL FIN
Figure 8
37
ACEE COMPOSITE PRIMARY STRUCTURES
COMPONENT
COMPOSITE DESIGN
ESTIMATED WT,
LB
EXPECTED
WT,	 SAVINGS
%
CARBON-EPDXY
COMPOSITE ESTIMATED
WEIGHT,	 LB
737 HOR,	 STAB. 183 27 163
DC-10 VERT,	 STAB, 743 20 489
L-1011 VERT,	 FIN, 645 25 503
Figure 9
as composite parts to put on the aircraft than the existing
aluminum parts for that same aircraft. It is kind of a preliminary,
estimate in this stage of the game. The programs all have a year
or more to go before they have the final cost figures and about
all that can be said is that it looks optimistic at this stage
that the manufacturing costs are going to be down on these types
of elements.
The final figure, figure 10, outlines briefly some of the
principal areas of projected usage in civil aviation for graphite
composite. Dr. Harris `
 talk presented several curves that pro-
jected the total aerospace poundage that might be used in the
years 1990 to 1993. The bulk of that usage is going to come in
transport aircraft. Using things like the ACES technology on
empennage components, on control surface components, and wing
trailing edge structure, and applying that technology on the next
generation of aircraft will project usages of at least the order
of 450 kg (1000 pounds) of graphite composite per aircraft. How
rapidly that gets translated into the total fleet, of course, will
depend on sales history. Based on some discussions with the
manufacturers, it appears that by 1993, approximately 500 of the
civil fleet will be carrying significant amounts of graphite
composites in their structures. In the helicopter business, there
probably will be at least as many of the civil helicopters carrying
significant amounts of graphite composites, but the total impact
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in terms of volume or pounds of composites will not be as great
because the total weight of the helicopter structure is not as
great as that of the civil transport aircraft. The percentage
of composite will be large, but the total weight is small so the
total amount of the composites will be relatively small. In the
general aviation portion of the market there will be many more
aircraft manufactured, but to date general aviation has taken a
very small look at the possibilities of advanced composites,
particularly graphite composites for application in their air-
craft. The first area of application will probably be in the
executive aircraft and probably in some of the flight control sur-
faces, borrowing from the technology of the civil transport manu-
facturers to update and upgrade the performance of the executive
type jets that are being produced by general aviation. A big
penetration of composites in this market is not anticipated through
the 1990 time frame. However, it is an area that could grow rapidly.
There are enough aircraft being manufactured that if only a few
pounds were used on each one,it could still get to be significant
total poundage compared to some of the other areas. Sooner or
later they will get the manufacturing costs for their applications
down to where it becomes competitive and then that part of the
civil aviation program will grow rapidly, but at the moment the
big user appears to be the civil transport aircraft in the 1990
time frame.
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Question:
Is there any reason other than material properties that prevents
the manufacturers from using the composites in other components
of the aircraft, say more in the basic structural framework rather
than empennage and wing trailing edge surfaces?
Answer:
I think it is again a question of level of confidence; when you
begin to consider components like the main wing box structure, for
example, you are committing extremely large capital resources to
acquire the facilities to build that kind of structure with
composite manufacturing techniques as opposed to building the
smaller pieces which can be handled pretty much in existing or near
term type facilities. I think it is largely that kind of thing,
plus again some increased concern about the long term durability
of major components which are not so readily repaired or replaced,
if the situation should subsequently require it. The ACEE program
has had three composite wing study contracts, the final reports
are just in the process of being released, and they provided a
preliminary look at this question of what is required and when
could we go to a full wing type structure.
Question:
I understand that the 747 has carbon fiber floor panels. Is that
correct?
Answer-
We have some Boeing representatives here who might care to comment
on that specific question. To my knowledge they are not a pro-
duction commitment at the present time. There are a number of them
that are in-service as part of a company evaluation program of the
performance of these panels, but I do not believe that Boeing has
made a production commitment of these in the 747 line. Would any-
body from Boeing care to comment on that?
Answer.
Cory McMillian, Boeing. That is correct, it is not a production
commitment.
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SOURCE OF RELEASED CARBON FIBERS
	 5
Vernon L. Bell
NASA Langley Research Center
The first of the elements in the Langley risk analysis pro-
gram is concerned with the source of released carbon fibers.
Although there have been, to our knowledge, no crashes of
civilian aircraft containing carbon composite parts, there have
been several crashes of military planes carrying carbon composites
which have demonstrated the high potential for the release of
carbon fibers from the ensuing fires. With this military
experience and the body of accident statistics for commercial
aviation to draw on, we must face the inevitability of crashes
and fires involving commercial aircraft with carbon fiber
composites.
In the absence of actual experience, we have had to study
ways to simulate the conditions of aircraft crash fires in order
to predict the quantities and forms of fibrous materials which
might be released from civilian aircraft crashes/fires. The
following figures will describe some typical fiber release test
activities which have been conducted, together with some very
preliminary results of those activities. Following that, the
status of our knowledge of carbon fiber release from simulated
aircraft fires will be summarized, as well as some of the
uncertainties in our knowledge of accidental fiber release.
Prior to NASA's involvement in the carbon fiber program,
most of the knowledge of carbon fiber release resulted from
investigations by the Navy. This testing is outlined in figure 1.
Most of the fundamental studies of the burning of carbon fiber
composites and fiber release were conducted at the Naval Research
Laboratory, where the rates of composite combustion at low,
moderate, and high fire temperatures were studied. The NRL
researchers also noted the formation of a char, or "coke,"
resulting from the combustion of the epoxy resins. This char was
observed to serve as a binder which tended to prevent the
release of single carbon fibers from the burned composite
residue. When single fibers were released, they were generally
short. The NRL workers observed that some form of agitation was
required to release any significant number of single fibers, and
they also found an effect of thickness; that is, the thinner the
composite, the more readily fibers were released.
The Navy's Dahlgren, Virginia laboratory developed a test in-
volving a burn/explosion cycle for studying carbon fiber release.
From the testing of one square foot flat composite plates in the
chamber, they demonstrated there was a minimal release of carbon
fibers when the composite was burned only, without the explosion.
They showed that the same minimal release resulted when the
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PRE-NASA CARBON FIBER RELEASE TESTING
NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
1 STUDIED COMPOSITE BURNING RATES
1 NOTED EPDXY CHAR BINDER ON FIBERS
1 OBSERVED SHORT LENGTHS OF RELEASED FIBERS
1 NOTED TURBULENCE REQUIREMENT FOR RELEASE OF FIBERS
1 NOTED COMPOSITE THICKNESS EFFECT
NAVAL/DAHLGREN CHAMBER
• DEVELOPED BURN/EXPLODE FOR COMPOSITES
1 DEMONSTRATED MINIMAL RELEASE FROM BURN ONLY
1 DEMONSTRATED MINIMAL RELEASE EXPLODED ONLY
1 OBTAINED 15-20% SINGLE FIBER RELEASE FROM BURN/EXPLODE
Figure 1
composite was impacted explosively, without burning off the
resinous binder. From the burning and exploding of the flat
composite plates, they obtained 15-20o release of single fibers and
lint (clusters of several single fibers), based on the amount of
carbon fibers initially present in the composite.
This Navy work was pioneering and many of the results cited in
the following presentation are in keeping with the Navy studies;
the NASA results generally confirm or quantify those earlier
findings.
The carbon fiber release test facilities listed in Figure 2
are those which have been closely coordinated into a NASA test
program. The laboratory studies, which are of an exploratory
nature, are being conducted at both the Langley and Ames
laboratories of NASA. The chamber studies are those which not only
burn and agitate or impact the composites, but also collect,
measure, and count the fibrous residues which are produced. The
only outdoor or range fiber release testing was done in the spring
of 1978 by TRW, Inc., under the sponsorship of the Air Force and
with the cooperation of the Navy at the Naval Weapons Center,
China Lake, California. Presently, NASA has contracted with TRW
to complete the reduction and analysis of the data resulting from
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NASA CARBON FIBER RELEASE
TEST FACILITIES
LABORATORY	 -	 NASA - LANGLEY
NASA - AMES
CHAMBER	 -	 NASA - AMES
NAVY - DAHLGREN
AVCO CORPORATION
OUTDOOR	 -	 AIR FORCE/NAVY/TRW - CHINA LAKE
Figure 2
those tests, and for that reason, it is considered an ongoing
test activity.
Some typical results from the simulated release of carbon
'fibers from laboratory testing will now be presented.
I
	
The information presented in figure 3 is intended to give a
,perspective on the thermal characteristics of carbon fibers. The
'comparative levels of heat resistance of several carbonaceous
materials are presented by means of the thermogravimetric analysis
'I of the carbon forms. Thermogravimetric analysis simply involves
'the heating of a material at a certain rate and in a particular
environment (in this case at a rate of 5 0C/minute in air) and
measuring the subsequent weight loss. Obviously, diamond is the
most thermally stable form of carbon, although it can still be
burned if it is heated sufficiently high with enough air present.
At the other extreme are the organic resins, in this case epoxy,
which begin to lose weight when heated to a relatively low
temperature, and which are almost completely burned up, except
for a small amount of char, at about 400 0C. Pyrolytic graphite
is a relatively stable form of carbon, and some of the more
"graphitic" fibers, such as GY 70, resist heat almost to the same
degree as pyrolytic graphite. Fibers such as AS and T300 display
thermogravimetric curves virtually identical to that of carbon
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Figure 3
black, confirming the manufacturer's opinions that those products
are carbon, and not graphite, in nature. The lower level of
stability of JP-4 soot probably reflects the incomplete carboniza-
tion of the fuel precursor.
Although thermogravimetry is only a simple tool for studying
thermal behavior of materials, some obvious things are apparent
from this figure. In a fire, the first part of a carbon/epoxy
composite to burn off will be the epoxy resin, and even the epoxy
char will completely burn up before the fibers. Further, if JP-4
soot (or other jet fuel residues) are given off, it's an excellent
bet that carbon fibers will survive the fire and be available for
dispersion. And lastly, it is apparent that the thermal resis-
tance of carbon/graphite fibers differ considerably, and that
difference must be considered in assessing the potential release
of fibers from a fire.
The apparatus shown in figure 4 is called the "Toonerville
Trolley" at Langley, where it was built for the burning of
composites with jet fuel. Most of the early composite burn work
has been performed using "clean" propane fuel, because of the
difficulty in analyzing the results of fiber release when compo-
sites are burned with messy, sooty, kerosene-based fuels. This
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COMPOSITE BURNER
Figure 4
"burner has been used fairly successfully at Langley to burn small
composite samples, about 2" x 2" in size, with the oxidation
;products being carried through the inverted "U" stovepipe into the
chamber at the bottom, where the fibers and large soot particles
are filtered before exiting to the outside.
Figure 5 shows the results of burning several different
I:virgin fibers, not composites, in the Langley oil burner. It is
apparent that the two fibers most commonly used in aerospace
'composites, AS and T300, were completely oxidized in the short time
of 1-1/2 minutes at 800 0C, which is a moderate-to-low JP-4 fuel
, fire temperature. On the other hand, the more so-called
"graphitic" fibers, Celion and HMS, are barely affected by the
fire in the first 1-1/2 minutes, although prolonged exposures of
3 and 10 minutes at 800 0C do burn them to a considerable extent.
However, exposures of Celion and HMS to the hotter fire
temperature of 1000 0C causes large weight loss in rapid order, and
at the very hot JP-4 fire temperature of 1200 0C, even HMS can be
burned completely in short order. These results support the
proposition given previously that the differing thermal behavior
of various fibers must be considered in studying carbon fiber
release from fires.
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The previous figures have shown some results from laboratory
testing, which has been relatively fundamental in nature. The
next investigations to be reported deal with the simulated release
of fibers by means of chamber testing.
The tests at the Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren,
Virginia are conducted in a room within a large hemispherical
chamber. The room is approximately 40 ft x 24 ft in size, with
about 10 ft ceilings, as shown in figure 6. Composite specimens,
preferably about 1 ft 2 in size, are mounted horizontally in the
test fixture in the middle of the room. A propane burner, shown
to the right of the test figure, is swung beneath the sample, which
is burned for the desired time, up to 20 minutes. The burner is
then swung away, and a conically-shaped explosive charge on the
left is swung beneath the burned composite residue and detonated.
The fibers and fragments from the composite are thrown throughout
the room and deposited on 8" x 10" pieces of "sticky" paper laid
out in a grid over the room. The sheets of paper are then removed
and a representative sample of the grid is then counted by a sta-
tistical technique at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. Only single
fibers are precisely counted by that method, but a crude mass bal-
ance of the residue produced from each test is obtained via hand-
pickup, sweeping, and vacuuming.
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NAVY-DAHLGREN CHAMBER TESTS
SAMPLE SIZE:
6 11 x6''OR 12''x12''
FIRE TEMPERATURE
H I GH (21000F)
FIRE FUEL :
PROPANE
IMPACT:
HIGH (2 oz OF C-4
EXPLOSIVE)
BURN/EXPLODE RES I DUE
SECONDARY IMPACTS
FULL RECOVERY
Figure 6
The conditions of this particular test method, from the
standpoint of simulating an aircraft crash/fire scenario, are
considered to be quite extreme. The fire temperature (2100 0F) is
fairly high, and certainly the impact produced by 2 ounces of C-4
explosive must be almost unrealistically high, at least for most
commercial aircraft crashes. An undesirable effect of this test
may be the fact that there is an opportunity for secondary impacts
(against the ceiling and walls) of the blast fragments. However,
a very desirable feature of the Dahlgren test is the complete
recovery of all burn/explosion products.
Six representative fiber release categories designated by the
Dahlgren test personnel are shown in Figure 7. Of most concern to
jdate have been the first two, single fibers and lint consisting of
4
several single fibers clumped together, due to their relatively
low settling rates. The third category, the brush clump which
looks rather like a paint brush, falls at such a rate to probably
preclude its dispersion for long distances. The three blast
fragment categories, arbitrarily divided up by sizes, probably
represent a threat only to open electrical equipment in the
limmediate vicinity of the fire/explosion.
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FIBER RELEASE CATEGORIES
Cate gory Fall Rates
1	 - Sing le Fibers 3.2 cm/sec
-	 2 - Lint 22 cm/sec
3 - Brush/clump 88 cm/sec
4 - Blast Fragments 152 cm/sec
Width 4,e 2 mm
5 - Blast Fragments 167 cm/sec
Width 2-7 mm; Leng th G 25 mm
6 - Blast Fragments 189 cm/sec
Width 7 7 mm, Len gth >17 mm
Figure 7
Prior to NASA's involvement, the Dahlgren test program had
been confined to the burning of simple, flat composite plates.
NASA then initiated a joint test program with the Navy to deter-
mine the relative tendencies for carbon fibers to be released when
real composite aircraft parts are burned. Using the Dahlgren test
chamber and burn/explosion sequence, a number of parts, as listed
on figure 8, have been tested. Of those listed, only the results
from the 737 spoiler and DC-10 rudder tests are complete.
This photograph of the 737 spoiler in figure 9 shows how the
part was cut along the indicated grid of lines into a number of
test specimens. The spoiler itself consists of 6-ply and 8-ply
carbon/epoxy skins, with aluminum honeycomb between the skins.
Since there was also a substantial amount of metal, in the form
of the honeycomb, hinge fittings and frame, and close-out edges,
etc., there was an opportunity to find if such factors as part
thickness, metal content, etc. would influence the amount of single
fiber released from the various specimens. The one-foot rule
shown gives an idea of the size of the part, which is 22" x 52".
The results of the spoiler and rudder burn/explosion tests
have been summarized in figure 10. A very definite finding was
that the bulk of the single fibers released were very short - less
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NASA/NAVY
COMPOSITE PARTS BURN TEST PROGRAM
OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE RELATIVE TENDENCIES FOR FIBER RELEASE FROM ACTUAL COMPOSITE
AIRCRAFT PARTS
0 TEST FACILITY: NAVY CHAMBER AT DAHLGREN, VIRGINIA
TEST PROCEDURE: BURN (PROPANE), BURN PLUS EXPLODE
1 PARTS TESTED: A. 737 SPOILER
B. DC-10 RUDDER
C. L-1011 AVF (MISCELLANEOUS TEST SPECIMENS)
D. 747 FLOORING
E. QCSEE FAN BLADE
Figure 8
737 SPOILER USED ICJ BURN TESTS
Figure 9
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RESULTS OF BURN/EXPLODE TESTS ON
COMPOSITE SPOILER AND RUDDER
• SINGLE FIBERS ARE PREDOMINANTLY SHORT (< 3 MM)
0 EXTENDED BURN TIMES YIELD LESS SINGLE FIBERS
• COMPOSITE PARTS WITH NON-COMBUSTIBLES YIELD LESS SINGLE FIBERS
9 FEWER BLAST FRAGMENTS FROM SPOILER AND RUDDER THAN FROM THICK PLATES
• BURN/EXPLOSION OF RUDDER RELEASED 10% SINGLE FIBER
• BURN/EXPLOSION OF SPOILER RELEASED 12% SINGLE FIBER
Figure 10
than 2 millimeters in length. Qualitatively, it was noted that
lengthy burn times resulted in the release of less single fibers,
suggesting that the carbon fibers will burn up if given sufficient
time. It also appeared that those specimens containing large
amounts of noncombustible materials, such as metal and glass
fiber, released less single fibers. The reason is not known, but
perhaps the metal serves in some way as a heat sink to moderate
the thermal effect on the composite; perhaps too, the aluminum
honeycomb softens the impact of the explosive force on the
composite skin.
Not surprisingly, fewer blast fragments were given off from
the thin skins of the spoiler and rudder in contrast to the amount
given off from thick composite plates. Although the amounts of
single fiber released from individual test specimens varied
widely, weighted averages of single fiber released from the rudder
and spoiler tests were loo and 120, respectively. However, it
should be emphasized that these quantities are single fiber only,
and the results do not reflect the amounts of other fibrous
residues which might represent a threat to electrical equipment.
A study to determine the effects of the various materials and
structural parameters of composites on fiber release has also been
conducted using the Navy's Dahlgren facilities. Fiber/resin
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compositions, laminate thickness, and layup configurations have
been investigated by burning and exploding composite panels which
have the variations indicated in figure 11. Although the actual
tests have been completed, quantitative results which will reflect
the relative amounts of fibers released are not yet available.
However, we do have some indication of the relative importance of
the parameters being studied.
COMPOSITE MATERIALS PARAMETERS STUDY
OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE RELEASE OF FIBER FROM RESIN/FIBER, THICKNESS, AND LAYUP
VARIATIONS
APPROACH:	 BURN AND BURN/EXPLODE GRAPHITE/EPDXY PANELS IN NAVY/DAHLGREN CHAMBER;
MEASURE RELATIVE AMOUNTS OF FIBER RELEASE
PARAMETERS: o FIBER/RESIN: T300/5208, AS/3501
o LAMINATE THICKNESS:	 1/16" , 1/8" , 1/4"
o LAYUP: UNIDIRECTIONAL, CROSSPLY, WOVEN
Figure 11
Figure 12 is a photograph of the fiber residue which remained
after a 2" x 2" unidirectional composite sample was burned with
JP-4 fuel in the Langley "Toonerville Trolley" oil burner. The
result is a rather firm, biscuit-like residue which retains the
integrity of the fiber as it was laid up in the fabrication of the
composite panel. It appears that fibers resulting from burned
j unidirectional composites naturally resist being released
individually, either by virtue of the small amount of epoxy char
which binds them together, or else as a result of the "cohesivity"
of the fibers as they lay intimately in contact with each other
for their entire length.
Figure 13 is a photo showing the results of impacting the
unidirectional fiber residue "biscuit" with a .38 caliber prime
load. An impact is required to cause such a fibrous residue to
break up and permit the release of individual fibers.
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FIBER RESIDUE FROM UNIDIRECTIONAL COMPOSITE
Figure 12
IMPACTED RESIDUE FROM UNIDIRECTIONAL COMPOSITE
a
Figure 13
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The photo in figure 14 shows the manner in which the burning
of the epoxy resin from cross-plied carbon/epoxy composites causes
RESIDUE FROM CROSS-PLY COMPOSITE
Figure 14
the individual plies to separate with no impact at all. It is
apparent that the strength of cross-plied composite residues is
very weak in the thickness direction, an observation in keeping
with a knowledge of the mechanical properties of the unburned
composites. Incidentally, the residues resulting from the burning
of cross-plied composites in the crash fire of a military aircraft
were virtually identical to those shown here from a test specimen.
The residue shown in the figure 15 photo resulted from
burning a carbon/epoxy composite fabricated from woven carbon
fiber, a method finding more and more use due to the ease of
working with that form of fiber. Obviously, the weakness in this
form of composite is also in the thickness direction of the
composite, causing the individual plies to fall apart simply by
burning off the adhesive epoxy resin. However, it also appears
that the woven fiber residue must have a great tendency to resist
the release of single fibers unless a substantial impact or
agitation is applied to the burn residue.
Some preliminary results reflecting the effect of composite
thickness on fiber release is shown in figure 16. Although fiber
count from these tests is not yet available, a mass balance which
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RESIDUE FROM WOVEN COMPOSITE
Figure 15
EFFECT OF COMPOSITE THICKNESS ON
RELEASE OF FIBROUS PARTICLES (PRELIM.)
DAHLGREN BURN/EXPLODE TEST
AS/3501 CROSS PLY PANELS
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Figure 16
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EV
includes all forms of fiber residue resulting after the burn/
explosion of six composite panels of three different thicknesses
clearly indicates that the thinner the composite skins, the more
fiber will be burned away. It should be stressed that this would
be expected given the identical flame conditions. Nevertheless,
it lends substance to early observations made by a number of
researchers, included those at the Naval Research Laboratory.
Figure 17 diagrams the fiber release test facility at Redwood
City, California which is being operated for NASA - Ames, and is
just beginning to generate useful fiber release data. The major
portion of the facility is at the right and includes a burner
system using highly radiant gas burners, with provisions for
nitrogen to cool the temperature or to modify the fire environ-
ment. The sample, preferably a 1 foot by 1 foot composite panel,
is mounted horizontally as shown in the fire chamber. After the
sample has been burned for the desired period of time, a
projectile of a chosen weight is dropped from a chosen height and
impacts the center of the burned composite sample. Immediately
upon impact, a cover falls over the impacted sample to contain all
the impact residue. The residue is then collected and counted to
complete the test. At the present time, this facility is
designed only to study burn and impact test cycles. However,
NASA-Ames does plan to modify it to study burn-only situations.
The scrubber-cooler is utilized to remove any carbon fiber which
might be inadvertently carried in the gas flow stream, and a high
FIBER RELEASE TEST FACILITY AT REDWOOD CITY, CALIF,
	
NITROGEN	 AIR/FUEL
	
INLETS	 INLETS
Figure 17
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efficiency filter serves to make certain no fiber is released to
the outside environment.
The photograph in figure 18 shows the state of a burned
composite test panel after the impact. The cross-plied composite
is seen to be severely shattered by the impact, suggesting the
presence of some residual epoxy char has tended to hold the
individual fibers together.
BURNED COMPOSITE TEST PANEL AFTER IMPACT
Figure 18
The photo in figure 19 shows the types of fragments which
were released from the impacted composite panel shown previously.
Not visible to the eye in this photo are any single carbon fibers
which might have been released.
Figure 20 shows the spectrum of lengths of single fibers
which were released from a cross-plied composite burned and
impacted in the Redwood City facility. The histogram clearly
shows that the large majority of fibers released in this test were
very short, less than 3 millimeters in length, and this finding
is in agreement with those results obtained in the Dahlgren test
chamber. However, in this particular test, the energy of impact
of less than 60 foot-pounds must be considered to be very low in
comparison to the explosive impact of the Dahlgren test, and
indeed the amount of single fibers released in this test was very
slight: less than 0.1% of the weight of carbon fiber initially
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vFRAGMENT TYPES RELEASED FROM IMPACTED
COMPOSITE PANEL
Tested at NASA/Ames-Redwood Facility
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Figure 20
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present in the composite panel. Furthermore, the quantity of
total fragments released in this test, less than to of the total
carbon fiber in the composite, was far less than the total frag-
ments released in the Dahlgren test.
Figure 21 pertains to a very interesting and potentially use-
ful test activity being conducted at the Navy's Aircraft
Survivability Laboratory at China Lake. Some of the conditions
which might be present during an in-flight fire are simulated by
placing a 6" x 6" x 1/2" composite panel, which in some cases has
a round hole or notch cut through it and in others has a slot cut
across the entire leading edge of the panel, over a fire box
containing burning jet fuel. Air at various velocities is passed
over the test panel and the rate of composite material loss is
determined. The results shown in this figure show that the rate
of mass loss increases with exposure time and then reaches a
constant rate for each air speed. Presently, the test only
determines mass loss, but plans are being made with the assistance
of NASA - Ames personnel to monitor carbon fiber loss from the
burning panels. Such a test could be very useful in answering
future questions regarding release of carbon fibers from
composite-containing aircraft which would be burning in flight.
SIMULATED IN-FLIGHT COMPOSITE FLAMMABILITY TEST
1.0	 Airflow--^
0,8 225Fire box 
n Knots
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Of	 0,6
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XIOO otsLoss,
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Figure 21
The next series of figures will describe the results of the
only large scale outdoor composite burn tests to have been carried
out to date.
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These tests are outlined in figure 22. TRW began its series
of outdoor burn and fiber release tests for the Air Force by
burning three standard one square foot composite plates in
separate tests, followed by an explosion to impact the fibrous
residue in a unique but simple outdoor facility at their
Capistrana, California Test Site. These tests, which were in-
tended to parallel the conditions of the Dahlgren test, were
conducted in a 15 foot by 15 foot tent with screen walls, thus
allowing for the retention of all but the finest burn/blast
fibers and fragments.
AIR FORCE/TRW OUTDOOR
COMPOSITE BURN AND FIBER RELEASE PROGRAM
o CAPISTRANO
THREE 1 ft 2 X 1/4" PLATES (PROPANE FUEL)
o CHINA LAKE
o THREE COMPOSITE PLATES, 1 ft 2
 X 1/4" (Propane fuel)
o THREE COMPOSITE BARREL BURN TESTS (PROPANE, JP-5 FUEL)
o COMPOSITE SPOILERS BURN TEST (JP-5)
o F-16 COCKPIT BURN TEST (JP-5)
Figure 22
Following those preliminary tests, eight more tests were
carried out at China Lake. First three individual flat plates
were burned with propane, and then a 2 foot diameter by 3 foot
tall composite barrel, consisting of thin 2-ply filament wound
inner and outer skins containing a Nomex honeycomb core, was
burned with propane. That was followed by the burning of two
half-barrels, segmented in the length direction, one first with
propane, and the second with JP-5. The next test involved the
burn of three 737 test spoilers at one time in a very large JP-5
pool fire. Finally, an experimental F-16 cockpit containing
several types of carbon composite pieces was burned in a JP-5
pool fire.
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The photograph, figure 23, of the test site at the Naval
Weapons Center, China Lake, California shows why such a range was
chosen. It was obviously suited for releasing fibers into the
open environment without fear of affecting electrical equipment.
The asphalt test pad at the left was heavily instrumented with
appropriate fiber detection and measuring equipment, and the
desert to the left of the pad was also instrumented for distances
up to 6000 feet.
NAVAL WEAPONS CENTER TEST SITE
Figure 23
The various methods used by TRW to accumulate fiber release
data is summarized in figure 24. The passive methods at the left
resulted in a measure of the deposition of fibrous residues,
while the active instrumentation on the right gave a time
resolution of the fibers released. The sticky paper, which caught
and held the falling fibers, were used as 8" x 10" sheets, 8" x 6'
strips, and 8" wide rolls as long as 200 feet. The fine-meshed
bridal veil fabric was used in several ways. Small cans about
the size of tuna fish cans had both ends removed, and bridal veil
was mounted over one end. The tuna cans were then placed
vertically, normal to the direction of the air flow so that any
fibers in the air flow would pass through the open end of the can
and be trapped on the bridal veil. Bridal veil was also placed
over 8" x 10" vugraph frames and mounted vertically, and it was
even placed over 9' x 10' frames. For one particular test, a
"Jacob's Ladder" 90' x 90' in size was used to suspend 342 bridal-
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METHODS USED TO
DETECT, MEASURE, AND COLLECT CARBON FIBERS
PASSIVE
STICKY PAPER (SHEETS, STRIPS AND ROLLS)
BRIDAL VEIL OVER OPEN-END "TUNA" CANS
BRIDAL VEIL VUGRAPHS (8" X 10")
BRIDAL VEIL FRAMES (9' X 10')
BRIDAL VEIL VUGRAPHS ON 90' X 90'
"JACOBS LADDER"
HAND PICKUP FROM TEST PAD
RANGE SWEEP BRIGADE
ACTIVE
LIGHT EMITTING DIODES
MICROWAVE
BRASS BALL DETECTORS
LADAR
THERMOCOUPLES (SAMPLE AND FLAME)
FLAME VELOCIMETER
PLUS
PHOTOGRAPHY (INFRARED AND VISUAL)
METEROLOGICAL EQUIPMENT
Figure 24
veil vugraphs to monitor a large cross-section of the air flow.
Hand pickups by test personnel gathered burn and blast fragments
from the asphalt test pad, while a "sweep brigade" of all test
personnel covered the desert for up to 6000 feet after the
spoiler burn test, collecting fibrous residues which had been
lofted for such distances.
Of the active techniques, the first three (light emitting
diodes, microwave, and brass ball detectors) monitored the
passage of individual fibers, while the remainder in the list
monitored the fiber and fire clouds. The principle and
operation of the novel brass ball detectors has been presented in
an exhibit at the rear of this hall.
The enlarged photograph of the fibers collected on the bridal
veil of a tuna can collector, figure 25 illustrates the nature of
the fibers given off and collected from the composite barrel burn
test. The size of the mesh is approximately one millimeter, so
you can see that in general, the single fibers are quite short,
perhaps mostly 2-3 millimeters or less (with a few exceptions).
The clustered mass of fibers in the lower right are typical of
many clusters which resulted from the barrel burn test, and could
probably be considered the hallmark of that particular test.
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BARREL TEST S - TUNA CAN RECORD
Figure 25
Figure 26 is a histogram showing the single fiber length
spectrum resulting from the China Lake barrel burn test (no. 8).
Once again, as has been noted for other fiber release tests, the
single fibers collected on sticky paper 3000 feet from the fire
were quite short, the big majority being less than about 5
millimeters.
As mentioned before, the unusual feature resulting from the
burning of the composite barrel with its very thin 2-ply composite
skins was the large number of clusters of individual carbon
fibers. These clusters, which apparently somewhat resembled
"chicken feathers", probably represented more potential numbers of
fibers than the single fibers actually detected. The distribution
of the cluster dimensions in figure 27 shows them to be generally
from about 1/2" x 1/2" in size up to 3-4 inches on a side.
The photograph in figure 28 is of the smoke plume from the
large (40 feet x 60 feet) JP-5 pool fire which was used to burn
the three composite spoilers at China Lake, and it is apparent
that the fire should be considered representative of a rather
vigorous fuel fire which could result from an aircraft crash.
Figure 29 is a diagram of the "Jacob's Ladder" array of
bridal veil vugraphs which was mentioned previously as one of the
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types of passive fiber detection methods. As noted in the figure,
the vugraph frames covered with bridal veil were spaced every
five feet, both horizontally and vertically. Thus, an excellent
monitoring of the fiber concentration in the air is possible. In
the spoiler burn test, it was found that the highest concentra-
tions of fiber were detected by the vugraphs in the lower half
of Jacob's Ladder, and up toward the upper right side of the
Jacob's Ladder.
The spectrum of lengths of fibers which were collected from
the spoiler burn test by bridal veil vugraphs on the Jacob's
Ladder are presented in figure 30. The histogram clearly shows,
as with several previously cited tests, that the majority of the
fibers collected were very short, less than 4 millimeters, with
a very small proportion being over 10 millimeters in length. In
this case, no fibers less than 1 millimeter in length were
counted, since they would have passed through the 1 millimeter
mesh of the bridal veil.
LENGTHS OF FIBER COLLECTED IN
JACOB'S LADDER - CHINA LAKE SPOILER TEST
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If the hallmark of the composite barrel burn test was the
release of a large number of "chicken feather" like fiber
clusters, then the unusual result of the burning of the three 737
spoilers in the large JP-5 pool fire was the release of a large
number of long, narrow, thin carbon fiber strips shown in figure
31. These were collected at distances up to 6000 feet from the
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fire. They were generally of a thickness very close to a single
ply, and were believed to have resulted from the almost explosive
delamination of the cross-plied carbon/epoxy skins of the
spoilers as the resin was violently burned in the intense heat of
the jet fuel. The lengths of the strips, scaled by the 18 inch
rule in the figure, seemed to be close to the length, width, and
diagonal dimensions of the plies within the composite skins.
These strips were lofted to extreme heights (the fire and smoke
plume was estimated to have reached in excess of 2000 feet in
altitude) and then were transported by the wind for up to 6000
feet downwind of the fire site.
The strips from the spoiler burn test were collected by a
range "sweep brigade" composed of the test personnel who, spaced
at arms length, searched the desert downwind from the burn site.
As they collected each strip, the size of the strip and its
precise location on the desert was noted. Thus, an excellent
record and thorough characterization of the strips was obtained.
This unusual strip deposition spectrum shown in figure 32
describes four dimensions of the spectrum. In the foreground is
noted the location of the range where the strips were found, on
the left is the classification of the lengths of the strips, and
the vertical scale gives the additive numbers of strips found in
each length interval. And then a key to the strip width
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spectrum, from 1/8 inch to 2 inches is given in the upper right
portion of the figure. Actually, a large number of strips were
collected from the test pad and also at up to 500 feet from the
fire site, before a record of the strip size and location was
begun. Therefore, if these had been included in the pictured
strip deposition spectrum, they would have increased the numbers
in the left hand portion of the figure to give a more normal
decrease in numbers of fibrous strips from left to right
(decreasing distance from the fire).
Although there is some question as to the degree of success
that was achieved in tracking the dissemination of single fibers
from the China Lake tests, there is no doubt that the formation
and dispersion of large numbers of clusters of fibers (as in the
barrel burn) and the generation and transport of long strips of
fibrous residue (from the spoiler test) created a new awareness of
types of carbon fiber materials other than single fibers which
could, under entirely imaginable situations, represent substan-
tial threats to outdoor electrical equipment.
Now, it is appropriate to present a summary, a little bit
quantitative but mostly qualitative, of some of the findings to
date from our simulated carbon fiber release testing.
5Am -
6000
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First of all, as shown in figure 33, we believe that the
burning of representative aircraft parts which use relatively thin
composite skins, such as the DC-10 rudders and 737 spoilers, will
release about 100 of the weight of the carbon fiber initially
present in the composite in the form of single carbon fibers with
a very high energy impact such as an explosive detonation and
probably less than to for a low energy impact, such as a short
fall of the burning structure to the ground. Secondly, and quite
conclusively to date, the majority of single carbon fibers
released under most fire conditions are very short, generally less
than 3 millimeters. This finding probably will have an effect on
the electrical equipment vulnerability test program.
CONCLUSIONS FROM SOURCE STUDIES
(PRELIMINARY)
• BURNED AIRCRAFT PARTS(DC-10 RUDDER, 737 SPOILER) USING THIN COMPOSITES RELEASE:
ABOUT 10% SINGLE FIBER WITH HIGH ENERGY IMPACT
LESS THAN 1% SINGLE FIBER WITH LOW ENERGY IMPACT
• UNDER MOST FIRE CONDITIONS, MAJORITY OF RELEASED SINGLE FIBERS
ARE VERY SHORT ( <3 mm)
0 THIN CARBON COMPOSITES RELEASE SINGLE FIBERS EASIER THAN DO THICK COMPOSITES
0 SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF CARBON FIBERS IN THIN COMPOSITES MAY BE OXIDIZED IN VERY
HOT FIRES
o CARBON FIBERS (AS, T300) IN COMPOSITES OXIDIZED EASIER THAN "GRAPHITE" FIBERS
(HMS, HTS, GY-70, ETC,)
o AGITATION OF COMPOSITE DURING OR AFTER THE FIRE IS REQUIRED TO RELEASE FREE FIBER
Figure 33
A general observation is that thin carbon composites release
single fibers more readily, in general, than do thick composites;
this probably comes as no surprise to anyone. Furthermore, there
'is strong evidence that substantial amounts of carbon fibers in
thin-skin composites may be completely oxidized in very hot fires.
Along these lines, it has been shown that the carbon fibers AS
and T300, which at this time are most often used in aerospace
composites, are oxidized in fires more readily than are those
higher performance fibers such as HMS, HTS, GY-70, etc. which may
have some graphitic content. And perhaps very importantly,
testing to date has demonstrated most definitely that some as yet
undefined amount of agitation, turbulence, or impact during or
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after a fire is requ i red to release any significant numbers of
free single carbon fibers.
At this time there remain a number of uncertainties concern-
ing the accidental release of carbon fibers from burning
composites which must be resolved before reliable predictions can
be made of how much fiber might be released from actual crash
fires of composite-containing civilian aircraft. These
uncertainties are summarized on figure 34. One uncertainty is
that of just how much of the fiber in a burning composite can be
completely consumed by the fire, and thus be eliminated from
concern. It is planned to study this uncertainty very hard in
testing in the near future. A second uncertainty lies in the
amounts and sizes of single fibers which can be released from
UNCERTAINTIES OF CARBON FIBER RELEASE
i AMOUNT OF CARBON FIBER OXIDIZED IN AIRCRAFT FIRES
1 AMOUNT AND SIZE OF SINGLE FIBER RELEASED FROM FIRES OF VARYING
INTENSITY
1 CHARACTER OF CARBON FIBER RESIDUES (SINGLES, LINT, CLUSTERS, STRIPS)
RELEASED FROM FIRES OF VARYING INTENSITY
/ CORRECT SIMULATION OF AGITATION AND TURBULENCE EFFECTS UPON BURNED
COMPOSITE RESIDUES
1 OPTIMUM TECHNIQUES OF FIRE-FIGHTING AND CONTAINMENT OF COMPOSITE
RESIDUE AT ACCIDENT SITE
Figure 34
fires of varying intensity. Next, the China Lake burn tests have
made us look beyond our initial prime concern with single fiber
release to an equal consideration of other forms of released
fibrous species, such as lint, clusters, and strips which, while
not as transportable through the atmosphere to the great distances
that single fibers will reach, nevertheless may pose substantial
hazards to exposed outdoor high voltage power equipment. In view
of the emerging criticality of turbulence and agitation to the
amount of fiber which can be released from burning composites, it
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is clear that a knowledge of just what form and intensities of
disruption to the burned composite residues can be considered to
be realistic.
The last uncertainty on the list, one which has not been
mentioned until now, pertains to the need to find the optimum
techniques to fight the aircraft crash fires and worthwhile
methods to contain and dispose of the wreckage containing compo-
site debris to minimize the release and spread of carbon fibers.
However, an investigation of those factors is being initiated by
the military services, with some NASA participation; and it is
expected some important and useful information will result from
that program in the near future.
MIR.gTMNS
Question: The question is related to the photograph showing
the residues from the woven composite sample where the
individual plies had come apart. Would the release of
single fibers be less from woven material than from uni-
directional or cross-plied material?
Response: Our feeling is that that is probably true in the
absence of any very high impact. There have been tests run
in the Dahlgren chamber with very high impacts and some of
the results indicate quite the opposite. There are weak-
nesses built in the weaving operation which might tend to
cause more fiber to be released. In just the burn situation,
with the very low impact, it looks like the woven material
is better as far as inhibiting fiber release.
Question: Was reduction in fiber diameter observed?
Response: Yes, from the numbers I've been given in both the
China Lake barrel and the spoiler tests, the fibers went
from an average of 6 1/2 to 7 microns in diameter down to
about 4 microns which represents about a 50o reduction in
the cross section of the fiber.
Question: Are we getting into a health hazard at those
diameters?
Response: I don't know. I thin
are looking into that matter. I
guidelines at around 1 micron in
However there's a region between
people have indicated concern so
in the future.
other government agencies
think they're drawing the
diameter for these particles.
1 and 3 microns where some
it may be a consideration
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Question: Question related to the minimum lengths of fibers
measured.
Response: In some cases where the fibers were collected by
deposition they were counted down to half millimeter in
length. In other cases where they were collected with the
bridal veil, they stopped at one millimeter because that was the
mesh size of the veil. In many of the tests there are very
small particles, almost identical with soot which must have
come from the blasting of the residue. There are fine
particles but we have not addressed the size of them.
Response by Dr. Sessels of TRW: In the Capistrano tests
that were performed by TRW, they did analyze fibers with
lengths down to 5 to 10 microns in length and the information
is available.
Question: Who is the contact for the China Lake tests?
Response: Mr. Quentin Porter of Rome Air Development Center
and Dr. Paul Lieberman of TRW.
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DISSEMINATION, REDISSEMINATION AND FIBER LIFE 	 6
Wolf Elber
NASA Langley Research Center
This presentation covers the technical background of the
subjects of dissemination as well as redissemination and fiber
life. These subjects were defined in the overview presentation.
Dissemination, as shown in figure 1, is the first release of the
OUTLINE OF PROBLEM
Figure 1
fiber and the drift of the fibers, or clumps, or fragments in the
pollutant cloud downwind from the accident scene. Those fibers
will of course deposit somewhere and there is a possibility that
they are either stirred up by wind or traffic to be redissemi-
nated. If they are not redisseminated, then they might be buried
in the ground or destroyed. That's the subject of fiber life.
I want to treat first the dissemination portion of the prob-
lem and give you a basic introduction. I want to leave you with
j a qualitative idea of how the fibers are disseminated and some
quantitative feel for the range and the amount of dissemination.
In figure 2 you see a typical accident scene. Above the air-
craft accident we consider having a fire plume, which as long as
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it has thermal energy also has buoyancy and therefore a vertical
velocity. After a while it mixes with the ambient air and it will
stabilize. After that we consider the next phenomenon which is
the drift of the pollutant cloud downwind over industry, domestic
areas, and possibly out to sea. The whole process is very strongl
dependent on the weather. One of the first characteristics of a
certain weather situation is the vertical temperature profile in
the atmosphere, because mixing of aerosols occurs only in the
convective band, i.e. below the inversion.
In this first case, in figure 3, which is typical of a night-
time situation, we have an inversion at about 200 m. So the
mixing occurs over a relatively shallow layer. If there are any
winds, they are typically very low, so that the cloud drifts
slowly. This nighttime weather would be categorized as an E or F
Pasquill-Gifford stability class. As you can see on the sketch
below this first case, the moon is shining, and the plume is
spreading at a relatively shallow angle that is characteristic of
stable weather conditions. The spread angle is of the order of 10
degrees, sometimes even less.
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In the second weather situation, called a neutral weather
category, we have typically very high winds, typically it is over-
cast and the mixing depth is very much deeper, on the order of
400 meters. The sketch shows overcast weather and a spread angle
of the plume cloud on the order of 20 degrees, somewhat larger
than for the stable weather. In the third category, that's the
weather we all like to have, and don't often get, it's the
typically sunny weather, low winds, and Pasquill-Gifford category
unstable A. If ever you see cumulus clouds in the sky, you know
lyou have unstable weather, usually B sometimes A. The mixing
layer is typically more like 1500 meters. The atmosphere is mixed
over very great depths and of course, that means also that the
,pollutants are mixed over those depths. The sketch shows the sun
'shining and the plume spreading at an angle of about 40 degrees.
(When it encounters the inversion the plume will not penetrate that
;inversion because there is no vertical turbulence up there. It
(will stay below the inversion, or reflect.
Next I want to define the measures of pollution shown in
figure 4. One thing that is of course important is the concentra-
tion of the pollutant, the number of particles over the volume, or
volumetric density. Usually, more important than the
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Figure 4
concentration is the exposure, which is the concentration times
the time of exposure, or the time integral of concentration. In
some instances, the number of particles that get deposited on
the ground, or the number of particles per unit area would
be a suitable measure of pollution. Measure of pollution is
not quite the same, of course, as the measure of potential damage.
We have to measure the potential damage. We also need to know
the area over which we get certain exposures. Therefore we plot
an area-exposure diagram. For each exposure such as exposure E4,
in figure 5, we calculate and plot the area A4, over which that
level of exposure is exceeded. The integral J E dA is a signif-
icant measure of potential damage. The others are just a mea-
sure of pollution. One important point, at this time you've
seen this morning that the vulnerahilit^r or the dama ge is a
continuous proportional function of exposure, so that even at
extremely low values of exposure, you still have a very small
probability of failure. Now if you have a very large area, at a
given small exposure, the product of that large area and exposure
contains a lot of equipment and may cause just as much damage
as having exposure over a small area. That is peculiar to this
situation which we have - a probability of damage continually
defined as a function of exposure, whereas in other pollution
problems we talk about a critical value below which we're safe,
above which we're unsafe.
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Many of you have seen the type of footprints that have been
used in the studies of the last few years to show the range over
which we can affect the countryside. Figure 6 is drawn basically
to give a qualitative feel for how strong the exposure effects
can be. In the top left hand figure, I've drawn an exposure
profile where the outermost exposure profile represents about 50
of the maximum exposure in that area. For the weather condition
which was an overcast weather or night, in other words, a stable
weather situation, the exposure pattern is a very narrow streak,
and it could extend the five percent level 100 kilometers from
the accident scene. In the unstable, sunny weather, the disper-
sion is very much wider, the dilution of the pollution is much
stronger so the 50 level is very much closer in. In this case
I've shown it as about 50 kilometers but the area is roughly the
same as in the previous case because the streak is now wider.
Those cases are for single fibers with fall velocity of 0.02
meters per second. Let's look at the heavier particles. Looking
at lint, which was characterized as being a group of fibers
typically 20 or more, it has a fall velocity one order of magni-
tude larger, or 20 centimeters per second. Now, that would mean
it would take approximately a half a minute to fall from the
ceiling to the floor in this room, whereas a single fiber would
take on the order of 300 seconds, or six minutes. Thus for the
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lint, the 5% level might occur out at 10 kilometers in the over-
cast weather and at about half that distance in the strong sun
shine with the wider exposure field.
EXPOSURE CONTOURS
100 KM ^ 50 KM
E/Emax
SINGLE FIBERS (	 V S -0,02	 )	
=0,05 SINGLE FIBERS
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Figure 6
Figure 7 lists the parameters controlling the dissemination
patterns. The fire starts the dissemination problem, and is
influenced by the amount of fuel, the burning rate, the pool size,
and maybe some other factors, like the pool shape, or the number
of individual pools of fuel. The exposure levels of course are
controlled very strongly by the source, that is, how many fibers
do we get out, what length fibers do we get out and what fragments
do we get out? We want to characterize those by distribution of
size and fall velocity. The weather strongly influences the
dissemination pattern. The effect of the vertical stability con-
ditions and mixing layer depths has been discussed. The wind
velocity influences how far the material drifts down range in a
given time, and fibers can be precipitated with rain or snow.
Figure 8 shows the logic for two fire plume model types: empiri-
cal models and physical models. The first model is the empirical
model which consists basically of the Briggs' equations. Those
equations are based on observations of smoke stacks and provide
reliable answers for the stabilization height and location.
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DThe growth of a fire plume is somewhat different from a smoke
stack, so that an empirical expression was derived for the type
of fire of interest. in most cases the fire plume will grow at
an angle of approximately 40 degrees, as shown in Figure 9, so
that the cloud location and stabilization height can be obtained
from the Briggs equations, the cloud size from the 40 degree esti-
mate. The second type of models are the physical models. Some
work was done under contract to develop a model which takes the
input conditions - fuel amount, burn rate, and weather - to obtain
a physical representation of a fire including cloud height, size,
location, flame temperature, flame velocity, flame chemistry,
and the potential fiber burn up, which may be of importance. Some
preliminary flame velocity data from this model are presented in
figure 10 showing flame velocities up to about 15 meters per
second. For the two fires shown here, a 7.5 meter pool and a 30
meter pool, you see that as a function of nondimensional radius
from the center at a height 5 meters above the ground, both fires
have about the same peak, but the little pool has already
developed a more uniform plume shape. Another output from that
type of model is the temperature distribution inside those
fires, shown in figure 11. We see some results that were
FIRE PLUME CHARACTERISTICS
H (FROM BR I GGS
P EQUATIONS)
Figure 9
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surprising and that were referred to earlier in a question. You
see for a small pool at the 5 meter height above the ground, the
temperatures are relatively low - the peak temperatures are about
1500 Kelvin which is in the range of temperatures we have been
talking about. But for the large pool, we have temperatures of
approximately 2300 Kelvin or 2000 degrees centigrade - very high
temperatures with a very great potential for burning up the fiber.
In this fire the influx of oxygen around the base is so strong that
stoichiometric conditions exist, and very good oxidation and very
high temperatures result.
A typical analysis of the amount of graphite fibers consumed
in a fire showed that a relatively small percentage of the fibers
is lost (figure 12). Other cases like the high temperature fire
of course would consume a larger percentage of fiber.
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As the fire plume rises, mixes, and cools, it reaches a sta-
bilization point. At that point the output conditions from the
plume models are transferred as input conditions into the dissemi-
nation model. Normally the pollutant is assumed distributed in a
Gaussian manner, either spherical for a short duration source or
two-dimensional for a continuous plume. The Gaussian distribution
has a minus R square exponent term so that we get the bell shaped
distribution around the center of the cloud as shown in figure 13.
That distribution shape and the size of the cloud go into the
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dissemination models. Basically, there are two types of dissemina-
tion models, the Gaussian models and the particle-in-the-cell
models. In the Gaussian models, we assume that this initial
Gaussian cloud drifts downwind and grows so that the standard
deviation (the sigma terms) keep growing in two or three direc-
tions as the cloud drifts downwind. If the cloud strikes the
inversion level, as it does in figure 14, the material in the cloud
is reflected back. Some fairly complex programming steps have to
be taken to reflect the material back in the computations. There
are several of these Gaussian models, such as the Tretheway and
Cramer models, and of course, the EPA Turner models, which are
being developed for pollution problems. The dispersion coeffi-
cient, namely, the angle at which the cloud spreads, has been
determined empirically for the various Pasquill-Gifford stability
classes, so that you have a 10 degree cone for the stable weather
and you have a 40 degree cone for the unstable weather. They
are somewhat difficult to adapt to complex terrains and wind
profiles. The Gaussian models are very cheap to run; a single
analysis on a large computer requires fractions of a second for
any one dispersion case. We use them in various forms in our
risk assessment contracts. The other model type, indicated
in figure 15, the particle-in-a-cell model, takes little particles
in a cell and by brute force solves the 3-D diffusion equations
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Figure 15
84
including of course the fall velocity of the particles. Depend-
ing on the required precision it is a very lengthy computation.
The diffusion is based on the same input data as used for the
Gaussian models. The diffusivities are back calculated from the
smoke plume model. In those models it is easy to adapt to a
terrain for a certain wind profile and any other secondary
details. Now that is important, because sometimes a cloud drifts
a hundred kilometers downwind over a long time including changes
in wind speed and direction as well as changes in the inversion
height. These models are extremely expensive to run on computers,
but to do a specific test run such as tracking a specific
accident, requires the use of those models to get the precise
details of where the material went.
A parametric dissemination analysis was developed to get a
quantitative feel for the size of the dissemination pattern.
This analysis is shown in figure 16 in a nondimensionalized form
where the distance away from the source is divided by the mixing
height. The fall angle (Q) is the fall velocity of the particle
divided by the wind speed, (N) is the number of particles and
(a) is a horizontal spread angle in which all the material is
contained uniformly. The exposure equation (shown) contains the
source terms, proportional to the number of fibers and their fall
velocity data, as an exponential term. The denominator has the
weather factor term UH 2 a, which is the product of the inversion
PARAMETRIC MODEL PREDICTIONS
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height squares, the spread angle, and the wind velocity. Such is
the influence of the weather on the exposure pattern.
The second equation is for the deposition profile. Out to
the nondimensional distance p you have a deposition fraction
given by that equation. The weather factor, UH 2 a, as listed in
figure 17, in the stable weather is about 3 x 10 4 ; in neutral
weather, 5 x 10 5 ; in unstable weather, 4 x 10 6 , indicating that
the exposures decreased by an order of magnitude everytime you
go towards the sunny weather. Sunny weather gives you 1/100th
of the local exposure values of the stable weather - the night-
time conditions.
Figure 18 represents an almost scaled drawing of the
dissemination pattern. Let's take single fibers with a 2
centimeter per second fall velocity and the wind at 2 meters
per second and a mixing depth of 1000 meters. Only 600 of the
fibers are deposited within the first 100 kilometers of the
source; the others are still airborne. To drift down 100
kilometers, the cloud takes 14 hours. In that time of course,
weather is going to change. You're not likely to have 100
kilometers of one weather system and even if you do, its going to
change in 14 hours. Even if you were to have that stability,
400 of the particles would still be airborne, covering a wide
sector of the countryside. For a case like that we can calculate
the area coverage for the simple model. Once we have exposure,
THE WEATHER FACTOR
STABLE	 NEUTRAL
	 UNSTABLE
TYPICAL:
H	 200 M	 400	 1500
a	 0,2	 0,4	 0,8
U	 4 m/s
	 8	 2
U H 2 a :
	
3.2 X 104
	5,1 X 105
	
4 X 106
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SCALE OF DISSEMINATION
FOR SINGLE FIBERS
	 Vs = 0,02 m/s
IN A WIND
	 U = 2 m/s
WITH A MIXING DEPTH
	 H = 1000 M
60% OF FIBERS ARE DEPOSITED WITHIN 100 KM OF THE SOURCE
SOURCE
100 KM	 14 HOURS	 40% STILL AIRBORNE
Figure 18
we can calculate the area over which that exposure occurred. We
have three curves, the stable, the neutral and the unstable
weather situation plotted in figure 19. You see that the stable
weather situation has the high values of exposure but over a
small area, whereas the unstable weather covers the extremely
large areas with the lower values of exposure. Surprisingly, the
total integral, which we're very interested in for vulnerability
calculations, is the same for all three. We can take those data
and plot the exposure and the area in nondimensional form -
exposure times the weather factor, divided by N, versus a
nondimensional area term. Some Tretheway-Cramer calculations for
three situations - unstable, neutral and stable-fell just about
precisely on that predicted relationship for single fibers. Their
prediction for lint fell just about precisely on our predictions
for lint as shown on figure 20. This parametric representation
for small fall velocity says that the exposure falls off as the
recipricol of the distance. This guides our thinking on how the
exposure profiles vary.
We've got some interesting field data for some heavy parti-
cles in the fire test at China Lake. We actually recorded the
coordinates of all the strips that we found as shown in figure 21.
For the purpose of this exercise, I categorized them within
certain sections of range. Figure 22 shows the number of strips
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within each interval, as well as the cumulative deposition within
each interval. Assuming a wind velocity of about 5 m/s, a fall
velocity of about 5 m/s (because they were very heavy fragments),
an average mixing depth at that time of 700 meters, and 130
particles, we can plot both the data and the equation for the
deposition. At least in this case we see in figure 23 that the
exponential profile of total deposition as a function of range is
approximately valid.
Last, I want to calculate the pollution effects for a possi-
ble scenario. Assume a source of 1000 kilograms - a metric ton
of composites on an airplane. If we were to destroy that airplane
in a fire, we could assume 5% would be released as singles, 50
would be lint, 20% airborne fragments, and 70% residue on the
ground, as listed in figure 24. From the mass of any one of those
fragments, we know the number of particles for each one of those
fragments per kilogram of material, we know the total particles of
each category and we know their fall velocities. Now we want to
calculate the exposure patterns from that source. First of all
let us take the data for the singles, and we find that in stable
weather, an area of approximately 1 city block will be covered at
an exposure of about 10 5 particles, as shown in figure 25.
Whereas in unstable weather, that same area would be covered at
an exposure of about 10 4 . In the unstable case, for an exposure
of 10 1 , an area equivalent to a full state would be covered,
whereas in the stable case, for that value of exposure, an area of
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TEST II - CUMULATIVE DEPOSITION
DEPOSITION CUMULATIVE
INTERVAL IN	 INTERVAL DEPOSITION
0 -	 500 11 17
500 - 1000 16 33
1000 - 1500 22 55
1500 - 2000 22 77
2000 - 2500 19 96
2500 - 3000 5 101
3000 - 3500 9 110
3500 - 4000 1 111
4000 - 4500 2 113
4500 - 5000 5 118
5000 - 5500 3 121
5500 - 6000 1 122
Figure 22
CUMULATIVE DEPOSITION OF FIBER STRIPS
FROM SPOILER BURN TEST
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RELEASE AND DISSEMINATION EXAMPLE
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a big city could be covered. That is the range of exposure from
this metric ton release of composite. Let's look now at the
other fractions in figure 26, and instead of calculating what
exposure levels occur, since we don't know vulnerability in terms
of exposure for those fractions, I plotted the deposition density.
For the lint, we have 5 times 10 7
 particles released. In the
stable case, at about 1 kilometer out, we have 50 particles per
square meter deposition density, and in the unstable case
approximately an order of magnitude less. For the fragments at
500 meters out we have about 0.4 particles per square meter, and
in the unstable case, again, significantly less. Those data are
not used in the risk assessment because we haven't qualified the
vulnerability of equipment to that type of particle.
In summary, as listed in figure 27, we know the following
about dissemination. We have the simple fire plume models
available. The differences between all of them affect only the
short range immediately around the fire. We have the complex
fire plume models under development, they will be most useful to
use in determining the oxidation potential of the fibers. We
have cloud dissemination models available; we have the simple
Gaussian models, which we're using in the very many repetitive
runs that we need to do for a risk assessment, and we have the
complex models which we could use if we ever needed them for
specific tracing of an event. We have the parametric analysis
which gives us a little more quantitative insight into the
RELEASE AND DISSEMINATION EXAMPLE
DEPOSITION DENSITY
Figure 26
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SUMMARY FOR DISSEMINATION MODELS
, SIMPLE PLUME MODELS AVAILABLE
, DIFFERENCES AFFECT SHORT RANGE ONLY
, COMPLEX PLUME MODELS UNDER DEVELOPMENT
, PREDICT TEMPERATURES, OXIDATION POTENTIAL
, CLOUD DISSEMINATION MODELS AVAILABLE
SIMPLE, SUITABLE FOR REPETITIVE APPLICATIONS
, PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT AREA COVERAGE IS INSENSITIVE TO
UNCERTAINTIES IN MODELS
, SUFFICIENT TEST DATA AVAILABLE TO VALIDATE DISSEMINATION MODELS
Figure 27
interrelations between the very many parameters involved. But it
also shows that the total area coverage, which we're using as a
measure of our damage potential, is rather insensitive to a lot
of parameters that go into the fire plume model and into the
dissemination model. We now feel that we have sufficient test
data to validate our dissemination models to the levels of
accuracy that we required for this study.
I will talk about fiber life and redissemination as outlined
in figure 28. I want to talk about outdoor testing, the program
direction that we have in mind, and a brief summary. In a study
done in the desert in which we checked on the redissemination of
some fibers that had been deposited there, we could get a measure
of the significance of the redissemination of the single fibers.
The data that we plot in figure 29 are the vertical deposition,
which means the tuna can catch, over a 24 hour period, as a
function of the time after the deposition, since June 75 to the
present. After a very high initial peak the deposition falls to
very low levels. Integration shows that by now, to of that source
has been redissemination. The other data in figure 30 show that
the fibers initially had a 8 mm mean length but as time went on
the type of fibers collected became shorter and shorter, so that
by now, three years after the event, the average fiber length
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collected is approximately 1 millimeter. The residual fibers are
caked into the desert crust. Some of them stick out, and the
only time any of those fibers are released is when saltating
particles rolling along the ground strike pieces of graphite off
the clumps that are lying there. That's the mode that we
currently feel is in operation out there, and the reason for the
shorter fibers. The conclusion is, that the dissemination rate
decreases with time, and the fiber lengths decrease with time,
or to be more precise, the spectrum of size has its maximum at a
shorter length. The desert country out there can be classified as
hard pan surface which has a very short roughness length that
makes it possible for the singles to be picked up. In a vegetated
country, like even short grass, agricultural lands, or forests,
it would be impossible to redisseminate singles back out of those
depths because the boundary layer is so thick and laminar.
Therefore, we feel that we won't get much redissemination from
anything except a hard surface. That subject of course is under
containued study.
Let me show you on figure 31 the road map for what we have
in mind. This is the problem for single fibers. Starting with
the deposition, they can fall into water, vegetation, or they can
fall on hard top. On the first two, those fibers must be con-
sidered as dead, the resuspension rates are very very small. From
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REDISSEMINATION OF SINGLE FIBERS
SMALL FRACTION FROM SMALL AREA,
Figure 31
the hard top, which might be typical of a city area, concrete,
asphalt, roofs, much of it could be washed down into the drainage
system of a large city. The rest might be available for
redissemination. But on the whole, the amount available for
redissemination represents a small fraction from a very small area.
Let's look at the larger fragments in figure 32, where we just
calculated a deposition density. Those fibers could again be
deposited in water, where they would be immediately lost. In
vegetation, with deep vegetation forests, they would be lost. The
big particles however are going to sit on top of shallow
vegetation, like lawns. They could essentially be fragmented by
wind action or other disturbances. They could land on the hard top
where some could be lost to washdown. We could clean up the area
and get rid of some of them once and for all. Traffic could
fragment those remaining particles providing a source of single
particles. Now that would remain the main study issue, because
the large clumps and fragments contain most of the mass of the
debris and could act as a substantial source of singles. However,
again you're looking at the possibility of resuspending from only
a very small area.
In conclusion, we need to continue working this issue of
redissemination, but are relatively confident with the other
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Figure 32
models of dissemination and the fire plume models. We are working
on advanced models to get oxidation state.
Question: How did you test the parametric model?
Response: I took the strip data set from the spoiler burn test
and analyzed the deposition, and found that it was an exponential
distribution.
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TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
Israel Taback
The Bionetics Corporation
There are various interfaces, such as filters, doors, window
screens, and cabinets, which affect the concentration, exposure,
or deposition on the two sides of an interface. The dimensionless
ratio of these quantities as they challenge and breach the interface
is called the transfer function.
Before transfer functions are discussed, it is useful to re-
view the overall problem of doing a vulnerability assessment. I
will talk in general about single fiber lengths, but when overall
vulnerability assessment is done, we must remember that the fibers
released from the source are of various lengths and, in general,
would have a distribution as illustrated in figure 1. It is be-
lieved that the shorter ones will be numerous and the longer ones
relatively infrequent. This would be designated as a source char-
acteristic. At a specific location away from the source, that dis-
tribution can very well change, depending upon how those various
fibers fly, the fall rates, and perhaps some of the fiber lift char-
FIBER LENGTH SPECTRA
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EXTERNAL EXPOSURE
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AT SPECIFIC	 EFFECTS
LOCATION
TRANSFER FUNCTION,	 TRANSFER FUNCTION,
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acteristics. The phenomena would be included in dissemination ef-
fects. We then get to the external exposure outside a piece of
equipment. The transfer functions between the external and inter-
nal world must be evaluated, and we find that the transfer functions
for the shorter particles are larger than the transfer functions
for the larger ones. To get the exposure for a piece of equipment,
all of these factors are evaluated at a fixed fiber length. The
installed vulnerability of the specific equipment is evaluated by
determining its local exposure at a fixed length and then inte-
grating its vulnerability over the complete length spectrum.
Figure 2 illustrates a number of typical values for filter
transfer functions. This work was done with fibers about 7 milli-
meters in length. These are a limited number of samples, there
are more in the literature. The first one illustrated is one
that is used quite often in around support equipment. It is a multi-
layer aluminum mesh called Air Maze (trade name), tested dry. In
its normal mode, this material is used coated with a sticky liquid.
We tested it dry in order to get some idea of what would happen if
the filter were poorly maintained. The figure illustrates the
transfer function at a velocity of 100 feet per minute, which is
approximately the velocity at which the filter is used.
FILTER TRANSMISSION
(MEDIUM LENGTH FIBERS)
AIR VELOCITY IN FEET/MIN
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3/8-INCH-THICK OPEN FOAM
POLYURETHANE
WINDOW SCREEN
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Transmissivity factors of the order of to may occur, and as
the air velocity through that filter is increased, we find that the
percentage passed through that filter also increases. These tests
were done at 100, 400, and 800 feet per minute. When this same fil-
ter is coated, which is the condition in which it is normally used,
it has transmissivity of the order of tenths of a percent at all
velocities. Its transmissivity is still a function of air veloc-
ity. Another commonly used filter is open foam polyurethane.
This filter was 3/8-inch-thick open foam. Again the transmissiv-
ities ranged from about a tenth of a percent to 1.4 percent. We
also tested one very interesting interface, a window screen, which
is not normally regarded as a filter.
At air velocities of about 100 feet per minute (which is about
a mile an hour), it had a transmissivity of to and then rose very
rapidly at higher speeds to about 10 to 150. One other filter was
tested with material of rather long lengths, compared to the lengths
of the fibers just discussed. It is another piece of polyurethane
filter, and the results are shown on figure 3. It has a trade name,
Scott Foam, and is 3/4" thick. It did not react the way the other
filters did in terms of its response to various air velocities.
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When the 16-millimeter material was passed through the filter,
the amount of 16-millimeter material which came through the filter
varied with air velocity from about 0.004 (note this is not per-
cent, this is in mass ratio) to a value about 0.001 at high veloc-
ity. On the other hand, if you look at the mass transfer ratio
without regard to the length of the material passed (the upper
solid line), this was relatively invariant with velocity through
the filter and, in fact, decreased as the velocity through the fil-
ter increased. The ratio of all lengths passed was about 2 to 3
times the amount of material that was passed at the 16-millimeter
length. Very much smaller ratios were secured for the 24-millime-
ter material, and again there was a difference between the total
amount of material passed, regardless of length and the material
that was passed at the original length. These numbers, by the way,
seem to be somewhat typical of most of the filters that we have
tried. A transfer function of approximately a few tenths of one
percent seems to be a number that we come across many times.
One typical enclosure, sketched on figure 4, that we encoun-
tered in some of our survey work was evaluated for its overall
transfer function. This is a rather typical traffic control box
somewhat similar to the kind that exist on many street corners.
It contains electronic equipment which controls traffic signals.
That equipment not only controls the traffic signals, but also has
TRAFFIC CONTROL ENCLOSURE TRANSFER FUNCTION
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lwithin itself a conflict sensor, such that in the event of an elec-
tric fault, it will put all the lights on that corner onto red. One
electronic failure in this box, generally, is not of large concern
with regard to causing accidents. The volume of this box is about
one cubic meter, and the floor area is 2/3 of a square meter. The
enclosure is ventilated by a flow into the box of about a 30th of a
cubic meter per second, so that it takes about 30 seconds to venti-
late the entire box.
We have tested the specific filter that is used in these box-
es, at least in the city of Newport News, and find that these fil-
ters have a transfer function of about 0.002. The fibers that were
considered here are single fibers, and their fall velocity is of
the order of about 0.02 meters per second. If one hypothesizes
that there is a square pulse of concentration outside the box and
looks at the inside of the box, the concentration inside the box
,comes up slowly with time and reaches a steady-state value.
At the end of the pulse, the concentration drops off at a rate
that is shown in the figure consistent with the ventilation rate of
the box. If the internal concentration is computed with respect
to the external, it turns out to be a function of the filter fac-
tor divided by one plus a correction term. This term consists of
the fall velocity times the area of the box divided by the flow
rate into the box. This fall rate, this settling term as it is
called, is the settling that would occur if the internal mixing in
the box was fairly uniform so that the concentration throughout
the box was constant.
The overall-steady state transfer function for concentration
( turns out to be 0.0014, somewhat smaller than the filter function
of 0.002. The transfer function for exposure is the ratio of the
integrals for concentration with time. For the external exposure,
the integral takes the form of a square pulse. For the internal
exposure the integration must include the effect of buildup and
the effect of drop-off. In performing the integration, the two
effects balance, and the transfer function for exposure is exactly
the same number as computed for the steady-state ratio of
concentrations.
There is one interesting thing about this filter, as well as
all others. (I'll present this in inches and you can turn it into
meters). If the height of that filter were about 6 inches and
there was a little bit of a gap at the top of the filter (which we
'have observed in many installations) of perhaps an eighth of an
inch, one would find that perhaps ten times as many fibers entered
that box due to the poor installation of the filters. The most
important factor with regard to the number of fibers that may be
ingested into this box may not be the filter itself but how well
it is inserted into its holder.
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The next illustration, figure 5, is for a typical room. It is
hard to recognize in meters but it is a 9- by 12-foot room with an
8-foot ceiling. The infiltration factor which I have assumed is
0.1. The flow rate into the room is such that the ventilation
time for the room would be of the order of about 3 hours. That is
fairly realistic. It could be as little as 2 and as large as 6 de-
pending on how well built the house was. We assumed that the room
has an air conditioner with a filter having a transfer function of
0.005 with a flow rate such that it could ventilate the room in
about 8.6 minutes.
The equation in the upper right of the figure gives the same
relationship that was shown in the previous figure; that is, the
ratio of the internal to the external concentration. Again, the
integral is really the same ratio that would be secured in the
steady state (if indeed the pulse lasted long enough to achieve
steady state). The ratio is always correct regardless of the
length of the pulse.
Again, we find that the predominate factors that determine the
ratio of internal to external transfer function consist of the filter,
factor, the filter infiltration factor, and three terms in the denom-
inator: the settling velocity times the area of the room, the filter
factor of the air conditioner and its flow rate, and both divided
TYPICAL ROOM TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
AIR CONDITIONER RECIRCULATING:
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Iby the infiltration volume flow. There are really only two impor-
tant terms here; one is the filter infiltration factor, and the
,second is the fall rate of the fiber. The characteristics of
the air conditioner, as such, do not strongly affect the ratio of
internal to external exposure. That ratio, the room transfer func-
tion, turns out to be about 10 -3 . One can recompute this with
the air conditioner bringing in air from the outside.
We still have an infiltration factor which is assumed to be
the same, although it may change somewhat with the air conditioner
running. The input-flow volume of the air conditioner and its fil-
ter factor appear, and when that is evaluated, it turns out that
the fact that the air conditioner is taking in air and passing it
through its filter has only raised the internal to external rela-
tionship by just a factor of two.
Of further interest is that if one shuts off the air condi-
tioner entirely (that is, let the second term be zero), one gets the
,same answer as in the first case or about 10 -3 . So although I did
not choose these numbers they are typical of a room. For all three
,conditions of operating that air conditioner, there is not an enor-
mous difference between the ratios of internal to external exposure
(time integrals of the concentration).
Figure 6 lists the work we have planned on transfer functions.
PLANNED TRANSFER FUNCTION WORK
ADDITIONAL FILTER TESTS: SHORTER LENGTHS
COARSE, MEDIUM, FINE
USED FILTERS
SPECIAL FILTERS: AIRCRAFT AIR CLEANERS
AIRCRAFT WATER SEPARATORS
GENERIC CABINET T,F, TESTS
FILTER T,F, MODELING
VERIFICATION OF TYPICAL ROOM/EQUIPMENT PREDICTIONS
Figure 6
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I suspect its elements are rather obvious; do more filter tests
at lengths down to the order of 1 millimeter or shorter. We did
want to test down to this value somewhat earlier in time, but have
been limited until very recently, both in terms of being able to
make fibers of that length in a practical way and in sensing those i
fibers in the laboratory. I believe we are now in a position of
running our tests down to about 1 millimeter. Various filters of
different fineness will be tested. Special aircraft filters will
be tested because of the specific responsibility NASA has regarding
aircraft.
Generic cabinet transfer function tests are planned. These
tests are on cabinets with louvers and on appliance cases with air-
flow which is fairly typical of that encountered in practice.
Filter transfer function modeling will be attempted in order
to predict transfer functions, and although the computations shown
on the previous figures seem to be straight forward, there is a need
to verify the settling terms in those equations. These may be some-
what dependent upon the amount and the scale of the turbulence that
might exist within a given enclosure, and it is planned to check
this under one or two sets of conditions.
Figure 7 lists some preliminary conclusions. I believe that,
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
1. A BODY OF ANALYTIC AND TEST DATA EXISTS WHICH ALLOWS COMPUTATION
OF TRANSFER FUNCTIONS TO BE MADE FOR SPECIFIC INSTALLATIONS,
2, ADDITIONAL TEST DATA AND MODELING IS NEEDED REGARDING GENERAL
TYPES OF ENCLOSURES FOR PERFORMING THE NATIONAL RISK ESTIMATE,
3, VERIFICATION BY TEST OF COMPUTED TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR TYPICAL
INSTALLATIONS HAS YET TO BE ACCOMPLISHED,
Figure 7
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if we have any specific installation and understand its filter,
the infiltration flow rates, and forced ventilation rates, there
is no question that the transfer function can be computed. How-
^ever, to generalize these relationships for particular industries,
homes, and other facilities in the country, additional modeling
work must be done so that the national risk can be computed.
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VULNERABILITY
Israel Taback
The Bionetics Corporation
The discussion of vulnerability will begin with a description
of some of the electrical characteristics of fibers before defin-
ing how vulnerability calculations are done. The vulnerability
results secured to date will be presented. The discussion will
touch on post exposure vulnerability which many have not heard
about and then hazard some guesses about what future technology
will do to the measurements made to date. After a description of
some shock hazard work now underway, the discussion will lead into
a description of the planned effort and present some preliminary
conclusions.
On the upper left hand corner of figure 1 I have diagrammed a
fiber and an external circuit. Electrically, fibers appear as a
resistance per unit length plus two contacts which have some non-
linear characteristics. The fibers that we have been working with
.show resistances of about 1000 to about 3000 ohms per centimeter
lof length depending upon the extent of graphitization.
FIBER ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS
30
N
20
I, MA
10
R
FIBER	 R CONTACT
10	 20	 30
RESISTIVITY: 1000-3000 4 /CM,	 VOLTS/CM
1	 2
VOLTS
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Their contact resistance is nonlinear. They burn out at about 1/2
to 1 watt per centimeter of length, and a one centimeter fiber
will burn out with a pulse input of about 100 millijoules. If one
plots the current through the fiber against the voltage across
the fiber, there is a small nonlinear region at low voltage, a
linear region which increases with increase in voltage, and then
just before the fiber burns out and probably due to its negative
temperature coefficient of resistance, a little further nonlinear-
ity in the current voltage characteristics. Some of the fibers
burn out at about 30 milliamperes; others will burn out at currents
between 10 and 20 milliamperes. The contact characteristics of the
fiber are somewhat similar to back-to-back diodes. The current
that will pass through the fiber contact stays very low until a
characteristic voltage is applied. For the fibers we have been
working with it has the order of about 12 to 2 volts. At this
point the voltage drop at the contact remains fairly constant and
relatively independent of current. Because of these characteristics
the fibers have the potential for doing various types of damage.
Figure 2 is a fairly gross categorization chart. I have tried
to generalize the types of damage that might occur with fibers
based upon the voltage range that they may be used at and whether
or not they are in a low power or high power circuit. one of the
areas of concern is the low voltage and low power region. A fiber
TYPICAL FIBER EFFECTS
VOLTAGE RANGE
	 LOW POWER (UP TO 1OOW)
	 HIGH POWER (ABOVE 1OOW)
LOW
(0 TO 30 VOLTS)
	 SUSTAINED SHORTS
	 SUSTAINED SHORTS
FIBER NOT BURNED
	 FIBER NOT BURNED
MALFUNCTIONS
	 NO EQUIPMENT DAMAGE
NO LOCAL DAMAGE
MEDIUM
(30 TO 1000 VOLTS)
	 SPARKING OR SHORTS
POSSIBLE FIBER BURN
TRANSIENTS
BLOWN FUSES
STRESSED COMPONENTS
LOW DAMAGE POTENTIAL
HIGH
SOME SUSTAINED ARCS
FIBER BURNS
TRANSIENTS
BLOWN FUSES
STRESSED COMPONENTS
DAMAGE USUALLY REPAIRABLE
( >1000 VOLTS)
	 SPARKS, NO SUSTAINED ARCS
	 SUSTAINED ARCS
LOW VOLTAGE CORONA
	 CORONA
TRANSIENTS	 FLASHOVER
INTERRUPTIONS
	 MAY BE SEVERE DAMAGE
Figure 2
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has the capability to maintain a high resistance short without
burning out. The equipment can malfunction and although no local
damage to components usually occurs the functioning of the device
may be impaired. At low voltage and high power (for example a 12
volt battery circuit) shorts may also be sustained. The fiber may
or may not burn out depending on the voltage; however, equipment
is not usually damaged. This is not a problem area from the view-
point that if a fiber does fall across a high power low voltage
circuit, it may draw a little bit of power from the circuit but it
probably would not stop the operation. The other area of concern
is high power and relatively high voltage where the fiber essen-
tially acts as a trigger to some potential arcing and that arcing
may be sustained. This will stress components, blow fuses and
cause flashover at insulators. There is another region where fi-
ber can damage some types of equipment and that is in the high vol-
tage high power area. Here one can encounter corona and initiate
sustained arcs which can disrupt equipment and damage equipment.
As I say this is a very gross chart. The 0 to 30 volts may
well be 0 to 10 or 15 and the 100 watts may well be anything from
about half that to twice that; but the general characteristics of
the types of problems listed are typical.
Figure 3 lists methods which are employed for evaluating
EQUIPMENT EVALUATION METHODS
DIRECT EXPOSURE IN TEST CHAMBER
FIBER SIMULATOR PROBE
GENERIC SIMILARITY
ANALYSIS & MODELING
Figure 3
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equipment vulnerability. The most direct one, and the one I think
has been used in most cases, is direct exposure of the equipment in
a chamber. There are chambers at Langley Research Center, at Rome
Air Development Center, and at Ballistic Research Labs in Aberdeen,
Maryland. There may be a few others with which I am not familiar.
A second way of evaluating equipment vulnerability is with a
fiber simulator. If the electronics or equipment has a limited
number of nodes, 50 or perhaps no more than 100, it is possible
to probe this equipment and determine whether or not the fiber as
simulated will produce a hazard, cause the equipment to malfunction,'
or burn out because of the power supply characteristics in the
equipment.
The third method is what some people call engineering judg-
ment, others call guesses, and I call generic similarity. That
is, if your tests are performed on one type of computer of a given
complexity and there is another of about the same complexity and
the same technology, one could hazard some guesses with regard to
its vulnerability.
The last method is called modeling and is outlined in figure
4. Even for equipment which may be as simple as a home television
set, it is probably impossible to just look at the case and hazard
VULNERABILITY MODELING
1. ANALYZE EQUIPMENT INTO DEFINABLE UNITS USING FAULT TREES AND SEPARABLE
CHARACTERISTICS,
2. FOR EACH UNIT:
A) TYPE OF VENTILATION (CONVECTIVE, FORCED, LEAKAGE)
B) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY (VACUUM TUBE, DISCRETE, INTEGRATED)
C) VOLTAGE RANGE ( < 15V, 15-20OV, > 20OV)
D) TYPE OF WIRING! CIRCUIT BOARD, SOLID WIRE) &
CONNECTORS( SPADE LUG, HERMETIC, WIRE WRAP)
E) ORIENTATION OF OPEN LEADS & CIRCUIT TRACES
3, USE GENERIC TEST DATA ON CIRCUIT BOARDS & CONNECTORS TO ESTIMATE FAILURE
STATISTICS,
4, COMBINE, USING FAULT TREE, INTO OVERALL FAILURE RATE PREDICTION,
STATUS: PRELIMINARY LOGIC MODEL DEVELOPED
Figure 4
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a guess as to its vulnerability. One way of breaking it down into
things that can be handled is to break the equipment down into de-
finable units using the fault trees and the characteristics of
the individual units which make up the tree. Then each type of
smaller unit could be analyzed at that level: the type of ven-
tilation, the type of technology, the voltage range of the equip-
ment, the type of wiring that might be in it, the orientation of
the open leads and circuit traces, and whether or not there are
open leads or coated circuit boards can be considered. Then,
using generic test data on similar circuit boards and connectors,
the statistics of failures of each of those parts can be com-
bined into an overall failure rate prediction. We have not done
very much with this other than develop a preliminary logic model.
Other people that have worked in this area have used this type of
modeling in order to model a complete radar system for example.
Figure 5 is a computer-generated experimental vulnerability
result. The testing was done on a PDP-11 computer, and it is a
plot for tests that were done at 7.8 and 4.5 millimeter length
fibers. Each of the staircase steps is at least one failure and
generates the approximate probability of damage curve when plotted
against the exposure in particle seconds per cubic meter. The
shape of this curve is typical. It is not the best fit that has
been secured, but it is typical and is fitted by the equation
j shown on the upper left where the probability of damage is shown
EXPERIMENTAL VULNERABILITY TESTING
1E+05 2E+05 3E+05 4E+05 5E+05 6E+05 7E+05 8E+05 9E+05
EXPOSURE, PSEC/M3
1.0
0.8
0.6
0
a
0.4
0.2
0
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as an exponential. Figure 6 shows typical vulnerability results.
The lengths of the test fibers are defined by 'short', 'medium',
'long'. The reason for this is that it is very difficult to cut
the same length of 3 millimeter fibers so that testing might have
been done anywhere from 22 to 3 1/3 millimeters, the 7 millimeter
testing perhaps plus or minus a millimeter, and the long testing
may be from 10 to 14 millimeters.
The small desk type computer, the PDP-11, was most vulnerable
to the longer fibers in those tests. The vulnerability was ap-
proximately 10 5 and for the long and the medium lengths. The com-
puter
—
was a ittle bit less vulnerable to the shorter lengths,
with E at 10^. It is interesting that the first two items on this
chart are both cooled with unfiltered fan-forced air, and neither
one of the devices has coated circuit boards.
The next item on the figure is a color television which just
barely came into our definition of vulnerable equipment. We essen-
tially stopped testing at about 10 8 . If one puts any reasonable
exposures and damage numbers into the problem of the national risk
analysis, 10 8 turns out to be a vulnerability level which results
in very small amounts of potential money loss. However, we stil^
carry along in our risk estimates those devices which fail at 10 .
The 5 rest of the equipmen seems to be vulnerable at E from
about 10 up through about 10	 The smallest number on the chart,
2 x 10 4 , occurs for the very long fibers for a stereo amplifier.
There is more of this data available in some of the reports which
are not being presented here.
One of the outstanding things that has happened in the last
period of time is the fact that many pieces of equipment were
tested with a large number of them appearing not vulnerable.
Figure 7 lists some of these. In fact, enough samples of consumer
equipment were selected, such as radios, recorders, home music
systems, etc. that they became indicative of about 75 percent of
the available goods on the market. Most of the devices that have
been tested so far have shown no vulnerability. It is believed
that this is due to the fact that some of the latest items are
somewhat newer technology, low wattage and do not require a cool-
ing ventilation. No problems have been encountered with 110 volt
electric motors and two thermostats. A number of appliances have
been testec with probes. No problems have been encountered except
in one case where a fiber would short out a resistor-capacitor
timing circuit. In that one case there was a small timing error
but no particular hazardous condition.
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VULNERABILITY RESULTS - VULNERABLE
RD - 11A COMPUTER (DEC)	 © OM	 OS
STEREO AMPLIFIER 	 ©	 O	 0
COLOR TV	 © O	 O
DIGITAL VOLTMETER	 OM
LOW VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY 	 OM
VOLTAGE REGULATOR	 O
ASR-3 RADAR, NO FILTER
	 MO
104
	105	 106	 107	 108
AVERAGE EXPOSURE AT FAILURE
FIBER LENGTHS: OS SHORT (3 MM), OM MEDIUM (-7 MM), OL LONG (-12 MM)
Figure 6
VULNERABILITY RESULTS - NOT VULNERABLE
NOT VULNERABLE
AM/FM RADIO
CALCULATOR WITH PRINTER
TAPE RECORDER
HOME MUSIC SYSTEM
10 BAND RADIO
ELECTRIC MOTORS 110V
24V AND 115V THERMOSTATS
BLACK AND WHITE TV SET
DISHWASHER (PROBE TEST)
TOASTER (PROBE TEST)
CAR RADIO
GENERAL AVIATION DME
ASR-3 RADAR, WITH FILTER
Figure 7
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The general aviation Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) was
tested as one of a series of tests of general aviation equipment,
to try to determine whether or not the type of equipment that might
exist in light aircraft might be subject to failure. It did not
fail. The ASR-3 radar, which is an obsolete radar, when tested
with its normal filter as used in the field, did not fail. It is
interesting that the radars that are replacing the ASR-3, which
are now ASR-7's and 8's, and going into service have coated circuit
boards and better control of ventilation with good filters. We be-
lieve that the newest radars will also not be vulnerable. That
concludes the data that will be presented on vulnerability.
The next subject for discussion is post-exposure vulnerability.
Most of the testing done to date has been done with equipment 'on',
and whether or not it has been vulnerable has been determined by
whether or not it has had a failure during the testing. There is
the problem of equipment being exposed in either an 'on' or 'off'
condition not failing during the exposure and then failing in some
period of time after the exposure. One way of thinking about the
problem is to think about the fibers that enter the equipment as
illustrated on figure 8. There is only a limited number of things
that can happen to ingested fibers. They can be exhausted immedi-
ately, which I think is what happens to most of the fibers. They
can cause a problem, in which case the equipment would be taken
POST-EXPOSURE VULNERABILITY
POSSIBLE FIBER HISTORY
ENTER
EXHAUST	 CAUSE	 BURN
	
TRAPPED
(NO EFFECT)
	
PROBLEM	 OUT
I
REPAIR & CLEAN
PERMANENTLY
	 RELEASED . AIRFLOW
BY	
. VIBRATION
• TILTING (ACCELERATION)
• ELECTROSTATICS
• REPAIR
EXHAUST
	 CAUSE	 BURN	 RETRAP
PROBLEM	 OUT
Figure 8
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apart, would be repaired and cleaned and that would be the end of
those fibers. They might burn out because of the voltage or power
range in the equipment, or they might get trapped within the box.
If they are trapped within the box they may get trapped permanently.
Cases have been observed where it is extremely difficult to remove
a fiber from its position in a box after exposure. The fibers
could be released either by subsequent air flow, vibration, elec-
trostatics (turning the equipment 'on' and 'off'), or by a sub-
sequent repair that might have been occasioned by some other fault.
The logic loop can be repeated many times and one can hypothesize
that every operation results in working with less and less fibers.
In an attempt to see whether or not this problem was worth study-
ing, we did some preliminary pathfinder tests with two boxes.
Figure 9 outlines the test scheme. The color television and
the stereo amplifier (for which vulnerability 5 data was presented
within figure 6) were exposed to about E = 10 fiber seconds per
cubic meter. They were given nine exposures in an 'off', and nine
exposures in an 'on' state with the supposition that there was a
possible electrostatic effect that could determine where the fi-
bers might land and might adhere. A year's operation was then
simulated after each exposure. These tests are very time con-
suming. They took about 200 hours of testing, yet it is apparent
that we really did not simulate the number of on-off switches that
POST-EXPOSURE VULNERABILITY
TEST METHOD
, FIBER EXPOSURE	 10 5 FIBER SECONDS/METERS
NINE EXPOSURES IN "OFF" + NINE IN "ON" STATE
, SIMULATE ONE YEAR'S OPERATION AFTER EACH EXPOSURE
• 100 ON/OFF SWITCHES (EACH TWO MINUTES)
•	 50 PHYSICAL MOVEMENTS
•	 50 BLOWER OPERATIONS
RESULTS
NO POST-EXPOSURE FAILURES CAUSED BY GRAPHITE FIBERS FOR COLOR TV OR
STEREO AMPLIFIER
Figure 9
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occur in a normal television in a year. The 50 physical movements
is probably about right, and the lower operations where opened
windows or fans were simulated are reasonably realistic.
Results to date are that no failures have occurred on either
box. This work will continue with some more devices but so far
the results look promising. It may not be a big problem.
Figure 10 offers conjectures with respect to the effects of
future technology. Some of this technology is already in use
and the effects are apparent in the testing of consumer appliances.
I believe there will be more coated circuit boards than at present.
One of the reasons for this is that manufacturers are beginning
to do wave soldering and it is economical to coat the board in
order not to waste solder. There is an increased use of integrated
circuits as compared to discrete items, therefore less leads, low-
er power requirements, and no need for cooling openings into the
case. When people build equipment nowadays they are more sensible
about specifying filters. This seems to be particularly true of
field equipment such as being specified by the FAA for airport
use. Improved ventilation practices in general, in homes and in
offices, should improve the situation; the only thing that looks
a little black is the tremendous rate of increase of the amount
of electronics in use.
FUTURE TECHNOLOGY EFFECTS ON VULNERABILITY
REDUCES	 INCREASES
INCREASED USE OF COATED CIRCUIT BOARDS	 X
INCREASED USE OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS	 X
LOWERED POWER REQUIREMENTS
	
X
IMPROVED FILTRATION SPECIFICATIONS 	 X
IMPROVED VENTILATION PRACTICES
	
X
MORE ELECTRONICS IN USE
	
X
Figure 10
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fi.tii/
one more subject which has not previously been discussed is
the potential of a shock hazard. Figure 11 diagrams how 110 volt
power is conducted into a normal home or office. There are usually
three leads, a "hot" lead at 110 volts, a neutral lead which is
usually at the same potential as ground, and a ground lead. When
these come into the home, and an appliance of any kind is plugged
in, and if a cheater plug is not used, then the external case is
connected to ground. The neutral lead and the hot lead enter the
case and either a one pole or a two pole switch makes the connec-
tion to the internal circuit.
If fibers are ingested into the case there is a potential
short between the wiring in the case and the case. If a human
being touches the case and has a resistance to ground, he completes
the circuit through himself from the 110 volt source.
Figure 11 also lists some typical resistivities resulting from
barely touching a case with everything dry, in which case the re-
sistance is in megohms, to touching it with various degrees of wet-
ness and area. For each of these contacts with different resis-
tivity, the current through the human being can range all the way
from where he might feel a mild shock to where he can be at a "no-
let-go" condition (no voluntary control over the muscles). In
fact, at 30 milliamperes he may be subject to ventricular fibril-
POTENTIAL SHOCK HAZARD
CONTACT RE: OHMS CURRENT AMP EFFECT
DRY, TOUCH CASE MEGOHMS - NONE
DRY, FINGER-THUMB GRASP 30 K ,003 MILD
WET, FINGER TOUCH 20 K ,005 ANNOYANCE
DRY, HAND HOLDING PLIER 10 K 1009 "NO-LET-GO"
DRY, PALM TOUCH 3 K ,030 VENTRICULAR FIBRILLATION
FOOT, ON DAMP LEATHER 12 K ,009 "NO-LET-GO"
FOOT, ON WET CONCRETE 1 K ,110 FIBER BURNS OUT
Figure 11
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lation. There are really very few appliances that are of concern.
Electric heaters and some metallic-cased small electric tools offer
some hazard; however, the most serious concern is the familiar home
toaster. It is believed that the toaster is the biggest problem
that exists because of the large numbers in use.
Figure 12 lists some assumptions which were made to determine
whether further work in this regard is needed. It was assumed
that there are 2000 pounds of fiber in each of five fire-accompa-
nied accidents per year, that ten percent of the graphite fiber
was released, that there are a thousand people per square kilometer
(typical of many urban areas), and that the average everyday family
has a toaster, with three people in a family. A 0.01 transfer func
tion from the outside to the inside of the home was also assumed;
however, 0.01 may be a little bit large with respect to computed
transfer functions into a home with windows and doors closed. The
transfer function could be unity if the home had wide open windows
or doors.
The determination of the hazard is made by applying an esti-
mation formula which includes: the probability of a shock hazard
as linearly related to the density of the toasters per unit area
the transfer function into the enclosure where the toaster exists;
an inverse proportion to the E necessary to produce the shock
hazard; a direct proportion to the number of fibers that are re-
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF TOASTER SHOCK HAZARD
ASSUMPTIONS
2000 # FIBER IN EACH OF 5 FIRE ACCIDENTS/YR
107	 FIBER RELEASE
1000	 PEOPLE (330 TOASTERS) PER KM2
0.01	 TRANSFER FUNCTION, OUTSIDE TO TOASTER
P SHOCK = TOASTERS 
	 CNWHERE
AREA	
) [T.F.
 ) l VHAZARD
	
E T.F. TRANSFER FUNCTION
N, TOTAL NUMBER OF FIBERS
RELEASED
Vs FALL VELOCITY
E, AVERAGE EXPOSURE WHICH
CAUSES A SHORT
P	 = 330 
	 10121,6 POTENTIAL HAZARDS/YEAR
SHOCK	 —
HAZARD( 106 ) [
.10 -2
108	2X10-2)	 (FOR E = 108 TOASTER)
1600
(FOR E = 10 5 TOASTER)
NOTE; 108
 AND 10 5
 DETERMINED WITH 7 MM FIBERS,
Figure 12
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leased in the accident; and an inverse proportion to the fall ve-
locity of the fibers.
This formula for integrated exposure has been checked a num-
ber of times against specific footprints that have been computed
and it is a good conservative estimator. If the footprint covers
a uniformly settled area, it will provide a conservative estimate
of the amount of damage. This formula is similar to one expres-
sion used to calculate dissemination footprints. Two toasters
were tested. There were actually three submitted. One toaster
j that was tested required an E of about 10 8 in order to produce a
shock hazard; and, if all the correct numbers are applied to the
formula, it computes about 1.6 potential hazards per _year fp^r that
toaster. The second toaster that was tested has an E of 10 . That
equates to be about 1600 potential hazards per year. That does not
mean that there is a hazard. There is a potential hazard. The
accompanying proper resistivity of the human being to do some damage
is required as well. We did check the third toaster, but inter-
estingly enough, it required an E of zero because it was shorted
when submitted to the laboratory. These tests were all done with
6 millimeter fibers. These tests will be repeated with shorter
fibers. The computations show values large enough so that we have
to further analyze the problem.
Figure 13 lists some reasons for believing that the computed
PRELIMINARY SHOCK HAZARD CONCLUSIONS
1, THE RISK IS LOWER THAN ESTIMATED FOR THE '10 5
 TOASTER':
A) LATEST SOURCE DATA INDICATES SHORTER FIBERS ARE PREDOMINATE
IN RELEASE SPECTRUM,
B) NEW SAFETY STANDARDS ISSUED IN 1973 REGARDING TOASTER
CONSTRUCTION,
C) ONLY 10 TO 50% OF TOASTERS IN USE ARE OF 10 5
 TYPE.
D) SIMULTANEOUS PROBABILITY OF REQUIRED HUMAN RESISTANCE TO
GROUND IS LOW,
E) PLUG MUST BE INSERTED SUCH THAT HAZARD IS PRESENT,
2, ADDITIONAL EFFORT IS REQUIRED:
A) SECURE MORE DATA REGARDING SHOCK HAZARD VS, EXPOSURE VS,
FIBER LENGTH
B) SECURE MORE INFORMATION REGARDING USE RATE AND OBSOLESCENCE
OF TOASTERS,
C) COMPUTE NATIONAL RISK USING DETAILED RISK ANALYSIS METHODS,
Figure 13
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hazard is probably too large. The latest source data indicates
that shorter fibers are predominate in the release spectrum. I be
lieve that the shock hazard is probably less than indicated for
the shorter fibers. The second item is that there were new safety
standards introduced in 1973 regarding toaster construction. We 	 i
really do not know how many are out in the field of each type.
Estimates were made by some people at the Bureau of Standards Con-
sumer Safety Group; they estimated that for the toasters considered
susceptible they would guess only 10 to 50 percent of the ones in
use are of that type. Perhaps there is one other small factor,
and that is that the plug must be inserted so that the hazard is
present.
Possibly the biggest safety factor of all is that whatever
number is computed by the methods shown must be multiplied by the
simultaneous probability of getting the right human resistance to
ground. We honestly do not know the probabilities for this event.
More data is required regarding the shock hazard versus exposure
and fiber length. More data regarding the use rate and the obso-
lescence of toasters is also needed. Apparently the newer ones
may be safer. Finally the national risk should be computed using
detailed risk analysis methods rather than the kind of estimating
scheme shown.
Figure 14 shows work that is planned. There is a specific
PLANNED EFFORTS
VULNERABILITY TESTING
APPLIANCES & ADVANCED ELECTRONIC CONTROLS
CONSUMER EQUIPMENT
INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT
AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT
GENERIC TESTING:
CONNECTORS
CIRCUIT BOARDS
TYPICAL COMPONENT INSTALLATIONS
VULNERABILITY MODELING
Figure 14
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worry about appliances that may show up on the market with advanced
electronic controls. Some tests are planned on consumer equipment,
industrial equipment, and on aircraft equipment. Testing is being
accomplished and will continue on particular types of connectors
and circuit boards. Vulnerability models are being developed so
that it will not be necessary to test every electronic box in the
country.
A few conclusions from the work that has been done so far are
shown on figure 15. It is not difficult to take any specific box
or any specific installation and do the necessary experiments and
evaluate that particular installation. However, it still looks
fairly difficult to do a national risk estimate because of the
difficulty of modeling things such as complete industries in terms
of what kinds of equipment they have and how much they may have
in a plant. It is believed that the use of new technology will
tend to reduce the risks because of the smaller size, the better
encapsulation and the lower wattage. To date no problems have
been encountered with any 110 volt equipment (motors, appliances)
and none are expected unless electronic controls are used. This
is primarily because with the 110 volt equipment in general use
when the fibers cross a pair of nodes, they will burn away. The
testing that has been done so far of a sample of consumer elec-
tronics indicates very little vulnerability. In fact none were
found in the group that was tested. More work is indicated on the
toaster shock hazard analysis in order to determine whether a
serious problem exist.
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
1. ANY SPECIFIC INSTALLATION CAN BE EVALUATED FOR RISK WITH AVAILABLE TEST
& ANALYSIS CAPABILITY, HOWEVER;
2, TO SECURE CONFIDENCE IN A NATIONAL RISK ANALYSIS ADDITIONAL TESTING &
MODELING IS REQUIRED,
3, USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY WILL TEND TO REDUCE THE RISK,
4. NO PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED TO DATE WITH 110V EQUIPMENT (MOTORS,
APPLIANCES) AND NONE ARE EXPECTED UNLESS ELECTRONIC CONTROLS ARE USED.
5, TESTS OF A SAMPLE OF CONSUMER ELECTRONICS INDICATE LITTLE VULNERABILITY.
6. PRELIMINARY TOASTER SHOCK HAZARD ESTIMATES INDICATE ADDITIONAL EFFORT
IS REQUIRED.
Figure 15
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END-TO-END TESTING	 9
Richard A. Pride
NASA Langley Research Center
With all the testing that has been done to determine vulner-
ability and failure of equipment, we still have not identified an
occasion in which electrical or electronic equipment has failed
because of carbon fibers released by the burning of composite
parts in an aircraft-fuel fire. Therefore, the principal objec-
tive, figure 1, of the kinds of demonstration testing that I will
discuss is to try to verify whether or not carbon fibers that are
released by burning composite parts in an aircraft-fuel fire can
produce failures in electrical equipment. A secondary objective
is to experimentally validate the analytical models for some of
the key elements in the risk analysis; source, dissemination,
transfer function, and vulnerability of equipment.
The approach to this demonstration testing (figure 2) is two-
fold; we are going to be conducting limited end-to-end tests at
Dahlgren, Virginia, in the Naval Surface Weapons Center shock tube,
and we are planning for some large outdoor burn tests at the
Army's Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. There are certain qualifi-
cations for the large outdoor tests which will be discussed later.
For now, I want to indicate that we do have these two types of
tests in various stages of planning and development.
RISK ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATION TESTING
OBJECTIVES
1 VERIFY WHETHER CARBON FIBERS RELEASED BY BURNING COMPOSITE MATERIAL PARTS IN
A REAL AIRCRAFT-FUEL FIRE WILL PRODUCE FAILURES IN ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
1 EXPERIMENTALLY VALIDATE ANALYTICAL MODELS FOR
SOURCE
DISSEMINATION
TRANSFER FUNCTION
VULNERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT
Figure 1
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RISK ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATION TESTING
APPROACH
DAHLGREN NSWC - SHOCK-TUBE TESTS
ARMY DUGWAY PROVING GROUND - LARGE OUTDOOR BURN TESTS
Figure 2
Our objectives at Dahlgren (figure 3) are to verify the vul-
nerability of equipment to fire-released fibers and to identify
some of the problems that would be associated with end-to-end
tests that will be even more significant if we go outdoors. Our
approach is to develop a burn and exposure facility in the shock
tube for doing these end-to-end tests and then to subject typi-
cal vulnerable equipment to critical exposures of fire-released
fibers along with the associated soot and smoke. When jet fuel
is burned in open fires, a lot of smoke and soot is generated
due to the fuel-rich type of combustion. The photograph from
Vernon Bell's source paper of the outdoor pool fire at China
Lake showed that it was certainly generating a lot of smoke.
It was not clean burning by any means. Our smaller JP-1 fuel
fires in the Dahlgren shock tube were also very smoky and sooty.
The Dahlgren shock-tube tests provide an opportunity to ex-
perimentally validate only a few of the elements of the risk
analysis flow chart, figure 4 1 but these are probably the most
important elements. For the source fire, we are using a controlled
burning rate JP-1 commercial jet fuel. There is not much differ-
ence in combustion with JP-1, JP-4, or JP-5. We did try to make
it realistic for the civil aviation situation by specifying JP-1.
We are going to burn graphite composite parts from structural
test programs at Langley. Combustion temperatures in the vicin-
ity of those parts will be controlled from about 930 to 9800C
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DAHLGREN NSWC - SHOCK TUBE TEST
OBJECTIVES
1 VERIFY VULNERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT TO FIRE-RELEASED FIBERS
1 IDENTIFY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH END-TO-END TESTS
APPROACH
1 DEVELOP BURN-EXPOSURE FACILITY FOR END-TO-END TESTS
1 SUBJECT VULNERABLE EQUIPMENT TO CRITICAL EXPOSURES OF
FIRE-RELEASED FIBERS WITH ASSOCIATED SMOKE AND SOOT
Figure 3
RISK ANALYSIS FLOW
REDISSEMINATION
FIBER LIFE
DISSEMINATION
CONTROLLED JP-1 FUEL FIRE
GRAPHITE COMPOSITE PARTS
TEMPERATURE UP TO 1750°F
OPTIONAL IMPACT OF RESIDUE
1 TRANSFPX/WNCTION F
KNOWN AND MEASURED
AMPLIFIER TRANSFER
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
COST RISK
SIX AMPLIFIERS
MEASUREMENTS
27 DEPOSITION
34 EXPOSURE
DAHLGREN TUBE TESTS
	
AIR VELOCITY
TEMPERATURE
12 FAILURE MONITORS
Figure 4
127
(1700-1800 0F), and we will have a facility that has the option of
agitating the residue after it has been burned, in order to study
the difference in the amount of fibers that are released from
just a burn compared to those released from an agitation towards
the end of the burn. Because we are working inside a tube, we
will not be getting much information about dissemination. We
will not be able to measure plume parameters or downwind trans-
port of the fibers in the sense that we can verify models that
are developed for outdoor atmospheric dissemination. We will be
disseminating fibers, but they will be constrained to stay within
the walls of the shock tube at Dahlgren.
We will be getting some limited transfer function data,
primarily the transfer function that is associated with the fibers
being pulled inside the case of the fan-ventilated stereo ampli-
fiers that we expect to be exposing for vulnerability at the
target table in the shock tube. Our present plans are to expose
a sample of six amplifiers. Failure characteristics have been
established for these amplifiers based on chamber testing. They
are reasonably low cost pieces of electronic equipment, and we
think we understand pretty well the kinds of failure modes that
are most apt to occur when they are exposed to carbon fibers.
These amplifiers are representative of a class of generic circuit
board equipment. They will allow us to determine failure rates
when exposed to fire-released fibers for comparison with those
rates that have been previously established for chamber-released
fibers. In the shock--tube tests we will be measuring both depo-
sition and exposure levels for fibers in the vicinity of the
amplifier locations. We will be measuring air velocity, air
temperature, and fire temperature, and we will have up to 12
failure monitors associated with the 6 amplifiers.
Figure 5 is an aerial photograph of the conical shock tube
at Dahlgren which was built back in the mid-60's to study the
effect on equipment of the pressure wave from a simulated atomic
blast. The facility is approximately 0.8 km (a half-mile) long.
It starts with four 16-inch naval gun barrels butted end-to-end,
and expands to a 7.3-m (24-foot) diameter tube at the exit end.
We are using approximately half the length, starting opposite
the white building shown in figure 5, where we opened up the
tube by taking out a couple of sections to provide an inlet.
The fire pan for the simulated aircraft-fuel fire is located
about 60 m (200 feet) from the inlet. The airborne effluent
from the fire is pulled out through a filter system by a group
of exhaust fans at the exit end of the tube. The filter system
has been shown to filter out all the fibers and the heavier
particles of soot, and essentially allow the discharge of only
very-fine-particle soot and smoke into the atmosphere. We have
monitored the particle content of the filtered smoke, and we have
determined that the size of soot particles is less than 4 microns
in diameter. We think our filtering system is very effective in
taking out any particle sizes greater than 4 microns.
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Figure 5
Figure 6 is a photograph of the inlet end of the tube. At
this point, the cross section of the tube opened to the atmosphere
is 3 m (10 feet) in diameter, which permits sufficient fresh air
to be drawn in to feed the fire. The fire pan is shown in
figure 7. We have two sizes of pan built up together, a 1.2-m
(4 feet) square inner pan and a 2.4-m (8 feet) square outer pan,
giving us the capability of building two different size fires,
depending on the particular experiment requirements. Fuel is
pumped at a controlled rate in through the bottom of the pan,
which is kept flooded with water. Behind the fire pan is an array
of tubing supporting a series of thermocouples that were used to
survey and monitor flame temperature at locations downwind of
the fire. Figure 8 is a photograph taken, from inside the tube,
of one of the development fires. Modifications made since that
time include a chimney around the fire pan to get the fire to
stand more nearly vertical. With the addition of a chimney we
have been able to provide a larger area in the flames in the
930-980 oC (1700-1800 0F) temperature range in which to mount the
composite specimen for burning.
The combustion products and fibers from the burned composite
are pulled through the tube approximately 210 m (700 feet) to the
location of the target table, figure 9. This is a table that is
about 5 m (16 feet) wide and 9 m (30 feet) long. The vulnerable
electronic equipment will be exposed on this table and connected
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SHOCK-TUBE INLET
Figure 6
SHOCK-TUBE FIRE PAN
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DEVELOPMENT FIRE IN SHOCK TUBE
Figure 8
SHOCK-TUBE TARGET TABLE
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to the electrical switch boxes shown. There are some wires
standing up from the surface of the table. Those wires hold the
sticky cylinders that we use to measure the fiber exposure.
A propeller anemometer is also on the table to measure local air
velocity. This particular view is looking up the tube towards
the location of the fire pan. The opening that can be seen at
the end is where the section of the tube was removed for the in-
let. Note that there is an indication of deposition of soot on
the upper portions of the tube wall. There appears to be a fair
amount of stratification in the airflow coming down the tube.
The bulk of the soot tends to be near the top, but there is an
ample deposition of soot all over the table and on the floor of
the tunnel in that location.
Figure 10 is a picture of the filtering system. In the back-
ground is a framework which supported an initial attempt at
building a filter wall which consisted of fiberglass furnace
filters. They were very effective in taking out particles of
soot and fibers; however, they became clogged in about three
minutes of operating time, stopping the airflow and choking the
fire upstream. We are looking for operational times on the order
of 20 minutes on a particular burn. In the foreground is the
current filter system which is basically a fire-fighting type
water-spray fogging nozzle. A .fire hose is connected to the in-
clined supply pipe supported on the scaffold. The nozzle is at
the upper end. This nozzle emits an effective fog of fine par-
SHOCK-TUBE FILTERING  SYSTEM
Figure 10
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ticle water which washes fibers and soot particles greater than
4 microns in diameter out of the airstream. We think it also
washes out a considerable number of particles under 4 microns,
but it does not capture all of them. The washed out fibers, soot,
and water collect on the floor of the tube and then are filtered
between a series of baffles shown in figure 11. We have a skim-
ming system which allows the water to run under these baffles in
a controlled manner and retains the soot and fibers that are
floating on the surface. The water drains through a hole in the
floor of the shock tube. We have been monitoring the output of
particles and fiber by deposition on sticky cylinders in the
exhaust end of the tunnel. The filtering system has been working
very effectively.
Figure 12 is a photograph of the exhaust end of the shock
tube. Six exhaust fans were installed in the bulkhead in the end
of the tube. Access to instrumentation is through a steel door
which is closed and locked prior to testing. The six exhaust
fans have variable speed control, providing a wide range of air-
flow ranging from essentially zero up to a maximum of about 3400
cubic meters per minute (120 000 cubic feet per minute). Typically
we are operating at about 1130 cubic meters per minute (40 000 cubic
feet a minute) which gives us an average velocity over the target
table of about 0.5 m/sec (1.2 miles per hour).
DRAIN BAFFLES IN SHOCK TUBE
Figure 11
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gSHOCK-TUBE EXHAUST
Figure 12
One of the first graphite composite samples that was burned
in the shock-tube fire was monitored for fiber release with
sticky cylinders at the target table. Sticky cylinders are made
by rolling a 50-mm (2 inch) square piece of sticky paper into a
cylinder with the sticky surface on the outside and mounting it
on a wire with the cylinder axis perpendicular to the airflow.
Figure 13 is an enlarged photograph of a portion of one of the
sticky cylinders after exposure and after cutting it open to
flatten it. This part of the sticky cylinder shows a cluster
of about six fibers ranging in length from 3 to 15 mm. Those six
fibers on that particular sticky cylinder represent an exposure
of about 10 4 fiber-seconds/cubic meter for a 20 minute fuel
burn. That is not enough for the levels that are needed to gen-
erally produce electrical failures, but considering that it was
our first attempt at burning composite in that facility, we were
quite encouraged.
Figure 14 is a photograph of a circuit board out of an
amplifier that failed in chamber testing. It represented an
electrical short caused by a fiber getting across a critical
element in the amplifier, which then caused both the transistor
and a resistor to burn out. There is a lot of smoke, oil, and
soot associated with the burn out, which created a failure in
that particular case and is an indication of the kinds of fail-
ures that can occur on this type of equipment in chamber test-
ing. I should say that, in connection with our preparation
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for testing in the shock tube, we have exposed these amplifiers
without fibers in the tube for periods up to an hour to determine
if smoke and soot would cause a failure. There was no indication
of failure.
The typical failure curve that has been obtained on these
stereo amplifiers in the chamber testing is shown in figure 15.
For this equipment, 27 tests produced 27 failures with a mean ex-
posure for the failures of 8.48 x 10 5 fiber-seconds/cubic meter.
These were tests at various fiber lengths, ranging from 3 to 14
millimeters. The indications from those early sticky cylinders
exposed in the shock tube are that the fibers we have seen so
far range in length from less than 1 mm to about 15 mm. But again
this is preliminary data. Future effort will be directed towards
increasing the number of released fibers to achieve exposure
levels comparable with chamber tests.
The second part of the two-fold approach to demonstration
testing would be to go to Dugway Proving Ground for outdoor, end-
to-end tests, figure 16. Dugway is not the only place in the
United States where this type of test might be conducted; however,
it does provide a location which appears to be quite satisfactory
for doing large outdoor burns of graphite composites for the pur-
pose of verifying the kinds of risk analysis elements that are
STEREO AMPLIFIER FAILURES IN CHAMBER TESTING
0
	
1	 2
	
3 x 106
EXPOSURE, FIBER-SECONDS/METER3
Figure 15
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DUGWAY PROVING GROUND END-TO-END TESTS
OBJECTIVE
LARGE OUTDOOR BURN FOR VERIFICATION OF RISK ANALYSIS ELEMENTS
APPROACH
USE ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE TO DEVELOP CREDIBLE FIRE SCENARIOS
USE TEST EXPERIENCE AND RISK ANALYSIS TO SELECT EXPOSED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
PREPARE PRE-TEST PREDICTIONS OF: FIBER RELEASE
FIBER DISPERSION AND PENETRATION
PROBABLE EQUIPMENT FAILURES
MEASURE ALL VARIABLES KNOWN TO INFLUENCE FINAL RESULTS
COMPARE PRE-TEST PREDICTIONS WITH TEST RESULTS
MANDATORY PREREQUISITES
ESTABLISHED CONFIDENCE IN: FIRE PLUME PREDICTIONS
FIBER RELEASE PREDICTIONS
MODELS FOR FIBER DISSEMINATION
CONCERNS: IF WIDESPREAD DISSEMINATION FOOTPRINTS - TEST MAY BE IMPRACTICAL
Figure 16
shown in figure 17. In this case if we go outdoors, we not only
have the capability of verifying source but we can also verify
outdoor dissemination. We can verify in a more effective manner
a number of transfer functions and the vulnerability of suitable
electrical equipment. Our approach is to use the accident
experience that is being generated by the three commercial air-
plane manufacturers, using their data to select a creditable
scenario for a fire for the source of fiber release. We will use
our test experience in the risk analysis program to select the
appropriate kinds of electrical equipment to be exposed. We want
to be able to prepare pretest predictions for the amount of fibers
,
to be released, their dispersion and penetration, and the probable
equipment failures that will result from a test of that sort. We
need to have the capability of measuring all the variables that
are known to influence the final results. That is one of the
reasons Dugway is considered to be a favorable location. In
their past experience with airborne release of a number of chemi-
cal agents for the army, they have built up a very comprehensive
network of meteorological stations, so they have a knowledge of
the weather conditions over the entire range at the it.ime of re-
lease as well as before and after release. We will be able then
to modify our pretest predictions with the weather conditions
actually present.
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We do have a couple of mandatory prerequisites to conductingf
the end-to-end test. We need to have already established confi-
dence in our fire plume predictions, in the fiber release pre-
dictions, and in the models for fiber dissemination. Until we
have a good level of confidence established, it is probably
futile to go outdoors and start burning composites. Our chances
of finding fibers, knowing where they are going, and catching
them again would be quite uncertain. One concern is that if we
get a widespread dissemination footprint, the available fibers
are scattered over such a large area that the whole test may be-
come impractical to perform from the experimental point of view.
That is not to say that the problem is not there; it just becomes
very difficult to try to track down the results,
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IQuestion-
(What is the rationale for burning fiber first and then exploding
it? Isn't this kind of the reverse of what it should be?
Answer:
'The impact, or explode, and then burn seems to be the general
scenario for commercial aircraft accidents. We do not have the
final answers in from the aircraft manufacturers, but the pre-
liminary indications are that for most of the commercial aircraft
accidents the plane crashes and burns. Then, if there is an
impact, it will be a low-order type impact. It will not be an
explosion. A major impact like a crash occurs before the fire
and really does not have anything to do with disseminating carbon
fibers. The crash would scatter parts of the airplane around,
'but the fibers can not be scattered until after they have been
released from the composite by burning out the matrix. You have
to have a fire to burn the matrix out before the impact or ex-
plosion is going to have a significant effect on scattering fiber.
Most of the civil accidents that have been investigated do not
, have the kind of explosion that occurs after the fire has burned
lout the epoxy matrix. I am sure there are going to be a number of
exceptions to the above crash and burn situation, but I think,
for civil aircraft, you generally do not have the burn and then
explode situation.
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SURVEYS FOR SENSITIVITY TO FIBERS
AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS FROM FIBER
INDUCED FAILURES
A. J. Butterfield
The Bionetics Corporation
The surveys for sensitivities to fibers and potential impacts
,from fiber induced failures begins with a review of the survey work
completed to date and then describes an impact study involving
four industrial installations located in the Virginia - southeast
area. The observations and results from both the surveys and the
study provide guidelines for future efforts.
The surveys have been performed by a number of teams working
more or less together. Figures 1 and 2 summarize the status of
(surveys conducted to date.
The survey work was done with three broad objectives:
1	 1. Identify the pieces of potentially vulnerable equipment
has candidates for test.
2. Support the transfer function work by gaining an un-
!,derstanding of how fibers could get into a building.
3. Support the economic analysis by understanding what would
happen if fibers precipitated a failure in an item of equipment.
The surveys completed to date have covered both commercial and
public service installations. Figure 1 begins with hospitals where
the Hill-Burton Act sets the requirements for a hospital to receive
federal aid. The Hill-Burton specifications define a minimum level
of air filtration for operating rooms, cardiac care units, and in-
tensive care units in terms of a triple filtration system: a pre
filter; a secondary filter; and the last stage as a high efficiency
(HEPA) filter. The rest of the equipment in a hospital correlates
to electronic items in general use throughout the rest of the
,country. Hospitals live with a lint environment; therefore hospi-
'tal equipment tends to have good covers. Life critical equipment
;appears well protected.
For air traffic control, the surveys included the tower and
area traffic control centers outside of Boston plus the Washington
National Tower. The radars, the control rooms, the IFR rooms ; and
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HOSPITALS:
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all the pieces of equipment necessary to handle an airplane in the
air have air conditioning with good filtration and in most cases,
each item of equipment has a good enclosure or case.
The passenger areas of a terminal must control jet engine
,fumes. Each terminal handles the problem differently. Dallas -
Ft. Worth uses positive pressure; Boston uses activated carbon.
The surveys found air conditioning with extra filtration or some
means that would tend to minimize the ingestion of carbon fibers.
Reservation systems generally have open electronic equipment and
depend upon the air conditioning system for protection.
Airline operations equipment includes the computers and the
communication elements by which an airline schedules its airplanes,
schedules its maintenance, and schedules its own internal opera-
tions. These functions receive their protection from air condi-
tioning since most of the equipment tends to be open. Potentially
vulnerable items have been identified and are candidates for test.
Reviews of this particular area found power failure as the prin-
cipal problem. Most have some kind of emergency power system; and
Boston generally has to call on emergency power about four times
a year. Hangars are open. In the servicing of aircraft, equip-
ment can become exposed; however, sensitive pieces of equipment
have protective covers which tend to minimize the ingestion of
fibers. The lists have now defined those items which are open and
do need testing.
For telephone exchanges (Figure 2), the other big user of
electronics, the surveys included central offices and one military
base. Here, the range of equipment runs from fairly old to the
most modern of electronics. Some exchanges have better protection
than others. The surveys have identified a composite list of po-
tentially vulnerable equipment. Some of the patch boards and pass-
through circuitry that the telephone company uses appear potentially
quite sensitive. Some of that equipment finds its way into airport
equipment rooms and control towers. In such a case, should the
integrity of the tower be violated, it would probably be the tele-
phone items in the ground communication equipment that would suffer
first.
The post office uses digital equipment in cancelling and sort-
ing mail. Some show reasonable protection; however, the facility
surveyed had elevator shafts, roller doors, and windows such that
fibers could enter. The impact would be a return to hand sorting
if the equipment were down for an extended period of time.
Traffic light controllers show a similarity to telephone equip-
ment; they range from simple items to sophisticated equipment.
The combination of air flows, filtration and design features elim-
inates these items as a problem.
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Radio stations have their studio areas divided into small
rooms for isolation. This limits the ingestion of fibers however,
a fair amount of dust does get into the electronics. The field
survey found one transmitter that was an open building; newer
transmitters are moving away from open construction.
The digital electronics manufacturer protects the manufactur-
ing areas by air filtration and operates the building at a positive
pressure. Control computers are installed in a room-within-a-room.
If they lost their air conditioning system and their air filtration,
the economic impact would be the cost of cleaning any open equipment.
At the present time,survey efforts are considered completed for
hospitals, air traffic controls and traffic light controllers.
The last four industries were surveyed in detail to look at
the possible effects of a fiber release incident. In addition to
the general objectives which guided all the survey efforts, the
impact study carried the three special objectives as listed in
figure 3. This particular effort received cooperation and hospi-
tality from four major industrial installations located in the Vir-
ginia - southeast area. The basis for their selection was diversity
in product coupled with a dependence upon electrical equipment
throughout the manufacturing sequences.
IMPACT STUDY - INTENT AND OBJECTIVES
A DETAIL IMPACT STUDY WOULD PROVIDE:
(1) VERIFICATION OF DATA OBTAINED 	
- USEABLE DATA
(2) AN INITIAL SCOPING OF ANY POTENTIAL COST-RISK	 - FIRST ESTIMATES
(3) IDENTIFICATION OF DATA IMPROVEMENTS	 - DIRECTIONS FOR
REQUIRED FOR AN ACCEPTABLY COMPLETE	 FURTHER EFFORT
COST-RISK VALUE
INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS STUDIED:
(1) MANUFACTURE OF MACHINED METAL AND ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS
(2) ASSEMBLY OF MONOCHROME AND COLOR TELEVISION RECEIVERS
(3) ASSEMBLY OF LIGHT TRUCKS
(4) MANUFACTURE OF SYNTHETIC TEXTILE FIBERS AND YARN
Figure 3
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As listed in figure 4, the study used six steps to make the
detailed estimate of impact. The first step was aimed at under-
standing what went on inside that factory. The second step sought
out the vulnerable equipment and looked at what would happen in
the event of a failure. The third step clothed the failure inci-
dents with dollar costs. Step four drew from the information on
ventilation to define transfer functions that would show the kind
of barriers in the way of a carbon fiber entering the building.
Step five became a scenario for a carbon fiber release incident
plus the use of established mathematics to estimate a probability
for failure. Step six multiplied the values from step five and
step three to get the impact summary. This study is presently
on-going, therefore one plant will serve as an example to show the
method and then be compared to the other three.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate Step 1. These diagrams show a mod-
ern factory powered by four large transformers. All four work to-
gether in one room. The factory operates three independent lines
with each line producing one component. The electronic component
is sophisticated; the line has all the classical elements of a mod-
ern electronic fabrication facility. They make their own circuit
boards and use numerical controlled equipment to drill the holes
l in the circuit boards. The circuit assembly process uses automated
(techniques; digital controlled devices place the resistors and ca-
Ipacitors into the circuit boards; and hand stuffing completes the
IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLES
THE STUDY REQUIRED 6 STEPS TO GENERATE IMPACT PRODUCTS
1. DIAGRAM THE FACTORY IN TERMS OF: PRODUCT FLOW; VULNERABLE EQUIPMENT; AND
IN-PLACE PROTECTIONS,
2, IDENTIFY POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT IN TERMS OF: IMPACT OF
A FIBER-INDUCED FAILURE; AND THE KINDS OF LOSSES WHICH COULD OCCUR,
3, ESTIMATE THE POTENTIAL COST ASSOCIATED WITH EACH POTENTIAL FAILURE,
4, ESTIMATE AN EXPOSURE TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR EACH ITEM OF EQUIPMENT,
5, ESTIMATE THE PROBABILITY FOR SUCH A FAILURE BASED UPON A DEFINED RELEASE
INCIDENT AND BEST VALUES FOR E.
6, CALCULATE THE IMPACT PRODUCTS (PROBABILITY X COST ESTIMATE)
Figure 4
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IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLE
STEP 1, VULNERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR A METAL MACHINING AND ELECTRONIC
COMPONENT FACTORY,
POWER SUPPLY: 4 AIR-COOLED TRANSFORMERS LOCATED IN ONE ROOM
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IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLE
STEP 1, CONT'D VULNERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
PRECISION MACHINING LINE:
MACHINING	 ASSEMBLY/TEST
_Q MOTORS	 0 OPERATION
q ADJUSTMENT
q CALIBRATION
PROTECT: A/C
	
PROTECT: CLEAN ROOM
AUTOMATED MACHINING LINE.
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CONDITION
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q MACH, SEQUENCE CONTROL
	
q ASSEMBLY SEQUENCE CONTROL
PROTECT: A/C
	 AUX. FILTERS, UNIT FILTERS
Figure 6
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population. Digital equipment performs inspection sequences. This
particular circuit is balanced by very precise,laser trimmed re-
sistors. The values of the resistors are defined using digital
equipment; the resistors are trimmed using digital equipment. The
assembled units are conditioned by a thermal cycle burn-in as with
any high quality electronic component.
In assessing vulnerability, the electronic component has
coated circuit boards and is not considered vulnerable. The elec-
tronic equipment depends upon air conditioning filters and cabinet
filters for protection. Therefore the electronic component line
and the air cooled transformers show a degree of vulnerability.
Figure 6 diagrams the other two lines, one is a machining lane
for an electromechanical unit built to close tolerance. The ma-
chining is done in a separated area and the equipment operates in
the spray from the cutting fluids. Assembly has to be done under
very closely controlled environmental conditions. This particular
unit has to be operated, adjusted, and calibrated, all using digi-
tal test equipment. On the automated machining line, computers do
the sequencing and controlling of the steps during both machining
and assembly. In looking at the kinds of protections, the computers
in the automated line are also working in the spray from the cut-
; ting machines or in the dust from the lubricants used during as-
sembly. Filters which remove mist or stray lubricant will not pass
fibers. The filtration within clean rooms employs HEPA type fil-
ters which do not pass fibers. These two lines do not show a vul-
nerability to fibers.
The comparison to the other three factories must consider the
diversity intended in the selection for product and mode of opera-
tions. Figure 7 compares the characteristics of the four factories.
The assembly of televisions included a limited amount of fab-
rication, mostly plastic molding, together with a number of n.oving
belt assembly lines. Each television chassis size has a dedicated
assembly line which can accommodate different cabinetry and dif-
ferent small features from set to set. The assembly of light
trucks employs one large integrated line which can accommodate
every option that can go into a pickup truck from vehicle to ve-
hicle. The production of textile fibers requires a dedicated line
which runs continuously seven days a week around the clock.. This
plant has another product, nylon with a conductive carbon coat.
This material is used for control of static electricity in carpets.
In comparing the factories, the first two are "all under one
roof" type of operations. The truck assembly plant is about 50
years old and has a main assembly building plus warehouses and a
separate building to house the air compressors and steam boilers.
The fiber producer employs separate buildings for processing lines,
for spinning of yarn and for the crating of nylon.
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COMPARISON OF INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS: CHARACTERISTICS
MACHINING ELECTRONIC AUTOMOTIVE TEXTILE
ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLY ASSEMBLY FIBER
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Figure 8 compares some of the pertinent features of the four
industrial installations. The power systems showed both points of
diversity and elements of commonality. Transformers were located
in different places, many of them indoors, some clustered together,
some of them outdoors; and they employed different means for cool-
ing; but there was one commonality. All installations used a 13.2
kV inlet, all had air cooled high voltage switches. In the case
of the television factory, the cooling was secondary air flowing
around sealed cases. The automotive plant and the fiber plant had
the air cooled switches enclosed in outdoor type cabinets, louvered
inlets, vents at the top of the case, over-hanging roof for rain
protection. Outside air circulates through this type of cabinet.
The 440 volt power equipment showed a diversity which re-
flected the product of the plant. The television plant has to heat
plastics, the automotive plant has to weld, the fiber plant has to
control the speeds of the line. They achieve control by driving
a motor generator to produce a variable frequency. Variable fre-
quency 440 volt induction motors along the line will then all run
in step.
440 volt motors appear as the common denominator for all in-
dustry. They are running in the spray and mist of a machining
operation; they are hanging from the ceilings to drive an over-
head conveyor; they are buried under the floors to drive moving
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IMPACT STUDY
COMPARISON OF INDUSTRY INSTALLATIONS; FEATURES
MACHINING ELECTRONIC AUTOMOTIVE TEXTILE
FEATURES ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLY ASSEMBLY FIBER
POWER SYS, 4 TRANSFORMERS 16 TRANSFORMERS 9 TRANSFORMERS 9 TRANSFORMERS
1 LOCATION 6 LOCATIONS 9 LOCATIONS 9 LOCATIONS
INDOORS INDOORS MOSTLY INDOORS OUTDOORS
COOLING:
TRANSFORMER A-IR OIL OIL OIL
SWITCH AIR AIR AIR AIR
CT,	 BKRS, AIR AIR AIR AIR
44OV POWER MOTORS • MOTORS • MOTORS • MOTORS
MAJOR USE * HEATERS • WELDERS • FREQUENCY
CONVERTER
BUILDING
VENTILATION AIR COND, AIR COND, e WINDOWS MOSTLY OPEN
• HEATERS
FILTERS ALL AIR RECIRCULATE PAINT AREA ONLY "TONE
Figure 8
belt conveyors; and they are mounted over chemical vats to drive
process lines. At the present time, tests have shown that 110 volt
motors are not a problem, and 220 volt motors should be the same.
However, 4.40 volts is in the range which can create a sustaining
arc; and considering the wide usage, the vulnerability of 440 volt
motors must be defined by test.
The ventilation systems reflect the needs of the product.
Precision assembly and the fabrication of electronics benefit from
closed buildings with filtered air conditioning. The assembly of
automobiles has a dust-critical operation during spray painting.
The heat and vapors from a chemical process dissipate more readily
from an open building.
Figures
of the fault
vulnerable i
in the event
ure are then
cost.
9 and 10 illustrate Step
tree concept. This step
tem of equipment and then
of a fiber induced failu
presented in terms which
2 which employs an adaptation
first identifies any possibly
describes what would happen
re. The results of the fail-
would permit establishing a
For instance if a power transformer were to fail, it would
probably stop some of the lines, but offices would not go dark and
the maintenance people could work. In such a case, the considera-
tions would become: Would it be necessary to furlough people?
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IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLE
STEP 2, IMPACT SUMMARY
MAIN TRANSFORMER
(13.2KV SUPPLY)
DRILL
CONTROL
LASER
TRIM
HALT STOP OPERATION STOP OPERATION
MANUFACTURE SPOILED BATCH SPOILED UNITS
WORK FORCE TIME SPOILED BATCH SPOILED UNIT
LOST PRODUCT TROUBLESHOOT TROUBLESHOOT
START UP LOST TIME LOST TIME
RECOVER SCHEDULES STARVED LINE STARVED LINE
EQUIPMENT
ITEM
IMPACT, FIBER-
INDUCED FAILURE
LOSS
CONSIDERATIONS
Figure 9
IMPACT STUDY	 METHOD AND EXAMPLE
STEP 2, CONT'D	 IMPACT SUMMARY
EQUIPMENT
ITEM
INTEGRATOR
POPULATOR
INSPECTION
RESISTOR DEF.
ACCEPTANCE
MONITOR
CHAMBER
CONTROL
REDUCED CAPABILITY REDUCED CAPABILITY DELAY
SPOILED UNITS PRODUCT DELAY SPOILED BATCH
SPOILAGE TROUBLESHOOT SPOILED BATCH
TROUBLESHOOT RE-TEST TROUBLESHOOT
LOST TIME LOST TIME RE-TEST
DELIVERY RATE DELIVERY RATE DELIVERY RATE
IMPACT; FIBER-
INDUCED FAILURE
LOSS
CONSIDERATIONS
Figure 10
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Would machine stoppage spoil product? Would start-up require
clearing the machines and reprograming some computers? And, fin-
ally, in the case of a plant which supplies another assembly line,
would they have to recover their schedule?
`	 For some of the other items (Figure 10), the situation is a
little different. The considerations include spoiled batches
and the time required to trouble shoot or repair; meanwhile there
,
would be lost time for the operators. A prolonged down time of
a piece of equipment could starve the rest of the assembly line
or at least reduce the capability for production.
Figure 11 compares the potentially vulnerable equipment with-
in the four factories. For power, the common use of air cooled
,switches both indoors and outdoors appears vulnerable. For the
440 volt equipment, some work reported by the Navy has shown that
440 volt buses with air ventilation can create a sustaining arc
and burn up; a similar situation may exist in large 440 volt motors
with open windings. In the textile fiber plant, the frequency con-
verter appears potentially vulnerable.
For low voltage analog types of equipment,the vulnerability of
temperature controllers has been recognized. The television plant
has two areas of concern. A television set has to be aligned and
(tuned to the frequencies of the commercial stations. This requires
IMPACT STUDY
COMPARISON OF INDUSTRY INSTALLATIONS: POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE EQUIPMENT
ELEMENT MACHINING ELECTRONIC AUTOMOTIVE TEXTILE
ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLY ASSEMBLY FIBER
POWER AIR-COOLED AIR-COOLED OUTDOOR
SWITCHES SWITCHES SWITCHES
440V •	 VENTILATED BUS FREQUENCY
EQUIPMENT •	 OPEN WINDINGS CONVERTER
LOW TEMPERATURE
•	 TEST SIGNAL WELD TIMERS TEMPERATURE
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Figure 11
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an oscillator to generate the test signals and circuitry to support
operations on the assembly lines. At any time during assembly, a
number of television sets operate with their cases open; under
such conditions there is some vulnerable product. The assembly of
automotive sheet metal relies on spot welding; the welding timers
operate exposed with uncoated circuit boards. These units must be
considered vulnerable.
Low voltage digital equipment has an identified vulnerability.)
The automotive industry appears to be expanding the use of digital
controlled robotic manipulators within the welding operations. In
addition, teletype printer stations throughout the factory provide
the means for achieving integration across the entire assembly pro-j
cess.	 I
Figure 12 compares the potential impact of a fiber induced
failure within types of vulnerable equipment. The failure of a
power switch would halt manufacturing in one plant, halt assembly
in another and, in the textile plant, it would shut down one or
more lines. The 440 volt equipment has the same capability for
impact. Low voltage equipment does not show quite the potential
for impact; however, line stoppage is still a significant expense.
IMPACT STUDY
COMPARISON OF POTENTIAL FOR IMPACT
POTENTIAL MACHINING ELECTRONIC AUTOMOTIVE TEXTILE
FAILURE OF ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLY ASSEMBLY FIBER
POWER; HALT HALT ASSEMBLY STOPS ONE
TRANSFORMER MANUFACTURE - OR MORE
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As shown in figure 13, the first step in the estimation of a
cost requires defining how a factory would respond to a failure;
and there seemed to be no common way these factories would re-
spond. The factory supplying another assembly line would prob-
ably have to recover the delivery schedules. A factory that main-
tained an inventory supply may elect to defer any catch-up of pro-
duction. A continuous operating plant does not have much flexibil-
ity for improving delivery or recovering lost production. The loss
terms were converted to costs expressed as lost labor hours, num-
ber of product lost, and estimates of materials involved. The con-
version to dollars used data that came from such sources as Chamber
of Commerce publications, Industrial Association publications and
to the extent practical,data from the Bureau of the Census. A
national estimate for an economic impact on industry must find a
way to use census data.
As shown in figure 14, the transfer function took the simplest
practical approach. The A. D. Little Company, during previous work,
had devised an equation for the transfer function based on filter
efficiencies and the relative ventilation flow rates throughout the
factory. This equation was considered adequate for the purposes of
this study. The transfer function appears as a product with one
term which describes the factory and the other term which describes
i the cabinet that houses the electronics.
IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLES
STEP 3, ESTIMATION OF A COST
• DEFINE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE-TO-FAILURE ACTION.
• ESTIMATE THE CORRESPONDING IMPACT FOR EACH ITEM OF EQUIPMENT AND EACH
LOSS CONSIDERATION IN TERMS OF: LABOR HOURS; PRODUCT; MATERIALS.
o CONVERT TO DOLLARS USING AVAILABLE PUBLISHED DATA.
Figure 13
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IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLES
STEP 4, TRANSFER FUNCTION, ASSUMPTIONS:
ACCEPT THE ADL EQUATION BASED UPON VENTILATION PARAMETERS AND FILTER
EFFICIENCIES,
TRANSFER FUNCTION =	 Q + (1 - NI) M	 1 - NC)
	
Q + M + NR R	 J
RELATIVE FLOW RATES
	 FILTER EFFICIENCIES:
0 = INFILTRATION
	 NI	 INLET FILTER
M = MAKE UP	 NR	 RECIRCULATION FILTER
R = RECIRCULATION
	 NC	 CABINET FILTER
9 ASHRAE DUST SPOT EFFICIENCIES CORRELATE TO FIBER EFFICIENCIES:
ASHRAE
	 FIBER	 ASHRAE 7	 FIBER 7
	
10-35	 90	 45-80
	 98.5
	
35-40
	 97	 80-90	 99
	
40-45	 98
Figure 14
Other work reported by the A. D. Little Company indicated that
air conditioning filters showed a correlation between the efficiency
for stopping fibers and the efficiency as rated by the ASHRAE dust
spot method. As interpolated from the published data, the values
shown represent the efficiencies for removing fibers as correlations
to the efficiencies measured by dust spot ratings. The assumption
is limited to just those kinds of filter materials used in indus-
trial installations.
Figure 15 outlines the assumptions used to calculate the prob-
ability for a failure. The equation shown assumes the failure is
precipitated by a single fiber. The values selected for E become
the best estimates extracted from existing test data. The outside
exposure of 10 5 fiber seconds per cubic meter represents an esti-
mate for a median fiber release incident.
Figure 16 shows the kinds of results appearing after pre-
liminary calculations. Relative to the transfer functions, the
value shown for the transformer/13 kV switch represents the basic
air conditioning system. The populator has air conditioning plus
a cabinet filter. Acceptance test represents a room-within-a-room
with precise temperature control. The chamber control relfects
air conditioning plus a tight cabinet.
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IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLE
STEP 5	 ESTIMATE A PROBABILITY FOR FAILURE
• PROBABILITY OF FAILURE	 =	 1 - e-EiIE
E  = EXPOSURE
E = AVERAGE EXPOSURE TO CAUSE A FAILURE (TEST DATA)
• ASSUME A FIBER RELEASE INCIDENT RESULTING IN AN OUTSIDE EXPOSURE OF 105
THEN,	
E 
	 = T,F (105)
STEP 6	 IMPACT PRODUCT
(PROBABILITY) X (COST ESTIMATE)
Figure 15
IMPACT STUDY METHOD AND EXAMPLE
CALCULATION ASSUMING AN EXPOSURE OF 105
TRANSFER PROBABILITY FAILURE IMPACT
ELEMENT FUNCTION E OF FAILURE EST,	 COST PRODUCT
TRANSFORMER 3,2 X 10 -2 105 6,4 X 10 -2 $8 X 104 $	 5,2 X 103
(13 KV SWITCH)
POPULATOR 3,0 X 10 -4 106 1,2 X 10 -4 $4 X 102 $	 4,9 X 10-2
(COMPUTER)
ACCEPTANCE 2,2 X 10 -5 106 1,4 X 10 -5 $4 X 102 $	 5.5 X 10-3
TEST
CHAMBER 6,2 X 10 -4 107 6,2 X 10 -6 $4 X 104 $	 2,5 X 10-1
CONTROL
Figure 16
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For the E values listed, the chamber control reflects a gen-
eral knowledge of typical units. The 10 6 values correlate to test
results on typical computers employed in such installations. The
value listed for the transformer/13 kV switch is an engineering
estimate. The values shown for the probability of failure include
the effects of a multiple installation where a failure in any one
unit could produce the estimated cost.
In assessing costs, clearing a failure within a computer does
not incur a large penalty particularly if companion units do not
fail (only one failure in a group). Loss of a half day of produc-
tion during a thermal excursion has a significant cost impact. A
power failure which halts manufacture has a major impact.
The consequence of a power failure persists into the impact
product and result in the only significant value. The costs associ-
ated with a half day of production are offset by the low probabil-
ity for a chamber control failure to cause a thermal runaway.
The findings from the study as listed in figure 17 show that
failures within power equipment have the potential for causing the
kinds of economic impact associated with the shut-down of a factory.)
Low voltage equipment can fail and cause a significant economic
impact such as loss of a half days production. Fortunately, the
IMPACT STUDY FINDINGS
OBSERVATIONS FROM THE STUDY:
POWER:	 ONLY FAILURES WITHIN POWER EQUIPMENT SHOW A POTENTIAL FOR MAJOR
ECONOMIC IMPACT,
LOW	 WIDE USAGE IN IMPORTANT APPLICATIONS,
VOLTAGE:	 FAILURES COULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC IMPACT.
PROTECTIONS: FILTERS AND CABINETS IN-USE APPEAR TO PROVIDE ORDERS-OF-MAGNITUDE
BUFFERING,
Figure 17
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L
esent protections of air conditioning and good cabinets moderate
y chances for failure.
Figure 18 summarizes the results from the surveys relative to
{further effort. The areas of hospitals and air traffic control
o not seem to have a problem. For other essential service equip-
s"ent, the surveys have generated candidate lists of items for test.
Industry cost modeling requires more data. Future work must look
t high voltage and 440 volt equipment first. Test data must in-
s
lude a wider range of filter media, since industry uses a corre-
pondingly wide range. There is a need for a correlation to other
economic data such as provided by the Bureau of the Census. There-
ore, surveys must continue toward developing a method for relating
^o the bulk of federal data. The DOE has a test plan to evaluate
sigh voltage equipment and requires the coordinating of information
such that areas of concern do receive evaluation by test. Finally
tr.he current test program for vulnerability and for filter transfer
=ill require a continuing liaison toward updating candidate lists
_[_n the light of new data.
CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS FROM THE SURVEYS
APPLIED TO FUTURE COST RISK ASSESSMENT EFFORTS
1, HOSPITAL AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL EQUIPMENT APPEAR TO HAVE GOOD
PROTECTION.
2, SURVEYS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE EQUIPMENT HAVE IDENTIFIED POTENTIALLY
VULNERABLE ITEMS.
3. COST IMPACT MODELING FOR INDUSTRY NOT COMPLETE; DATA FROM SURVEYS
AND TESTS NEEDED TO:
• DEFINE VULNERABILITIES OF HIGH VOLTAGE AND 440 V EQUIPMENT
• CHARACTERIZE FILTER EFFICIENCIES AND TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
• ESTABLISH A CORRELATION TO OTHER ECONOMIC DATA
4, ACTIONS INDICATED:
• PLAN AND CONDUCT ADDITIONAL SURVEYS
is COORDINATE WITH DOE IN THE TEST PLANNING FOR HIGH VOLTAGE EQUIPMENT
• EVALUATE RESULTS FROM ON GOING TESTS
Figure 18
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Pertinent Questions and Answers
(1) Question:
Have any surveys looked at nuclear or other electrical gener-
ating stations for effects on control rooms or vulnerable equip-
ment?
Answer:
No visits have been made to any electric power plants; the
DOE is charged with that responsibility. In a review of the re-
quirements for nuclear plants, their specifications consider
seismic effects, and they also require the capability to seal
the control rooms such that they become self-sustaining entities
in the event of an emergency. Control of power plants does not
appear as a problem.
There is no definitive data to show what happens when fibers
get into an area that is concentration critical, here the presence
of fibers can distort the electric field. These effects are part
of the reasoning behind the DOE test program. There has been some
work done by BRL, by the Navy, and by other agencies; they have
identified the principal areas of uncertainty.
(2) Question:
What did the airport surveys find for landing aids such as
glideslope transmitters and similar equipment?
Answer:
These items are usually located out along the runways in a
sealed building or at least with filtered air. The electronics
are mounted in closed or sealed cases. They do not appear as a
problem.
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RISK METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW
Karen R. Credeur
NASA Langley Research Center
Figure 1 gives the agenda for the risk methodology
overview. Before talking specifically about the carbon
fiber risk methodology, I'd like to talk about risk methodology
in general. We'll talk about some considerations of risk
estimation, how risk is measured, and how risk analysis
decisions are made. We'll then turn to the specific problem
of carbon fiber release where I will review the objective,
describe the main elements, and give an example of the
risk logic and outputs.
RISK ANALYSIS CONTENT
1 GENERAL
- ESTIMATION
- MEASUREMENT
- DECISION
1 SPECIFIC
- OBJECTIVE
- ELEMENTS
- EXAMPLE
- LOGIC
- OUTPUTS
Figure 1
Risk estimation involves a number of considerations, as out-
lined in figure 2. Among these are the objective, the elements of
the individual problem, the methods that are used, and how those
methods are chosen and tested. Another consideration is whether
the methods used are analytic or approximate; under "approximate"
we're particularly interested in whether simulation is used. We
are also concerned with what assumptions are made. For example,
are all filters properly installed? How much carbon fiber is
carried and by what types of planes? What kind of electronics
will be used in 1993? Another component of risk estimation is
scope. Under scope we are interested in both micro and macro
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RISK ESTIMATION
1 OBJECTIVE
1 ELEMENTS
1 METHODS
1 ASSUMPTIONS
1 SCOPE; MICRO, MACRO, LIMITS
1 ERRORS
1 SENSITIVITY STUDIES
1 WORST CASES
Figure 2
analysis. "Micro" and "macro" are used here as economic terms and
mean "bottom up" and "top down," respectively. Micro refers to
the details of the problem whereas macro refers more to an over-
view. Mr. Ansel Butterfield gave a good example of a micro anal-
ysis when he talked about the costing of industrial plants. An
example of a macro analysis would be trying to cost a power outage
resulting from the carbon fiber problem by using costs of power
outages resulting from non carbon-fiber problems. Part of scope
are the limits of the risk analysis. Limits are closely tied with
assumptions. Two limits, for example, in the carbon fiber study
are restriction to just the commercial part of civil aviation and
to just single fibers.
A major consideration in risk estimation is errors. Errors
are involved in the elements, methods, assumptions, and scope.
How these errors are defined and presented are two important parts
of the problem. Sensitivity studies show how variations in the
elements affect the risk; in particular, they indicate which of
the elements are the main contributors to the risk. A sensitivity
study is done by varying only one parameter, or perhaps one group
of the parameters, while holding all other elements fixed and re-
calculating the risk for each variation of the parameter. Worst
cases are usually important to present. Furthermore, if, as in
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(most risk analyses concerning rare events, simulation forms the
basis of the methodology, the worst cases might not be obtained
among the simulated cases and, hence, must be calculated
separately.
Figure 3 gives the units and format for risk measurement.
The usual units are fatalities, injuries, dollars and complaints.
As Mr. Heldenfels noted in his talk, fatalities and injuries are
,usually the most important units. However, as he also pointed
out, they don't seem to be an issue in this problem. Complaints
can't be ignored even though the dollars are small, and there
are no fatalities or injuries. Because nearly all risk analyses
involve probabilities which range from 0 to 1, the main output is
in terms of a curve instead of a point. Two types of curves that
are commonly used are what are called density and cumulative curves
and I will be giving examples of these later. Even though the main
result is a curve it is usually important to have one or more sum-
'iary measures. Some of the typical types of summary measures are
peans, medians, modes, extremes, and various combinations of these
Ilfour. Again, error bounds are usually important in any type of
frisk analysis, and they can be shown in various ways.
RISK MEASUREMENT
UNITS
FATALITIES
INJURIES
DOLLARS
COMPLAINTS
FORMAT;
CURVE: DENSITY, CUMULATIVE
POINT: MEAN, MEDIAN, MODE, EXTREME, OTHERS
ERROR BOUNDS
Figure 3
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The main elements of risk decision are given in figure 4.
The first job in decision making is defining the decision maker.
Sometimes he is not specifically defined. Sometimes the decision
maker is a body of people. The second job is determining the
measures that are important to the decision maker. These mea-
sures, or acceptability criteria, vary with the problem and with
the decision maker. The first acceptability criterion usually
concerns the actual values. If the risk curves have many ex-
tremely large values or all very small values, the remaining
acceptability criteria may not be important. Under "actual value"
one is concerned with whether the value is direct or indirect. An
example of a direct cost in the carbon fiber problem is equipment
replacement and repair. An example of an indirect cost would be
product loss, as Mr. Butterfield illustrated, resulting from
equipment that has malfunctioned because of the carbon fiber
problem.
RISK DECISION
1 DECISION MAKER
1 ACCEPTABILITY CRITERIA (VARIES WITH PROBLEM
AND DECISION MAKER)
- ACTUAL VALUE
- DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT
- COMPARISON WITH OTHER RISKS
- VOLUNTARY VERSUS INVOLUNTARY
- COMPARISON WITH BENEFITS
Figure 4
once we have analyzed the actual risk values, we are then
interested in comparing these values with those from other types
of risk. For example, how does the probability of failure to a
stereo from the carbon fiber problem compare with the probability
of failure to a stereo from all other causes. How does the
carbon-fiber risk compare with other types of risk, for example,
risks from floods, tornadoes, driving, and private flying. In
making risk comparisons, two concerns are voluntary risk versus
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involuntary risk. Voluntary risk is risk a person imposes upon
himself. Involuntary risk is risk imposed upon the person. Ex-
amples of voluntary risk are flying a private plane and driving
an automobile. Involuntary risk is exampled by being a passenger
in a commercial airplane. Needless to say, people are much more
willing to accept voluntary risk than they are involuntary risk.
We are also interested in comparing risk with benefits in terms
of the curves and summary statistics. If the benefits greatly
outweigh the risks, then the decision maker leans toward accep-
tance of the risk. However, a benefit-risk comparison is never
the sole criterion for decision making. If, for example, a pro-
gram would have huge benefits but is such that there would be a
high probability of destroying two cities, the program would
not be accepted.
Figure 5 gives an example of a risk comparison. This figure,
which is called a risk profile, comes from a risk analysis of the
operation of water-cooled nuclear power plants in the United
States. This nuclear reactor safety study was commissioned by the
United States Atomic Energy Commission and directed by Dr. Norman
C. Rasmussen of M.I.T. The vertical axis gives the number of
events per year exceeding various dollar damages that are shown on
the horizontal axis. The curve for natural events is dominated by
hurricanes. The second main contributor is tornadoes. The main
component of the man-caused events is huge fires. Among other
events are mine disasters and industrial explosions. The "100
RISK COMPARISONS
NATURAL
EVENTS
1/10	 MAN
CAUSED
EVENTS
1/100
1/1000
FREQUENCY
(EVENTS/YEAR)
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100 NUCLEAR
	
1/1,000,000	 POWER
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106	107	108	 109	 10
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Figure 5
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nuclear power plants" means that the nuclear-plant population
considered consists of 100 plants, rather than just one plant.
That is, if the probability of one accident at one plant is It
then the probability of one accident out of a population of 100
plants is 100 times "x".
The plot indicates that the damage from both at least one
natural event, such as a hurricane, and one man-caused event, such
as a large fire, can be expected to exceed $10 million once every
year and $10 billion once every 1000 years. Equivalent damage
from nuclear reactor accidents occurring within a population of
100 nuclear plants is expected to happen much less frequently.
Note that automobile accidents, which had about $15 billion in
property damage when the three curves were constructed, were not
included in the man-caused events. In a subsequent talk Dr. Joseph
Fiksel of Arthur D. Little will compare the current risk profile
for the carbon-fiber problem with the risk profiles shown in
figure 5.
As you heard previously, and as shown in figure 6, the first
objective of the carbon fiber risk analysis is to estimate the
risk to the nation over the next 15 years from the use of carbon
fiber in civil aircraft. The methodology is a logical, systematic
analysis that strives to reduce the subjectivity of the risk
CARBON FIBER RISK ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES
1 ESTIMATE RISK TO NATION OVER NEXT 15 YEARS FROM USE OF CARBON FIBER IN
CIVIL AIRCRAFT
- REDUCE SUBJECTIVITY (ESTIMATE, ERRORS)
1 PROVIDE FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION MAKING ON MATERIAL USAGE, MODIFICATION, AND
PROTECTION SCHEMES
NOTE: OTHER RISK ANALYSIS:
- AUTOMOBILES: SEAT BELT USAGE
- LIQUIFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG): TRANSPORTATION,STORAGE
- NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (WATER-COOLED): OPERATION
- OIL (SPILLS): TRANSPORTATION
- VACCINATIONS: SMALL PDX, SWINE FLU
Figure 6
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estimate and of the errors associated with that estimate. The
second objective is to provide a framework for decision making on
material usage, material modification, and protection schemes.
Note that other risk analyses have parallel objectives. Some of
the more recent risk analyses are usage of seat belts in automo-
biles, transportation and storage of liquified natural gas (LNG),
operation of water-cooled nuclear power plants - the study we just
discussed for figure 5, comparison of transportation methods for
oil so that spills are minimized, and mass vaccinations for the
public; smallpox and swine flu being two examples.
As shown in figure 7, the carbon-fiber risk-analysis elements
can be described in terms of three levels. The first is the local
level, which is some type of geographic subdivision of the United
States. The second is the national level, given that you have an
estimate of the risk on the local levels. The third level in-
volves extrapolating the risk estimate from the national level into
the future. As noted in a previous paper, we're using the next
fifteen years 1978-1993 as the future. As you also heard previ-
ously, some of the main elements on the local level are aircraft
accident probability, dispersion of carbon fiber, transfer func-
tion, vulnerability, and costing. On the national level some of
the main elements are number of accidents per year and the location
of these accidents. Among considerations for location are whether
the accident sites are near mountains or large bodies of water and
CARBON FIBER RISK ANALYSIS ELEMEN
LOCAL:
- AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
- DISPERSION OF CARBON FIBER
- TRANSFER FUNCTION
- VULNERABILITY
- COSTING
NATIONAL:
- NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS PER YEAR
- LOCATION OF ACCIDENTS
FUTURE (1978-1993):
- CARBON-FIBER USAGE PROJECTIONS
- ACCIDENT STATISTICS CHANGES
- TECHNOLOGY CHANGES
Figure 7
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what the population and electronic densities are. Some of the
main elements on the future level are carbon fiber usage pro-
jections, accident statistics changes, and technology changes.
The next three figures are sequential illustrations of the
logic for generating damage from an accident involving fire.
This logic is an example of what is called an event tree or a
decision tree. All our risk methodologists use some type of
event tree like this one, although of much greater complexity and
not necessarily in the sequence shown. Although this is a very
simplified tree compared to what is actually used, at least one
representation of each of the main elements of the carbon-fiber
problem is included. The elements of the risk assessment under
evaluation are identified across the bottom of the next three
figures, that is: accident probability, source, dispersion
transfer function, vulnerability, and costing. Across the top
of the three figures are the data sources for these various
elements: operation rates, accident records, weather records,
census maps, experiments, surveys, and pathfinder studies.
Calculations are made at each of the nodes. Some calculations
involve analytic models; others, random selections.
The first node, shown in figure 8, represents the occurrence
of an accident involving fire. The second node represents the
choice of the location for the accident. Air traffic in the
United States can be represented by the traffic at the 26 large
EXAMPLE EVENT TREE
DATA	 OPERATION	 ACCIDENT	 ACCIDENT
SOURCE
	
RATES	 RECORDS	 RECORDS
TYPE OF
LOCATION	 OPERATIONAL PRASE
	 DAIKE
ACCIDENT
	 F	 SOURCE/
PROBABILITY
Figure 8
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hub airports with everything else lumped into all "other." The
number in parenthesis approximately gives the number of opera-
tions per airport. The airport selection is made by a random
'selection process. This selection process can be illustrated in
the choice of the operational phase. Accident records show that
;fire accidents occur 250 of the time in take-off; 450, in landing;
15%, in cruise; and 15% in static or taxi operation. The selec-
tion of the operational phase can be illustrated by use of a
roulette wheel. Moving clockwise, assign the first 250 of the
roulette wheel to take-off; assign the next 45% to landing; the
next 15% to cruise; and the last 15% to taxi/static. The roulette
wheel is therefore divided into four areas with proportions
corresponding to the probability of an accident in take-off, land-
ing, cruise, and static or taxi operation. For this example, a
spin of the roulette wheel selects "cruise" as the operational
phase. Although this is a very simple example, all random simu-
lations are performed in a similar manner. The next node selects
the type of damage. The type of damage determines, in part, the
amount of fiber released. In this example "substantial" is
selected using the random process based on statistics from acci-
Ident records.
A similar random selection process is used to select the size
of an aircraft, which affects source. The three aircraft size
categories are shown in figure 9. The probability of an explosion
EXAMPLE EVENT TREE
LOGIC FOR GENERATING DAMAGE FROM AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING FIRE
ACCIDENT	 ACCIDENT	 WEATHER
RECORDS
	
RECORDS	 RECORDS
WIND
PLANE SIZE	 EXPLOSION?	 DIFUTION
/DISPERSION
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DOLLARS:
REPAIR/REPLACE $
DOWNTIME $
PRODUCT LOSS $
OVERTIME $
$
TRANSFER
FUNCTION
(BLDG,
TYPES)
VULNERABILITY
(EQUIP, TYPES)
is also determined by random selection. The presence of an ex-
plosion determines not only how much material is released, but
how far it disperses. If there is an explosion, most of the
material is likely to be contained within a 10-mile area. If
there is not an explosion, much of the material can be dispersed
as far away as 100 kilometers or more. One of the two explosion
paths is chosen using the random process. The wind direction is
determined by random selection from weather records for the loca-
tion chosen in the first step. At this point, the use of the
random selection processes is completed. The dispersion of re-
leased carbon fibers can now be calculated based on an accident
scenario constructed from probabilities derived from accident
records, operational experience, and projections of the amount of
carbon fiber to be used on aircraft in the future. The dispersion
footprints, or isopleths of constant exposure, are related to spe-
cific geographical locations.
As illustrated in figure 10, by using a census map, with the
various exposure isopleths superimposed, the areas of the city and
countryside affected can be identified. The example in figure 10
shows only three such areas: commercial, public (which could be
post offices, hospitals, and fire stations), and residential.
Given the areas affected, the next step is to determine transfer
functions into the building types within each of these areas and {
the vulnerability of the various equipment types within each build
ing type. Equipment examples are: computers in the commercial
EXAMPLE EVENT TREE
CENSUS MAP
	 EXPERIMENTS
	
SURVEYS
SURVEYS
	
PATHFINDER STUDIES
Figure 10
168
(districts, stereos and televisions in the residential areas, and
telephone exchanges in the public area. Finally, the dollar loss
is determined using impact surveys and pathfinder studies. Four
..examples of impact costs are repair or replacement of equipment,
overtime, downtime, and product losses. The sum of these costs
gives the cost impact from one accident. By using the historical
five or six accidents a year involving fire, the random selection
of nodes in the event tree and the cost calculation is repeated
,five or six times and the cost summed to obtain one estimate of
the national risk. However, one estimate is not enough to obtain
a statistical distribution of estimates and, therefore, the cal-
culations of the national risk must be repeated a large number of
itimes.
Suppose we repeat these calculations 1,000 times and that
they give the results shown in figure 11. The first two columns
of figure 11 give dollar values for a year's national costs, or
damages, and the number of the 1,000 trials that had those
dollar values. For example, the first line of the first two
Icolumns gives that 50 of these 1,000 trials had zero costs. Per-
Ihaps very little fiber was released or perhaps all that was re-
"leased went over the water or into the countryside. The last line
gives one case that had a very high cost. Perhaps this case
resulted from use of a jumbo plane and carbon-fiber release over
(highly industrialized areas.
EXAMPLE
DENSITY AND CUMULATIVE TABLE
NATIONAL COSTS
TRIALS THAT YEARLY TRIALS THAT
HAVE $ VALUE NATIONAL DENSITY HAVE $ VALUE CUMULATIVE
OF $X COSTS.	 $(X)	 X PROBABILITY	 - PRODUCT OF ` $X PROBABILITY
50 0 ,05 0 1000 1.00
200 $	 11000 .20 $	 200 950 .95
100 10,000 .10 11000 750 .75
400 100,000 .40 40,000 650 .65
246 200,000 .246 49,200 250 .25
3 11000,000 .003 3,000 4 .004
1 10,000,000 .001 10,000 1 .001
1000 = 103,400
EXPECTED NATIONAL VALUE	 $103,400
Figure 11
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From the first two columns of numbers, we calculate a den-
sity function, with values given in the third column, by simply
taking the number of trials that have a certain yearly national
cost and dividing that number by 1,000. Note that, to simplify
the example, all numbers in figure 11 are rounded off and grouped
into only seven categories; in reality, of course, there are
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of categories. The fourth column
gives the product of the second and third columns. This column
weighs the dollar costs by the frequency with which they occur.
Summing up these dollar costs gives the expected value, which is
the most common summary statistic used in risk analyses. The ex-
pected national value of $103,400 in this example is very small,
especially with respect to the extreme of $10 million. In this
example, there is a very high frequency of middle and small costs
that tend to drown out the very large costs.
Some of the other types of summary risk measurements are the
median cost, which is $100,000.and the extremes, which are $0 and
$10 million. A particular interest is the frequency with which
the upper extreme occurs. One way of looking at this .001 fre-
quency is to say that roughly every one in a thousand years a
$10 million national cost can be expected. The last column gives
the cumulative probability, which is the basis of the most fre-
quently used type of curve in risk analyses. This column is ob-
tained by simply cumulating the probability given in the third
column. For example, the bottom values of 0.001 are the same.
The next-to-bottom cumulative probability is obtained by adding
the two bottom density probabilities of 0.001 and 0.003.
In figure 12, these cumulative probabilities have been
plotted to give a risk profile. The ordinate gives the values
from the last column of figure 11. The abscissa gives property
damage in dollars. Note that the curve is plotted on a log scale.
The error bounds in this illustrative problem are equally weighed
except when they're bounded by one.
Figure 13 gives several summary points about the capability
of risk analysis methodology. First, risk methodology integrates
the data and engineering judgment into a logical framework.
Second, it combines both deterministic and probabilistic models.
Third, it permits sensitivity analyses of key assessments. Two
examples are the carbon fiber usage projections and the nature of
released fiber; in particular, the fall rate. For example, what
are the effects from single fibers versus those from lint or
clumps. Finally, risk methodology permits evaluation for alter-
native sources, where alternative sources might be exampled by
general aviation or helicopters in civil aircraft or by other
types of sources such as automobiles.
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CAPABILITY OF RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
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AN ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL RISK	 12
Leon Pocinki
ORI, Inc.
I will present a status report on the ORI assessment of
the risk at Washington National Airport and the surrounding
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area associated with commercial
operations of aircraft with graphite fiber composite in their
structures. Figure 1 is an outline of my presentation.
OUTLINE
• OVERALL STRATEGY
• NEED FOR INDIVIDUAL AIRPORT RESULTS
• AIRPORT-METRO AREA MODEL
SUB MODELS
METHOD
ASSUMPTIONS
DATA
• PRELIMINARY RESULTS FOR NATIONAL AIRPORT
D.C. AREA
Figure 1
First, I'd like to spend a minute discussing the overall
strategy and the resulting need for individual airport analyses
of the type we're going to describe. I shall then describe the
actual model for assessing the risk to an airport and to the
surrounding metropolitan area. Then, for that risk assessment
model, I'd like to describe the set of submodels that comprise
the overall model. Each one of the submodels will be described
in terms of its three principal elements: the method that is
used, the assumptions that are reauired in order to use that
method, and the required data. Types, sources, and some examples
of the data that are required as input to each model will be
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presented. Finally, we'll present preliminary results based
on those data, using the methods we will have described, for the
Washington, D.C. - Washington National Airport risk analysis.
The overall strategy for developing the national risk profile,
that Dr. Credeur showed us in a hypothetical example earlier,
is shown schematically in figure 2. The cycle in the middle
tells us that we're still discussing among ourselves, and with the
Project Officer and her associates, the appropriate methods to
use for blending the risk profiles developed for individual
airports. On the other hand, all the methods that we've discussed
to date involve combining results for individual airports in
order to develop the national risk profile. For this reason, we
felt it was necessary to analyze at least one airport and develop
methods that could be applied to any airport, given appropriate
data for that locale. With that in mind, I would like to describe
the model for the individual airport and, as I said earlier, we
will blow that up in detail and describe all the subelements
that comprise that model in terms of the methods used, assump-
tions made, and the necessary input data.
NATIONAL RISK PROFILE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
COMPETITIVE
RISK PROFILES	 METHODS	 NATIONAL
FOR INDIVIDUAL	 UNDER	 RISK
AIRPORTS	 CONSIDERATION	 PROFILE
Figure 2
The airport model involves the major steps shown on figure 3.
We first have to decide what time frame we're interested in and
how long a time period we want to simulate. For that period, we
estimate the number of accidents at this airport. Then for each
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AIRPORT-METRO AREA
GRAPHITE FIBER
RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL
• SELECT TIME PERIOD
• ESTIMATE NO. OF ACCIDENTS AT THIS AIRPORT DURING
PERIOD
PROCESS ACCIDENT
REPEAT FOR ALL ACCIDENTS IN PERIOD
• COMPUTE STATISTICS OVER ALL SAMPLES
Figure 3
accident simulated, we do something called "Process Accident",
which involves computing the likelihood of damage to different
facilities and estimating the resulting costs. We repeat that
step for all the accidents in the time period we're modeling. We
then generate more accidents for another time period and compute
the statistics over all periods (or samples) to get the type of
'statistical distribution that Dr. Credeur showed us earlier. The
statistical distribution is obtained, therefore, by the use of
what is generally called a "Monte Carlo Simulation." What I'd
,like to do now is expand on the risk assessment model and discuss
jit in terms of its components.
We will concentrate on the calculations we're doing for 1985
!;as our time period or time frame. Let's discuss the first step
beyond that one in the risk assessment model for a particular
airport or area. It is necessary to start with an estimate of
the expected number of accidents at an airport during the
simulated time period. As indicated on figure 4, the method is
to allocate a fraction of the national total accidents to the
combination of aircraft category and airport. The fraction is
the ratio of operations for that aircraft type - aircraft
combination to operations for the total U.S. Incidentally, the
format we're following in figures 4 and 5 is the one I'd like to
;use throughout: method, assumption, and the data that is used
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ESTIMATE NUMBER OF
ACCIDENTS IN SAMPLE
TIME PERIOD
METHOD:
• ESTIMATE NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS FOR YEAR OF INTEREST
• FOR EACH A/C CATEGORY-AIRPORT, COMPUTE RATIO OF
OPERATIONS TO TOTAL U.S. OPERATIONS
ASSUMPTION:
• EXPECTED NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS IS PROPORTIONAL TO
NUMBER OF OPERATIONS
Figure 4
DATA:
• NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD:
ESTIMATE 6 FIRE ACCIDENTS IN U.S. FOR 1985
• FAA AIRPORT EMISSIONS DATA BASE/WASHINGTON NATIONAL
AIRPORT OPERATIONS IN 1985:
1. LARGE (DC-10, L1011, 747 ...) 	 18,850
2. MEDIUM (727, 757, 767, 707, DC-8 ...) 	 124,766
3. SIVIALL (737, DC-9 ... ) 	 60,284
• FAA AVIATION FORECASTS FY 1978-1989:
TOTAL U.S. OPERATIONS	 11, 700,000
Figure 5
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as input to the calculation. Again the basic assumption in
performing this calculation is that the number of accidents at a
particular place is proportional to the number of operations.
( We've tested that relationship and it is quite good. In order to
obtain the necessary data we have to go to the primary data source
for aircraft accident data, we have to go to the primary data source
Board. In this case we're interested in accidents involving fires
in the 1985 time period. We've estimated, on the basis of
historical data from the National Transportation Safety Board,
that a reasonable number of accidents involving fires for
commercial operations in 1985 in all the United States might be
six.
In order to allocate a fraction of those six accidents to
Washington National Airport, we use additional information in a
data base that ORI developed and maintains under contract to FAA.
These are the estimated number of operations of aircraft in the
three size classes shown on figure 5. The actual aircraft
designators shown with the three classes are meant to be indicative
of aircraft in those size classes today - they are not necessarily
the aircraft that will be operating at National Airport in 1985.
In order to get the denominator - the total number of certificated
air carrier operations, we use the official FAA aviation forecast:
in 1985 there will be about 11,700,000 certificated air carrier
operations in the United States.
The next major step in applying the risk assessment model to
a particular airport is to perform a set of calculations that we
call "Process Accident." Once we have an estimate of the number
of accidents, we want to deal with them one by one, and in order to
process the accident, we have several calculations to go through
as indicated on figure 6. These are performed with considerabJ-^
(speed by a computer that we have programmed to do the job. In
the present case the computer is an IBM 370/155. Fortunately
for me, many of the steps in the complete calculation were
discussed by previous speakers in considerable detail. Basically,
as Dr. Credeur pointed out, we want to develop a statistical
description of the risk, and to do that, we want to draw random
samples from distributions of such things as the accident
characteristics, including the operational phase during which the
accident took place and the accident location.
We then compute the exterior exposure downwind of the acci-
!dent for a series of representative locations. For each of these
locations we've defined combinations of commercial, industrial,
and residential units. For each point, we can then compute the
interior exposure, the associated failures, and the cost of those
( failures. The computer then goes back, performs this routine
for all the locations impacted by the accident, adds them up,
land is then finished with the accident. It then goes back and
jlooks at the next accident in this time period, finishes all
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PROCESS ACCIDENT
• SAMPLE ACCIDENT CHARACTERISTICS, A/C CATEGORY,
OP PHASE, LOCATION
• COMPUTE DOWNWIND EXTERIOR EXPOSURE FOR
REPRESENTATIVE LOCATIONS
• FOR EACH LOCATION, COMPUTE INTERIOR EXPOSURE
FOR INDUSTRIES, DWELLING UNITS
• COMPUTE EXPECTED FAILURES EACH INDUSTRY,
DWELLING UNIT
• COMPUTE COSTS OF FAILURES
• SUM COSTS AT EACH LOCATION
• SUM OVER ALL LOCATIONS., THIS ACCIDENT
Figure 6
accidents in the time period, and then performs the next replica-
tion of the time period (or the next sample). In order to
explain this in more detail, I'm in effect going to blow up the
"Process Accident" routine which is the computer program that's
at the heart of the calculation.
As indicated in figure 7, the first thing we have to do is to
develop - by sampling from appropriate statistical distributions -
information about the simulated accident. In order to develop
the characteristics of the accident we're investigating, we
sample from historical distributions that describe the location
of accidents involving fires and the operational phase during
which those accidents occurred. We calculate the fraction of
the aircraft destroyed by fire from analyses of individual
accidents in the NTSB files. The assumption without which the
calculation should not proceed is that the aircraft accident data
are statistically homogeneous -- put another way: we have to use
aggregate data from all accidents recorded in recent history
throughout the United States to prepare these distributions for
the individual airport we're studying. Examples of the input
data are shown on figure 8. The data comes from the National
Transportation Safety Board files: annual accident summary
reports, report of individual accidents, and finally, the actual
docket for each accident. The numbers on figure 8 are examples
of the data we need: the distribution of fire accidents over
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ACCIDENT CHARACTERISTICS
METHOD:
• SAMPLE FROM HISTORICAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR
LOCATIONS, OP-PHASE
• FRACTION OF A/C DESTROYED BY FIRE ESTIMATED BY
ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL ACCIDENTS
ASSUMPTION:
• ACCIDENT DETAIL DATA ARE HOMOGENEOUS
• U.S. AGGREGATE DATA CAN BE APPLIED TO INDIVIDUAL
AIRPORT
Figure 7
DATA:
FROM NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD FILES
AND ACCIDENT REPORTS
• DISTRIBUTION OF
FIRE ACCIDENTS
• ESTIMATED FRACTION
OF A/C INVOLVED
IN FIRE
0% STATIC
0% TAXI
20% TAKE-OFF
20% IN FLIGHT
60% LANDING
0 % STATIC
0% TAXI
20% TAKE-OFF
30% IN FLIGHT
50% LANDING
Figure 8
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operational phase and then the estimated fraction of the aircraft
involved in the fire for fire accidents occurring in the different
operational phases for which data are tabulated. Our estimate
on the basis of an analysis of about five years' accidents in
considerable detail - is that about 20 percent of the aircraft
would be involved in a fire that results from a take-off
accident; 30 percent for an in-flight accident; and 50 percent for;
a landing accident. A study by the Stanford Research Institute
recently made available to us, covering a larger sample, is
essentially in agreement. I want to point out that, although
the numbers in the lower right of figure 8 add to one hundred
percent, they do not have to.
The other thing we have to know about the accident is the
amount of fiber liberated which is given on figure 9. Again, the
aircraft types are those defined jointly by ORI, NASA, and the
airframe manufacturers. The amount of graphite in the structure
is based on estimates that we've mutually agreed on. We've
shown on the right the amount of fiber in pounds that we estimate
would be liberated in an accident for each aircraft category,
for an accident in each operational phase. There are two other
phases in which, on the basis of our analysis, we would not
expect any fiber to be liberated because fire would not result
from the accident, so we haven't shown those. The basic
assumption here is that only 20 percent of the graphite involved
in the accident is released in the form of the single fibers that
FIBER LIBERATED PER
ACCIDENT WITH FIRE — 1985
(Pounds)
A/C CATEGORY GRAPHITE INSTRUCTURE
OP-PHASE
TAKE-OFF LANDING IN-FLIGHT
1.	 LARGE
DC-10, L1011, 747 1000 40 100 60
2.	 MEDIUM
727, 757, 767, 300 12 30 18
707, DC-8
3.	 SMALL
737, DC-9 200 8 20 12
NOTE: ASSUMES 20 010
 OF INVOLVED FIBER IS RELEASED
Figure 9
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the analysis is concerned with - as opposed to clumps. This is
based on limited experimental data.
The next step in the "Process Accident" program is to compute
the downwind exposures at representative locations, and in order
to do that, the computer has to know where those locations are.
So, we've developed methods for defining points that we want to
look at in the geographical area. We define representative
points for industrial, commercial, and residential centers for
each city and county in the geographical area of interest. As
indicated in figure 10, the basic assumption that we've made is
that the industrial and residential units of the types we're
interested in are distributed relatively uniformly over the sub-
area that's represented by a particular point. The kinds of data
we need include population, for which we use the 1970 census.
For business types, sizes, and locations, we take advantage of a
scheme developed primarily by the Department of Commerce and used
by many agencies: namely, the SIC (Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation) code. We've limited ourselves to what is called the two-
digit breakdown, some examples of which are shown at the bottom of
figure 11. For example, SIC code 23 covers places that manufac-
ture apparel and do other textile processing. Number 27 is in
the manufacturing category for printing and publishing. 54 is the
code number in the retail business group comprising food stores.
SIC 60 is banking. Number 62 is stock brokers and so on. The
DEFINE REPRESENTATIVE
LOCATIONS
METHOD:
• DEFINE INDUSTRY AND RESIDENCE CENTERS FOR EACH
CITY, COUNTY
ASSUMPTION:
• INDUSTRIAL UNITS AND RESIDENCES UNIFORMLY
DISTRIBUTED OVER SUB AREAS
Figure 10
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DATA:
• POPULATION — 1970 CENSUS
• BUSINESS TYPES, NUMBERS, PAYROLL BY 2-DIGIT SIC*
CODE — COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS
• BUSINESS LOCATIONS — LOCAL & STATE DEVELOPMENT
AGENCIES
*SIC = STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION
eg: 23, MANUFACTURING APPAREL
27, PRINTING & PUBLISHING
54 9 FOOD STORES
60, BANKING
Figure 11
County Business Patterns identifies the kinds of business per-
formed in an individual county using this terminology. It tells
us how many employees there are; there's a frequency distribution
of establishments by size, as well as payroll data.
In order to determine where clusters of these businesses are
on a scale finer than the county, we deal with people at state
and local economic development agencies. An example of the kind
of thing we've done is illustrated on figure 12. The scale on
figure 12 indicates that Howard County, at its closest point, is
15 or 20 miles from National Airport. The inset map in the lower
left of figure 12 shows Howard County in more detail. In order
for us to represent Howard County for the calculation of graphite
fiber impact, we've located a point at Ellicott City which is
residential; we have located another point at Columbia,
Maryland - a so-called new town - as a center of residences and
commercial interests, primarily retail establishments. The area
marked by four heavy dashed lines is the part of Howard County
zoned for industry. The heavy dot is where we have placed all
the significant industry in Howard County and essentially
assumed that the part of Howard County to the left (west) of those
three points is essentially farm land and not of great interest
to us from the risk-assessment point of view. The same
methodology has been applied to Washington, D.C., and the
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Maryland and Virginia countryside within about 50 miles of
Washington National Airport to define the set of representative
locations for which the computer program called "Process
Accident" will calculate exterior exposures.
Once we've generated an accident with its characteristics -
"drawn an accident" is the customary expression - we proceed as
indicated in figure 13 to compute the downwind concentrations
and the associated exposure at the set of points we're interested
in. In order to do that, we use a technique similar to the
turn of the roulette wheel that Dr. Credeur talked about to draw
a set of weather variables from a distribution that gives the
observed frequency with which different combinations of wind
speed, direction, and stability categories occurred in the past.
These data are made available by the National Climatic Center
for major weather stations around the country--so we use the
data set for Washington National Airport. This process gives
us the weather conditions for the accident we are now processing.
We calculate the pertinent plume rise characteristics using the
so-called Briggs model that was described for us by Dr. Wolf
Elber yesterday. The energy release rate is a function of the
aircraft category. The assumption is that the size of the burning
fuel pool, and thus the heat release rate, is proportional to the
square of the wing span of the aircraft. The computer program
uses inputs to the Briggs calculation based on the size of
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COMPUTE DOWNWIND
CONCENTRATION
METHOD:
• RANDOM DRAW OF WEATHER CONDITIONS
• FIRE PLUME BASED ON BRIGGS MODEL — ENERGY RELEASE
RATE A FUNCTION OF A/C CATEGORY
• DOWNWIND TRANSPORT — GAUSSIAN MODEL
• DISPERSION, LAYER DEPTH FUNCTIONS OF STABILITY
CLASS
• PARTICLES FALL OUT
• PARTIAL REFLECTION AT SURFACE
ASSUMPTION:
• FIBER RELEASED = FRACTION OF AIC DESTROYED BY
FIRE X 0.2
• FIBERS MOVE WITH MEAN WIND
• DISPERSION IN VERTICAL AND LATERAL DIRECTIONS
Figure 13
typical aircraft in each category involved in the simulated
accident.
The subsequent downwind transport calculation is based on a
Gaussian model. The dispersion parameters that go into that
calculation are based on a set of inputs from EPA. As shown on
figure 14, they are from the CRSTER model that EPA makes available.
The inversion height - or layer depth - is from a publication by
George Holzworth. He has essentially developed a climatology
of mixing depths or inversion heights and associated wind speeds
for different stability classes. The model we use then takes
account of dispersion, allows the particles to fall to the
surface, and allows for partial reflection of the fibers at
the surface and for reflection at the inversion. The basic
assumption we've made is that the fraction of aircraft destroyed-
in the fire is used as an estimate of the fraction of the amount
of fibers in the aircraft released. To be more precise, the
amount of fiber released is set equal to the fraction of aircraft
consumed by fire, which we have estimated from accident data,
times the factor 0.2 to represent that part of the graphite
that will end up as single fibers. The fibers move downwind
with the mean wind, spreading by dispersion only in the vertical
and lateral directions. These latter are standard assumptions
in most of the Gaussian plume models used in pollution studies.
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DATA:
• WIND SPEED, DIRECTION, STABILITY CLASS FROM
NATIONAL CLIMATIC CENTER
• DISPERSION - "CRSTER" MODEL FROM EPA/MODIFIED
• LAYER DEPTH - HOLZWORTH, MIXING HEIGHTS, WIND
SPEED ... EPA, 1972
Figure 14
The particle fall rate is represented by using a "tilted" plume
model, which is a variation of the basic Gaussian model.
Having computed the exterior concentration and the resulting
exposure at our representative locations, the next step, as
indicated in figure 15, is to compute interior exposures for the
places we're interested in. To do that, we assumed that - for
each one of the two-digit SIC codes - we can define a representa-
tive building. For each representative building type we defined
ventilation parameters. As indicated on figure 16, the data
source for most of this work is a volume put out by the Carrier
Corporation for the design of air conditioning systems. That
was the basic source of information for air leakage into
buildings. The calculation proceeds along the lines that Mr.
Israel Taback described.
For the particular building parameters we've assigned to
each business and industrial category, we compute an interior
exposure which is a function of the external exposure, the
ventilation parameters, as well as the wind speed, and the fall
rate of the particles. The basic assumption here is that these
typical facilities can be defined and that all facilities
associated with a given type of business or industry are similar.
I should mention that, in addition to the Carrier Corporation's
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COMPUTE INTERIOR EXPOSURE
METHOD:
• FOR EACH INDUSTRY CLASS, DEFINE VENTILATION
PARAMETERS FOR TYPICAL FACILITY
• COMPUTE INTERIOR EXPOSURE FROM EXTERIOR EXPOSURE,
BUILDING PARAMETERS, WiND SPEED, PARTICLE FALL RATE
ASSUMPTION:
• TYPICAL ENCLOSURES CAN BE DEFINED
Figure 15
DATA:
• CARRIER CORPORATION
HANDBOOK OF AIRCONDITIONING
SYSTEM DESIGN 1965
4t SITE VISITS
Figure 16
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handbook, we made quite a few site visits in the Washington
metropolitan area. They were listed on one of the slides that
Mr. Ansel Butterfield used yesterday in his talk on "Pathfinder
Surveys."
At this point, we have simulated an accident, computed the
downwind exterior exposure, and moved the fibers inside typical
facilities at representative locations. We now need to estimate
the expected failures. As indicated on figure 17, the basic
method is to define typical systems for each of the two-digit
COMPUTE FAILURES
METHOD:
• DEFINE TYPICAL SYSTEMS FOR EACH INDUSTRIAL
CLASS, RESIDENCE
• COMPUTE OVERALL FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR EACH
TYPICAL FACILITY USING INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT
FAILURE PROBABILITY, COMPUTED EXPOSURE
ASSUMPTION:
• TYPICAL SYSTEMS CAN BE DEFINED
• EXPONENTIAL FAILURE MODEL FOR INDIVIDUAL
EQUIPMENTS
Figure 17
industrial-commercial SIC categories that are present in
Washington, D.C. and environs. For each of these systems, we
computed an overall failure probability. Figure 18 illustrates
the kind of data we used. As a result of digging into the
journals and reports listed, we were able to develop a model of
the type shown for all the industries and businesses we were
concerned with. It says that, typically, power comes in from the
outside through a transformer, passes through a switch panel and/or
terminals on the transformer, and flows to something we call common
equipment, computers or control systems for the entire facility.
Power is then split into a set of parallel lines, each of which
might involve a servo and a control system.
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The probability of failure for each individual element in
the system obeys an exponential law. As shown on figure 18 the
probability of failure is 1 - exp(-E/E), where E is a number we
get from test data of the type described by Mr. Taback in his lec-
ture on vulnerability. From the available experimental data we
matched the tested equipment to actual industrial and commercial
equipment as closely as possible to obtain the appropriate E. With
the computed interior exposures E, and E, we compute the failure
probabilities for individual equipment. With these individual
probabilities properly hooked together, we obtain - for the com-
puted interior exposure - an estimate of the probability that a
plant or facility of a particular industrial-commercial category
will fail. A basic assumption is that such typical systems can
indeed be defined and that the exponential failure model is appro-
priate for the individual equipment. Once we've computed these
expected failures, we have to estimate the cost impact. That is
the next step in our "Process Accident" calculation.
To compute the costs of failures, the basic method, as
indicated on figure 19, considers that the fraction of the
industry down or the fraction of production lost is equal to the
probability that an industrial unit of that class has failed.
The residential unit cost is estimated by looking at the costs of
repairing equipment in the household that has failed. The data
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COST OUT FAILURES
METHOD:
• FRACTION OF INDUSTRY DOWN = PROBABILITY OF
INDUSTRIAL UNIT FAILING
• COST OF OUTAGE IS FRACTION OF LOCAL GDP, BY SIC
• RESIDENTIAL UNIT COST IS COST OF REPAIRING FAILED
EQUIPMENTS
ASSUMPTION:
• INDUSTRIAL IMPACT MEASURABLE BY GDP
• NATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY VALUES CAN BE APPLIED
LOCALLY
Figure 19
and the actual formula or algorithm for industrial cost estimating
are shown on figure 20. It says that for a particular SIC
classification, we can estimate local productivity by looking at
the Gross Domestic Product (a term that is closely related to what
everyone calls the GNP (Gross National Product, the sum of all
goods and services produced in a year)).
The Gross Domestic Product is the Gross National Product
with all production in the United States by foreign manufacturers
added and all production by American manufacturers overseas
taken away. The basic approach is to say that the productivity
per payroll dollar can be estimated by looking at the amount of
Gross Domestic Product assigned to each economic sector on the
national level. We take the Gross Domestic Product associated
with each type of industry and divide it by the national payroll
for the same type of industry - that, in effect, gives us the impact
of a payroll dollar on Gross Domestic Product. We then multiply
that result by the local payroll for the same industrial category
obtained from a document called County Business Patterns for each
county (as opposed to the County Business Patterns, National
Summary.) We then multiply that result by the probability of
failure for that class of industry that we just computed at the
particular location. We have assumed that the impact lasts one
day - so we have divided the annual GDP by 365 in estimating fail-
ure impacts. We add these costs up over all SIC categories - all
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Figure 20
industries or kinds of commerce represented at this location.
That is the way we estimate the- industrial and commercial impact
of a failure at the local level.
The basic assumption is that industrial impact can be
measured this way and that the national productivity estimate
obtained by dividing Gross Domestic Product by the national
payroll for a particular industrial sector can be applied locally.
In other words, it says that the workers, say in printing or
publishing at Time-Life Books in Alexandria, are as efficient as
the "national average workers" in the same industry.
The next calculation, as indicated on figure 21, is to estimat-
the impact on individual households. Again, as described by Mr.
Taback yesterday, we have estimated some fraction of households
as being air-conditioned, some not air-conditioned, where the
fraction that is air-conditioned decreases with distance away
from the metropolitan area - assuming that farmers in Talbott
County do not have air-conditioned farmhouses. We assume, on the
other hand, that everybody in Montgomery County is air-conditioned.
We've estimated the number of TV's and Hi-Fi's per household,
again assuming that although the national average is one TV per
household, the number will be a little higher in more affluent
communities and lower in less affluent communities. With those
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HOUSEHOLD COST MODEL
METHOD:
• VENTILATION PARAMETERS DEFINED FOR A-C, NON A-C
HOUSEHOLDS
• ESTIMATE NUMBERS OF TVs, HIFIs PER HOUSEHOLD FOR
EACH GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
• COMPUTE NUMBER OF TV, HIFI FAILURES EACH AREA
• COMPUTE TOTAL REPAIR COSTS
ASSUMPTION:
• HOUSEHOLDS UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED OVER
GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS
Figure 21
numbers we were able to compute the estimated number of TV and
Hi-Fi failures for each one of our residential units. We
estimated the total repair costs based on a gross cut: it costs
50 dollars to fix a TV set and $75 for a Hi-Fi, if it failed as
a result of the graphite fiber problem. Again, the basic
assumption is that the households are uniformly distributed in
the neighborhood of the representative points we've selected.
We find that we have now more or less worked our way
painstakingly through the calculation. The next step is one that
doesn't need any technical explanation - we add up the costs for
everything at each location and then add up the costs for all
locations for this accident.
That takes us through the "Process Accident" routine, and if
we look back at the Airport-Metropolitan Area model we find that
once we have finished the "Process Accident" routine we repeat
it for every accident in the simulated time period. We then
repeat the time period over and over again to develop statistics
over many sample time periods. I feel that I have now described
the strategy - why we need the individual airport results - and I
have described the Airport-Metropolitan Area model in some detail.
I would like to stick to our original outline and show you several
preliminary results for the Washington National Airport -
Washington Metropolitan Area risk assessment. The map we looked
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at (figure 12) showed that the area we needed to consider
included the Baltimore SMSA (Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area), the Washington, D.C., SMSA, and the Wilmington, Delaware,
SMSA. So, when we say Washington, D.C., we're really talking
about Washington, D.C., Baltimore, and Frederick, Maryland, as
well as large parts of Virginia.
We are still working on the processing of the statistics to
develop risk profiles. Figure 22 shows some sample results
garnered from the simulation of 2,000 accidents processed by the
computer in exactly the way I described. Over the 2000
accidents - using the best estimates we could get for our 1985
scenario - preliminary results indicate that expected cost, or
average cost per accident, is on the order of 5,000 dollars. If
one looks at the accident rate and asks for the numbers per year
the expected cost per year is on the order of a little more than
100 dollars; because, the likelihood of an accident at the
Washington National Airport involving fire in an aircraft with
graphite fiber is quite small. If you remember, we started off
with an estimate of 6 fire accidents per year in the country and
that number is then degraded by the share of operations at
Washington National Airport, further degraded by the fact that
about 20 percent of the 1985 aircraft fleet will be using graphite
fiber. We can also look at the distribution of accidents. We've
estimated that - at the relatively high end of the spectrum - .005,
1985 RESULTS
2000 SIMULATED ACCIDENTS
• EXPECTED COST PER ACCIDENT -- $5000
• EXPECTED COST PER YEAR ti $110
• FRACTION OF ACCIDENTS WITH COSTS > $200,000 = 0.005
CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THESE ACCIDENTS:
STABLE ATMOSPHERE
	 PLUME STOPS
LOW WIND SPEED	 AT INVERSION
NIGHTTIME OPS
Figure 22
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or half a percent, of the 2,000 accidents we simulated ran up
costs greater than 200,000 dollars.
Now, I'd like to describe one of the advantages of our method.
Although Dr. Credeur concentrated on statistics in her talk and
our goal is clearly to develop statistical results, one has the
option when using this computer program of asking for what I call
almost "infinite detail." We have several options with regard
to computer output, starting with the "De-Bug Print" which prints
out every calculation the computer made--all the way up to gross
statistics summarized over many replications. In between, we
can ask for certain results for every accident that was simulated
in the program.
What we've done in figure 23 for the 1985 scenario is to show
key items that the computer drew from the random distributions
described earlier - associated with the results computed for each
accident. Of interest is the fact that all of these relatively
high cost accidents, in our sample of 2,000, occurred in the
most stable meteorological conditions. All but one of the
accidents took place in the landing phase. The stability
conditions correspond to what Dr. Elber defined as Class E and
Class F, the most stable Pasquill-Gifford categories. Associated
with them were low wind speeds, but different wind directions. A
sample from the statistics for the Washington National Airport
shows that all directions are not equally likely, but these
HIGHEST COST ACCIDENTS
1985: BASE CASE
AIRCRAFT
CATEGORY
OP
PHASE
STAB
CLASS
WIND GRAPHITE
RELEASED
(POUNDS)
TOTAL
COST
($103)SPEED DIR.(MISEC)
MED LAND 6 2 166' 30 844
LARGE LAND 5 2 226 100 537
MED LAND 6 2 174 30 490
MED LAND 5 2 171 30 387
MED LAND 6 2 341 30 303
SMALL TAKE-OFF 6 2 165 80 299
MED LAND 6 2 177 30 250
MED LAND 6 2 189 30 250
MED LAND 5 2 342 30 234
MED LAND 6 2 162 30 227
Figure 23
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1 .33 1000 18,850
2 .20 300 124,766
3 .20 200 60,284
LO
coCD
r
TOTAL U.S. OPS
11,700,000
1 .50 4500 29,621._
2 .60 1500 143,669
3 .50 1000 24,710
M
r
TOTAL U.S. OPS
13,800,000*
are the directions associated with these particular accidents.
These stable meteorological conditions, incidentally, might occur
with fog or generally reduced visibility. Further, the stable
atmosphere and low wind speeds are typical of nighttime
conditions. This implies - again, this is a preliminary result
based on the analysis of these 2,000 simulated accidents - that if
a relatively bad accident of this type were to occur it would
appear most likely to occur during nighttime operations. Now,
for safety purposes, night ends an hour after sunrise and
begins an hour before sunset. So even though a commercial airport
typically closes at night, closing time might be ten or eleven
PM, which includes a few hours of what Pasquill-Gifford call
nighttime. In addition, in these cases the Briggs model is used
to estimate the height of the fire plume, and if the plume height
provided by the equation is above the inversion, we stop it at
the inversion. This is by far the most frequently observed
situation. We've shown that, when the amount of fibers increases
by a factor of 10, the expected cost per accident increases by
a little less than a factor of 10. So that, if the estimated
costs for other scenarios are high enough to worry about, these
results say that we should probably take a closer look at the
meteorology of this situation.
Now beyond these results, we have made some runs for the
1993 time frame using the information shown on figure 24. For
1993 SIMULATION PARAMETERS
FRACTION
AIRCRAFT	 WITH	 GRAPHITE	 AIRPORT
CATEGORY GRAPHITE	 PER A/C	 OPS
*1995 FAA PROJECTIONS
Figure 24
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1993, the rough situation is that the amount of composite per
aircraft with composite structure is expected to increase by
about a factor of 5. The number of aircraft with composite in
their structures is expected to go up roughly by a factor of 2
to 3. The charts identify the time frame as 1993 although the
FAA air traffic projections are for 1995, the closest date for
which they are available. With those changes to the basic
inputs, the results for 1993 are as shown on figure 25. Assuming
that population and industry stay the same, the average cost
associated with these accidents on a per-year basis is estimated
to be about a thousand dollars and the average cost per accident,
on the order of $20,000. This is based on an analysis of about
2,500 simulated accidents. Using the same $200,000 dollar cutoff
we used for the 1985 scenario, it is estimated that about 2
percent of the accidents involving fires aboard aircraft with
graphite fibers in their structures would incur costs greater
than $200,000.
1993 RESULTS
2500 SIMULATED ACCIDENTS
• EXPECTED COST PER ACCIDENT $20,000
• EXPECTED COST PER YEAR ^$1000
• FRACTION OF ACCIDENTS WITH
COSTS> $200,000 = 0.02
• FRACTION OF ACCIDENTS WITH
COSTS >$1,000,000 = .0036
• ONE ACCIDENT WITH COST> $4,000,000
Figure 25
To wind things up, I would like to summarize our current
status, which is shown on figure 26. We have developed a viable
airport risk assessment model. In the lingo of computer experts,
it is an input-driven model. We have some preliminary results
for the Washington National Airport risk for 1985 and 1993. We
plan to combine those results appropriately to develop risk
profiles for the Washington National Airport and Washington-
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CONCLUSIONS
STATUS REPORT
• AIRPORT RISK ASSESSMENT
MODEL DEVELOPED
• PRELIMINARY RESULTS PRESENTED
FOR WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT
FUTURE
• RISK PROFILE TO BE
CALCULATED
• NATIONAL RISK TO BE
ESTIMATED
Figure 26
Baltimore metropolitan area and to go on from that to develop a
national risk estimate. That completes the formal presentation.
Question: Do you have the standard deviation for the accident
costs as well as the expected value?
Answer:	 I don't have that right now. We haven't calculated it
yet.
Question: When you talk about 6 airplanes a year being involved
in fire, you projected that for 1985 	 Is that 6
airplanes with composite fibers?
Answer:
	
No, six altogether. For fire accidents with composite
onboard, it's actually lower than that. It's about
20 percent of that number (6).
Question: All your results are for stable meteorological
conditions?
Answer:	 Well, I'm sorry if you drew that conclusion, because
that means I really didn't get my message across very
well. The major point of our whole approach has been
the sampling of conditions from the appropriate statis-
tical distributions The meteorology is drawn from a dis-j
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tribution that gives wind speed, wind direction, and
stability class for Washington National Airport. The
likelihood that the stability for the particular
accident will be an unstable case is based on the
historical record of weather as observed at National
Airport over a long period of time.
The cases on the last figure were the conditions
associated with the ten worst accidents out of 2,000,
so it happened that the highest cost accidents
according to the model we've developed seem to be those
that occurred when stable conditions existed.
We ran 2,000 accidents for 1985. Each time there's an
accident the computer asks: "What's the weather for
this accident?" It looks at a table, structured by
sixteen wind directions, five wind speed ranges, and
six stability classes, so there's a box for every
one of those combinations. In each box is the fraction
of weather observations at Washington National
Airport in which that combination was observed. Now
the computer makes a random draw, generates a random
number, turns the roulette wheel that Dr. Credeur
told us about, and picks the weather condition.
Question: (Continues) But we know that accidents tend to occur
when the weather is bad.
Answer:	 Well, that's a problem that we recognized early in the
game and addressed with the Project Officer. A
decision was made to draw the weather from this random
distribution. Now, it's true that one would have
expected some bias in accidents toward bad weather,
likewise towards cases when there's rain falling.
Frankly, for the degree of precision with which we
know all the inputs that go into this calculation I
feel that that problem is one that we can neglect for
the time being.
Dr. Credeur responds: Your point is correct with respect to foul
weather. Roughly 40 percent of the accidents that
involve fire occur in foul weather; that is, weather
involving precipitation. There are two problems
with that though. "What is the effect of weather
downstream?" You may have rain at an accident site
for a very short time or over only a very small por-
tion of the dispersion area. So one of the problems
was how to handle the rain factor. The other was that,
even if we incorporate it, the greatest impact it
would have upon the answer was at most a factor of 2.
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The other errors involved in this problem are much
greater than that, so for the time being, we're not
including it.
Question: Can you report on the results of sensitivity analyses?
Answer:	 Well, let's put it this way. One of the reasons we
developed this approach was to be able to do the kind
of things you asked about. We haven't done them yet.
The one thing we can say is that the average cost per
accident, at least in the range we're dealing with,
is roughly linear with the amount of composite.
Increase the amount of composite per aircraft by a
factor of 10 and the average cost goes up by a little
less than a factor of 10.
Question: What about sensitivity of results to the modeling
method itself?
Answer:	 Well, hopefully, we're going to get some of that by
comparing results from people who've used other models
for the same kind of calculation. One of the big
things that our industrial impact calculation leaves
out is the cost of repair of equipment that may fail.
In making the decision to use this approach - which I
must admit is very attractive on the basis of data
availability - we argued that the cost of a plant
being closed down might roughly be equal to the cost
of cleaning up any equipment. At most we thoua_ht we
might be off by a factor of 2. We've made the
assumption here that if a plant is down, it's down for
a day. There's a one over 365 factor applied to the
GNP numbers. That's our intuitive feel for that part
of the problem.
Question: Have you neglected costs due to lawsuits following
accidents?
Answer:	 The honest answer to that is: yes, we are neglecting
that part of the problem.
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AN ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL RISK
Arthur D. Little, Inc.
General Concepts and Overall Approach
Ashok Kalelkar
Our presentation reports on the analysis of risk presented
by carbon fiber utilization in commercial aviation. At the out-
set, I would like you to note two things. First, although several
speakers yesterday alluded to the entire civil aviation activity,
today we are reporting only on one portion of the civil aviation
activity, namely, commercial aviation. Second, this is a status
report and some of the things that we will be presenting today may
change somewhat as our study progresses. As shown in Figure 1,
we have a three part presentation: Part I - General Concepts
and Part 2 - Overall Approach, which I'm going to discuss; and
Part three (which requires a majority of the time allocated to
us) Risk Evaluation and Perspective, which will be presented by
Dr. Fiksel. The last part of our presentation, which Dr. Fiksel
1 will give, will show national risk profiles for carbon fiber
usage in commercial aviation.
THREE PART PRESENTATION
1.GENERAL CONCEPTS
2. OVERALL APPROACH TO CARBON
FIBER COMPOSITE RISK ANALYSIS
3. RISK EVALUATION AND PERSPECTIVE
Figure 1
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General Concepts
Risk profiles are a very good way of expressing risks, espe-
cially where complicated mathematical models are involved. They
express a risk in a relatively easy way and allow decision makers,
who may not be interested in the detailed modeling, to make
decisions based on what they see graphically. However, risk pro-
files can also be misinterpreted just as easily. I want to be
absolutely certain that our results are not misinterpreted and in
order to make sure of that, I'm going to take ten minutes to dis-
cuss certain general concepts.
Some of you may already be quite familiar with risk analysis I
and the concepts inherent in such analysis and for you this discus-^
sion may be repetitious. However, I think it is worthwhile because
you will understand and appreciate our output better if you under-
stand our terminology and objectives.
Now to begin with, I'd like in Figure 2 to very quickly
define risk as we have used it in our analysis. Risk is the po-
tential for realization of unwanted negative consequences of an
event or an activity. Today, the event or activity of concern to
us is the use of carbon fiber composites in commercial aircraft.
The negative consequences, of course, were discussed yesterday.
The fact that fibers can be released and can cause negative impacts
GENERAL CONCEPTS
DEFINITION OF RISK
RISK IS THE POTENTIAL FOR REALIZATION
OF UNWANTED, NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES
OF AN EVENT OR ACTIVITY
Figure 2
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on electronic equipment is well known. The question must be asked
"What is the potential for realization or the likelihood of
occurrence of those negative consequences?" As you can see, risk,
as we have defined it, has two very definite components. There
Dare probabilistic components, which deal with the likelihood of
occurrence of various events, and deterministic components that
deal with the actual level of impact that may be experienced. It
is very important to keep in mind that "risk", as we use the term
throughout our presentation, has these two components. It is
meaningless to talk of risk only in terms of probability of
occurrence or only in terms of the amount of damage that can occur.
',The two go hand in hand and are inseparable.
Now, as I'm sure you've gathered from the many presentations
that were given yesterday, the use of carbon fiber composites in
commercial aircraft does involve some risks. Where there are some
risks there is need for an appropriate way of handling those risks
through risk management as shown in Figure 3. In this particular
case, the Federal Government is essentially placed in the role of
'being risk manager. A rational way of conducting risk management
activities is by going through the three-step process shown: of,
first, identifying the risk (again keep in mind the two components
of risk); then measuring it quantitatively (it is very important
to do it quantitatively); and finally by looking at the measured
value to determine if control strategies are required or not, by
DEALING WITH RISK THROUGH RISK MANAGEMENT
RISK IDENTIFICATION
RISK MEASUREMENT
RISK CONTROL
Figure 3
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comparing the measured risk against other risks and comparing the
benefits to be derived by the use of the CF material against the
risks that have been measured.
I don't think it necessary to spend much time discussing risk;
identification, the first step in the three-step process. Several
speakers addressed different areas that deal with the risk associ-
ated with the use of carbon fiber composites in aircraft. There's
been some past experience. There was an accident of sorts in-
volving an incinerator. There's been substantial experimentation
and dissemination testing, with actual burning of composite struc-
tures to see how much fiber can be liberated under different fire
conditions, and studies of the effects of burns and explosions, of
burns alone, and so on. The risk of the problem that we are look-
ing at today has been pretty well identified in terms of the areas;
identified in Figure 4. There aren't too many unknowns in terms
of conceptual identification of what can happen, what different
consequences can result and the probabilistic pathways leading to
what those consequences might be. In some cases where a certain
piece of equipment may not have been properly tested, it is use-
ful to use industrial experience-based judgement, engineering
judgement, guesses if you will, to try to assess how things are
going to fail, so their failure can be incorporated within the
risk analysis. The risk identification step in this risk man-
agement scheme has, I believe, been quite well completed.
RISK IDENTIFICATION
• PAST EXPERIENCE DIRECT OR RELATED
• EXPERIMENTATION
• INDUSTRIAL EXPERIENCE - BASED JUDGEMENT
Figure 4
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The next step then is to measure the risk quantitatively as
described in Figure 5. This requires that we assess the frequency
RISK MEASUREMENT
• FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF FAILURE EVENT
• CONDITIONAL OCCURRENCE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS
• CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT IN TERMS OF TOTAL IMPACT
Figure 5
of the occurrence of the failure event of concern. In our case
this is an accident involving an aircraft that has carbon fiber
composite structures on it and that is involved in either a fire
or a fire followed by an explosion. This frequency can be assessed
by looking at historical data on accidents and operations. Once
that particular step has been completed, there are several con-
ditional occurrences of subsequent events which must be examined.
Given that the fiber is involved in a fire in the aftermath of an
aircraft accident, what are the chances that it will be released?
What are the chances that there will be wind blowing from a certain
direction to carry the fiber a certain way? What are the chances
that there will be certain classes of industrial facilities in
its path? And so on. Finally, we need to assess deterministically
the consequences of the event in terms of total impact. As Dr.
Credeur pointed out in her presentation, impacts can vary across a
wide spectrum, depending on your interests. We're not that con-
cerned about fatalities or environmental damage or chronic health
problems today; we're more concerned with total dollar loss as a
result of one of these occurrences.
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In Figure 6 I'm going to show how the measured risk can be
displayed. Now this is hypothetical, so please, these numbers
-10-1
` \	 Comparator Risk Profile A
10-z
	 \	 (e.g. Damage from Tornadoes)
Comparator Risk Profile B
Probability of
Exceeding	
-10-3
Dollar Damage
D
10 -4
Activity 1
Activity 1 with Risk
Control Option in Force
10 -5
10 5
	 10 6	 10 7
	
loll
	
109
Impact Level D ($)
Figure 6
have no bearing on the presentation. I just want to use this for
demonstration purposes, because I want to point out five or six
things. First, look at Activity One. Suppose Activity One is an
activity of concern to us and we evaluate it through our risk
analysis scheme and we measure the risk. The measured risk would
be portrayed in a fashion as shown depicting the probability of
exceeding a certain dollar damage plotted against the dollar dam-
age. For example, if Activity One had the risk profile as shown
and you go up to the 10 -3 probability (which is about one chance
in a thousand), you find that the corresponding dollar loss is
about a million dollars. If on the same risk profile for Activ-
ity 1, you look at an event that has a probability of occurrence
of 10 -4 (one in ten thousand chance), you see that the loss is
about ten million dollars and so on.
Curves such as these are very useful when the probability of
occurrence can vary over several decades as they usually do in pro-
blems like this and where the consequence of the impacts can also
vary over several decades. It is better to show the risks in this
way then just talk about "expected values," because an "expected
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clue" really hides the fact that you can get substantially greater
or lesser losses with different probabilities. We give our numbers
in "expected values" as well, however. Expected values are useful
hen the degree of variation in both probability and impact are
,small. But when the degree of variation in impact and probability
'Iget this large, it is not necessarily the best measure of assessing
the risk we're dealing with.
You notice I've shown uncertainty bounds, and the uncertainty
bounds are rather substantial. They can vary by as much as an
order of magnitude on either side. In risk analysis, we have
generally found that we are not trying to find estimates within
an accuracy of a factor of 50% or even a factor of 2. Very often,
even with substantially greater uncertainties, very useful
decisions can be made. As you will see later on, when you compare
that risk profile with the uncertainties against other risk pro-
files A and B in Figure 6 (comparative profiles might be damage
from tornadoes, hurricanes, high winds, or snow storms), you might
find that, in spite of the uncertainties, one profile can lie
substantially below another. Hence, you would be in a position to
say that the risk from this activity, in spite of its uncertain-
jties, is substantially less than the risk from whatever else. You
might wish to compare it against manmade risks, because, after
all, this is a manmade risk. It is a risk that man imposes on
,himself. It's not a natural event and you might want to compare
^i.t with things like transportation of hazardous chemicals, pesti-
cide programs, nuclear power plants, liquified natural gas
transportation.
Now after you've developed the risk profile for the activity
of concern, if you find that the risk is unacceptable for whatever
reason, you can go back and ask yourself what caused the risk in
the area of concern to lie where it does lie. For example, if a
decision maker finds that one portion of the risk profile is too
high, he can look at options to reduce the risk. He can go back
to his calculation to learn what contributed to those points on
the curve and he can reduce the risk with risk control options.
He can make that curve swing down with the control strategy by
either reducing the probability of occurrence or reducing the
consequences. This can be done by making changes in operations,
by material modification, by engineering fixes or redundancy in
the systems, by better inspections, etc.
The final thing I want you to note on Figure 6 is the x-axis,
the impact level D. There are dollars, and there are dollars.
Now you can talk about the losses caused by lost payroll, you can
add to that the cost of repairing the equipment, you can add to
that the business interruption which is very often the largest
cost, you can add to that legal fees of defending against the
accident, and so on. So you must understand very carefully what
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dollars you're talking about when you present a risk profile.
Somebody might present it only in terms of direct loss incurred.
Others, who want to explore the problem in more detail, might
present it in terms of loss and the two can differ greatly for
the same phenomenon. So keep in mind that the definition of the
impact dollar D can vary. Note that for this same carbon-fiber
problem, if one wanted to examine shock hazards and portray the
shock hazards in terms of expected casualties, it is very easy to
do so, and we are going to take a look at that in the next phase
of our work. Today, however, we're only going to present our
results in terms of national risk profiles with dollar damage as
the impact parameter of interest.
I already talked about risk control. Recalling that risk is
comprised of two elements, there are two ways in which you can
reduce it, as shown in Figure 7. You can either reduce the pro-
bability of occurrence through better control systems, or you can
reduce the level of impact. Which method you choose depends on
how large the risk and benefits are and what the cost effective-
ness of the various control strategies is
RISK CONTROL
• REDUCE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE
• REDUCE LEVEL OF IMPACT
Figure 7
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Overall Approach
I briefly want to review the overall approach that we used so
that you understand how we procedurally went about solving this
iproblem. As illustrated in Figure 8, utilizing aviation statis-
jtics, such as the number of accidents that have occurred in the
OVERVIEW OF RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
AIRPORT COMPUTE ACCIDENT AVIATION
CHARACTERISTICS PROBABILITIES STATISTICS
(E.G. CLIMATE)
ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
CF UTILIZATION DETERMINE RELEASE FIRE SEVERITY
IN AIRCRAFT CONDITIONS AND DURATION
RELEASE SCENARIOS
ATMOSPHERIC CALCULATE ASSUMED FIBER
CONDITIONS DISPERSION FOOTPRINTS PROPERTIES
EXPOSURE DISTANCES
WIND ENUMERATE FIELDWORK AND
DIRECTIONS EXPOSED PROPERTY CENSUS DATA
AVERAGE EXPOSURE LEVELS
BY EQUIPMENT AND FACILITY
PENETRATION AND DETERMINE DIRECT AND
VULNERABILITY ­"[]EEXPECTED LOSSES INDIRECT LOSS
ESTIMATES
RISK PROFILE
Figure 8
last ten years, the accidents that fall in the fire or fire and
explosion category, and the number of operations, and tying those
statistics in with airport characteristics (such as the type of
climate it might have, the number of operations, any unusual fea-
tures, the runway orientation, and so on), we compute the accident
probability for aircraft. Out of that would be developed a series
of accident scenarios which, when tied in with the amount of car-
bon fiber utilization in aircraft in different years and the fire
extent and duration that can occur in accidents of different sever-
ity, would determine the release conditions--how much carbon fiber,
if any, is released, and in what form. Then, we use that informa-
tion, along with the prevalent atmospheric condition and the fiber
properties (which have been reasonably well measured at this time)
to calculate a dispersion footprint. The accident probability
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calculation (the top central box in Figure 8) will be addressed in
some detail, because it was not addressed in much detail in previ-
ous presentations. The release conditions will not be addressed
in too much detail because there has been a lot of discussion on
the testing that has been done. As far as the dis persion footprint
calculation is concerned, we use a method very similar to the one
Dr. Wolf Elber talked about, so we are not going to spend too much
time discussing that. Once we get the footprint, we can get expo-
sure distances out of it; and depending on the wind direction and
actual field work in areas of interest, we can find and enumerate
the property that has been exposed. This again was not discussed
in too much detail yesterday so we will be discussing it today.
We did look at all the 26 major airports in developing our national
risk profile. The information obtained then feeds into average
exposure levels by equipment and facility and, depending on the
transfer functions in different buildings and different systems
(which depend on the penetration capabilities of the fibers and
the systems they encounter), one estimates the direct and indirect
loss. By tying the accident probability with the total loss, one
develops a risk profile for this problem. Dr. Fiksel is now going
to talk about the last item: Risk Evaluation and Perspective.
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Risk Evaluation and Perspective
Joseph Fiksel
I would like to briefly summarize the objectives of our study
j as shown in figure 9. Our overall objective, as Dr. Kalelkar
explained, was to evaluate the risk to the nation due to carbon
fiber releases from commercial air carrier accidents involving
'fires. In order to do this, we gathered data concerning air
(carrier incidents. Our major source of data was the National
Transportation Safety Board statistics which were discussed ear-
lier. We gathered data concerning release and dispersion of fib-
ers, including the experimental results which were referred to by
Dr. Vernon Bell in his presentation. We also looked at the poten-
tial damage to electronic equipment and identified the types of
'equipment that might be vulnerable to carbon fibers. We developed
methodologies using various techniques including statistical tech-
niques, engineering models, and also a Monte Carlo simulation tech-
nique which is really at the heart of our methodology for develop-
ing a risk profile. Using the data and the methodology that I've
described, we were then able to estimate the national risk.
OBJECTIVES OF ADL STUDY
GATHER DATA CONCERNING
• Air Carrier Incidents Involving Fire
• Release and Dispersion of Carbon Fibers
• Potential Damage to Electronic Equipment
DEVELOP METHODOLOGY USING
• Statistical Techniques
• Engineering Models
• Monte Carlo Simulation
ESTIMATE NATIONAL RISK, INCLUDING
• Projection of CF Market Growth
• Consideration of Major Airport Cities
•	 Identification of Potentially Vulnerable
Facilities
Figure 9
This estimation involved a projection of the growth of the
carbon fiber market from the present day up to 1993 and considera-
tion of the major cities around the nation. We identified the
large hub airports as described by the FAA, and we examined the
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potential risk to those airports in detail. We also looked at the
additional airports in a more superficial manner to try to get
an idea of the total national risk due to all air carrier opera-
tions in the U.S. Finally, we identified the different kinds of
vulnerable or potentially vulnerable facilities that could exist.
Because of the very large exposure distances involved, and because
a carbon fiber cloud may extend over a very wide area, all
segments of society and business activity may be influenced by
this carbon fiber release.
The projections for utilization of carbon fiber composites in
commercial aircraft were provided to us by the airframe manufac-
turers. We also developed our own projections, and we will soon
be coordinating with the airframe manufacturers in trying to im-
prove these projections. These projections are preliminary, but
they give a good idea of the magnitude of carbon fiber masses
that will be on aircraft in the future. We divided the aircraft
that might carry carbon fibers into three classes. Since turbo-
props and propeller aircraft in general will not carry fibers, we
concentrated on jet aircraft. Three categories were identified:
small, medium, and jumbo jets.
On the first line of figure 10, the number of aircraft in
service is projected for both 1985 and 1993 in each of these three
categories. As shown, the total number of aircraft projected for
PROJECTED CARBON FIBER UTILIZATION
YEAR
SIZE OF JET
TOTAL
SMALL MEDIUM JUMBO
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
IN SERVICE
1985 825 1980 495 3300
1993 950 2280 570 3800
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
CARRYING CF
1985 165 396 163 724
1993 475 1368 285 2128
CF MASS PER
AIRCRAFT	 (LB.)
1985 234 338 1017
1993 1000 1500 4500
Figure 10
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1985 is 3,300. By 1993, we expect 3800 aircraft. The fraction of
these aircraft carrying carbon fibers varies from approximately
one-quarter of the total fleet in 1985 to half the fleet in 1993.
Thus, the total fraction of airplanes carrying fibers will in-
crease. In addition, the amount of carbon fibers per aircraft
will tend to increase. For example, on the jumbo jets in 1985,
we expect an average of about a thousand pounds of carbon fiber
per aircraft; by 1993 this amount is expected to increase to about
4500 pounds per aircraft. Incidentally, for the risk profile that
I'm going to show you later, we utilized the 1993 figures. We
concentrated on the 1993 data since we were attempting to upper
bound the risk that could be caused by the carbon-fiber release
phenomenon. It is also possible to generate a 1985 risk profile,
but we won't present that today.
The sequence of events that we were obliged to look at in
studying the carbon-fiber phenomenon is shown in figure 11. Of
course, to get a feeling for the frequency of occurrence of the
failure event, we had to look at the total number of air carrier
operations and project these out to 1993. Once an air carrier
operation occurs, there is a certain chance of an aircraft
accident. Therefore, we identified the accident statistics
corresponding to the kinds of accidents that we were concerned
with, namely those with fire and/or an explosion. In the after-
math of an accident involving an aircraft which carries carbon
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS TO BE MODELLED
ii
1
I _
Air Carrier Aircraft Carbon Fibers Carbon Fibers Carbon Fibers
Operation Accident Released and Penetrate Cause Equipment
with Fire Dispersed Buildings Failure and
and/or Over Large Housing Result in
Explosion Area Electronic Economic
Equipment Losses
Figure 11
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Airports
40 Medium Hub
Airports
26 Large
Hub Airports
Conventional Jet
Jumbo Jet
Small Jet
fibers, there is a possibility of the fibers being released and
dispersing over a large area. This has already been discussed to
a great extent by previous speakers. The fibers can penetrate
buildings and damage electronic equipment. This damage can result
in economic losses. Now, we'll go through each of these steps
in turn and I'll try to summarize some of the results that we've
obtained in looking at the different aspects of this release
phenomenon.
The first event is the air carrier operation. If you look at
figure 12, we have two circle charts. The one on the left indi-
cates the percent of traffic which takes place at the major
airports around the nation. As I mentioned, we concentrated on the
large hub airports. According to the 1977 FAA statistics, there
are approximately 26 such large hub airports, accounting for
almost 700 of the total traffic. These large hub airports would
therefore account for the majority of the risks. We also looked
at the medium and small hub airports to a lesser extent, but our
simulation concentrated on these 26 large hub airports. The
circle chart on the right shows the national fleet mix projected
for 1993 for the three types of jet air carrier operations. The
national fleet mix was adjusted for individual airports since
each airport has a slightly different fleet mix.
DOMESTIC JET AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS
n,hor
National O perations Mix
	
Percent-of Passenger Enplanements 	 (Varies by Airport)
Source:	 1977 Airport Activity Statistics - FAA, CAB
Figure 12
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Figure 13 shows results from an extensive analysis of the
National Transportation Safety Board data base using both the NTSB
tapes and the hard copy records for that subset of the accidents
that involved a fire. The data base contains approximately 260
accidents involving either total destruction of the aircraft or
substantial damage. Total destruction means that the plane is
essentially nonrecoverable. This chart shows the relative fre-
quency of total destruction and substantial damage in the dif-
ferent phases of operation: takeoff, landing, cruise, and
static/taxi. The largest potential for total destruction, which
is generally the type of accident that involves the largest fires,
occurred in the case of landing accidents, but there were also
significant possibilities of total destruction in the other
phases.
DOMESTIC AIR CARRIER INCIDENTS WITH FIRE AND/OR EXPLOSION
NATIONAL FREQUENCY — 6.7 per 10M i Ilion Operations
Takeoff	 Landing	 Cruise	 Static, Taxi
Phase of Operation
Source: NTSB Accident/Incident Statistics, 1968-1976
Figure 13
Weather conditions at the time of an accident are generally
classified into IFR - which stands for Instrument Flight Rules -
and VFR - which stands for Visual Flight Rules. There is also a
Below-Minimum classification. We took the IFR and Below-Minimum
statistics for accidents and compared those against the accidents
which occurred during VFR weather. We learned that an accident
is eight times more likely in IFR or below-minimum weather.
Accordingly, we normalized the national accident frequency (about
6.7 accidents per 10 million operations involving a fire and/or
explosion and total or substantial damage, which is equivalent
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Inversion Laver
Wind
Tilted	 \
Fiber
\	 Plume
to about 5 accidents per year) by the IFR/VFR weather frequency
in each of the major airports to obtain an adjusted accident rate
for each of these airports.
In addition, we estimated the occurrence of explosions in
these accidents. Explosions are relatively rare; only about 80
of all accidents with fire result in some kind of explosion.
However, it is not a true explosion. Rather, after a period of
burn the fire may reach the fuel tanks, at which point there is
a very rapid burning or deflagration of the fuel in the fuel
tanks, similar to an explosion. This deflagration or "explosion"
can cause an agitation of the structure, promoting the release of
a large number of fibers. In his presentation, Dr. Vernon Bell
showed some of the experimental results that we used to estimate
fiber release. Based on these results, we estimated the fraction
of fibers that were released from an aircraft. These fractions
ranged from approximately 5% in the case of substantial damage
accidents to as much as 25% in the case of a total destruction
accident with an explosion.
Because of the two situations under which carbon fibers can
be released, we used two different models, as shown in figure 14,
to account for the release phenomenon. The first model was an
instantaneous release model, corresponding to the explosion case.
In this model, we assumed an instantaneous release of a certain
mass of carbon fibers corresponding to the mass that was onboard
DISPERSION MODELS
1. Fire followed by a delayed explosion 	 2. Fire Plume Model
(instantaneous release model)
Figure 14
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the aircraft. A certain percentage of this mass was then assumed
to be released as single fibers. The resulting carbon fiber
cloud then drifted downwind. The other type of model, in the case
where no explosion occurred, is the fire plume model, where the
fire causes a plume which rises and reaches a certain maximum
height. The carbon fibers are then dispersed downwind. The
plume, however, is tilted due to the settling velocity of the
fibers. I won't go into the details of these dispersion models,
since Dr. Elber gave a very thorough discussion, but these models
are similar to the ones that he described and they have been veri-
fied in different experimental situations.
Our accident-statistics investigation also permitted us to
calculate a probability distribution for the location of an acci-
dent and to describe the proportion of the accidents that fell
within various distances of the runway. We found that the
fraction of accidents that occur off the airport was fairly large
in the case of landing accidents, as much as 450. With most
other operational phases, the proportion of accidents occurring
off the airport was smaller. In the case of off-airport acci-
dents, as illustrated in Figure 15, we established distributions
for the distance and the angle from the runway, and we also
utilized runway orientations to pinpoint the location of the
accident within the vicinity of each airport. Once the incident
location was established, the dispersion model was used to
EXPOSURE FOOTPRINTS AFTER CF RELEASE
Aircraft	 Wind Direction
Runway
ncident Location
n.3
Figure 15
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calculate exposure contours in the downwind direction. I should
point out that these contours are not drawn to scale.
Obviously, the aircraft runway is not that large; the contours
can be up to 50 miles in extent, and, generally speaking, they
tend to be elongated. That is, they are much longer than they
are wide, and not elliptical or almost circular as shown in
Figure 15.
Figure 16 gives some sample results from the fire plume model
just to give you an indication of the kind of results that we
SAMPLE OUTPUT FROM FIRE PLUME MODEL
Scenario: 500 KG of Carbon Fibers Released Over a 10-Minute Period
EXPOSURE CONTOUR NEUTRAL ATMOSPHERE MODERATELY STABLE ATMOSPHERE
LEVEL DIMENSIONS (M.) 4M. /SEC. WIND VELOCITY 2M./SEC. WIND VELOCITY
NEAREST DISTANCE 0 39,150
10 5 FARTHEST DISTANCE 0 57,150
FIBER-SEC/M3 MAXIMUM WIDTH 0 4,247
AREA (KM 2 ) 0 60
NEAREST DISTANCE 6,300 28,150
103 FARTHEST DISTANCE 94,300 63,150
FIBER-SEC/M 3 MAXIMUM WIDTH 16,107 8,363
AREA (KM 2 ) 1,110 230
Figure 16
obtained for the exposure contour. Two different types of atmos-
pheres are shown: a neutral atmosphere and a moderately stable
atmosphere. These are two of the Pasquill-Gifford stability
classes. In the case of the neutral atmosphere we had a four
meter per second wind velocity; and for the moderately stable
atmosphere, a two meter per second wind velocity. In both cases,
500 kilograms of carbon fibers were assumed to be released over a
10 minute period. The distances shown in figure 16 are in meters
except for the area which is shown in square kilometers. For
example, the 10 5 exposure contour extended over a distance of 57
kilometers and had a maximum width of four kilometers, so it was a
fairly elongated contour. Interestingly, in this case the neutral
atmosphere showed no 10 5 exposure contour. There are cases in
which the maximum exposure will not necessarily exceed 10 4 or 105.
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The 10 3 contour for the neutral atmosphere was fairly long. It
went out a distance of 94 kilometers, which is slightly in excess
of the 50 mile distance that we discussed earlier.
Given these contours, we can establish the exposure in the
case of an accident occurring in the vicinity of an airport. Fig-
ure 17 gives, as an illustration, a map of Massachusetts showing
DISTRIBUTION OF SECTORS AROUND LOGAN AIRPORT, BOSTON, MASS.
Figure 17
the location of Logan Airport in Boston. We first establish a
grid, or a map, in polar coordinates surrounding each major
airport. We then place concentric circles at distances of 5, 10,
20, 35, and 50 miles from the airport center and divide the
circles into 8 equal segments. This procedure effectively
divides the area into 40 sectors. Once the exposure contour is
determined and the incident location is identified, we can find
the exposure distribution in each of these forty sectors. Notice
that if you go out 50 miles, you cover a good half of the state
of Massachusetts. Therefore, many different communities are
involved. A number of other, smaller, airports are also covered.
So, as I mentioned earlier, there are an enormous number of
facilities which are potentially vulnerable and subject to expo-
sures of greater than 10 3
 carbon fiber seconds per cubic meter.
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To establish the kinds of facilities present in exposed
areas, we did a great deal of work in terms of field surveys as
well as investigations of census data. As shown in figure 18, we
POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE FACILITIES
1. Residences
2. Manufacturers	 — Electronic Equipment
— Computers
— Aerospace
3. Transportation	 — Aircraft and Air Traffic Control
— Mass Transit
— Motor Vehicles
4. Communication	 — Telephone
— Radio/TV/Microwave
— Post Offices
— Fire/Police
5. Services	 — Financial/Insurance
— Software/EDP
—'Hospitals
6. General	 — Retail Outlets
— Office Buildings
— Industrial Plants
Figure 18
identified the potentially vulnerable facilities in these areas,
starting with households. We were able to get a count of the
number of households in each geometric sector from 1972 census
data. We also used the 1972 census data to examine standard in-
dustrial classifications to determine the number of facilities in
various types of industries. We enumerated manufacturers of
electronic equipment which might be sensitive, including
computers and aerospace manufacturers, and we also looked at
general manufacturers who might use electronic equipment in
process control or for other applications. We looked at the
transportation industry; in particular, aircraft and air traffic
control were of great interest, and we also examined mass transit
systems and motor vehicles. We looked at communications in terms
of telephone, radio, T.V., microwave, Post Offices, and fire and
police communications. In terms of service industries, we looked
at finance and insurance industries, software and electronic
data processing centers as well as hospitals. Finally, in the
general category, we looked at various types of retail outlets,
office buildings and industrial plants corresponding to the
general manufacturing category. Mr. Ansel Butterfield described
some of the main field surveys that we made. There have been
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some additional surveys since then; so that we now have a fairly
good coverage of some of the more important facilities in these
different categories. As I mentioned, we established a data base
which essentially describes the number of facilities existing
in the fifty-mile radius area surrounding each of the 26 major
airports. I should reiterate that these results are based on
1972 census data and that we did not attempt to project the
number of facilities that exist presently into the future.
Given that the facilities have been identified, suppose
that a facility is exposed to carbon fibers. How many of these
fibers enter the building, and what is the effect of exposure
inside the building? Mr. Israel Taback gave us a good discussion
of the notion of penetration and transfer functions, so I won't
go into that in much detail. The model and main variables are
shown in figure 19. The filter efficiencies, window openings,
interior dimensions of buildings, ventilation rates, recircula-
tion of air, and infiltration rates through walls and through
cracks can all be estimated based upon heating and ventilation
handbooks and construction codes, so we can get a fairly good
idea of what the rate of entry is for fibers into a building.
We can then calculate an inside exposure based upon this infor-
mation and the outside exposure.
BUILDING PENETRATION MODEL
Inside	 Outside
	 X	 Transfer
Exposure
	 Exposure
	 Function
TRANSFER FUNCTION DEPENDS ON
• Filter Efficiencies
• Window Openings
• Interior Dimensions
• Ventilation Rates
• Recirculation of Air
• Infiltration Rate
Figure 19
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Figure 20 gives an overview of some of the results we got for
transfer function, which we call an airborne exposure transfer
function (AETF). We've shown a range from minimum to maximum.
The reason that we show a range is that there is some uncertainty
in the estimation of a transfer function. There are two sources to
AIRBORNE EXPOSURE TRANSFER FUNCTION
OVERVIEW OF RESULTS
AETF Range
AREA DESIGNATION	 Min.	 Max.
AIRCRAFT — CABINS, DOORS OPEN	 0.16	 0.68
—CABINS, DOORS SHUT	 0	 9 x 10"3
— EXTERNAL COMPARTMENTS
	
10-3	 9 x 10"2
AIRPORT — BAGGAGE AREAS
	 7 x 10-2 	0.87
— CONTROL TOWERS, WINDOWS SHUT
	 0	 6 x 10-3
— PASSENGER TERMINALS	 0	 10-3
COMPUTER ROOMS
	 0	 3 x 10-3
EMERGENCY GENERATORS	 0.1	 0.7
HEALTH FACILITIES — GENERAL AREAS, NON SEALED 1.5 x 10 -2 	0.44
— OPERATING ROOMS
	 0	 3 x 10-4
INDUSTRIAL BUILDINGS — OLD BUILDING
	 0.3	 0.7
— MODERN, AVERAGE FILTERS 7 x 10-5
	 0.13
OFFICE AREAS —WINDOWS SHUT 	 4 x 10 -4 	7 x 10-2
RESIDENCES — WINDOWS OPEN	 10-2	 0.7
Figure 20
this uncertainty. One is the fact that each of the variables is
somewhat uncertain. For example, filter efficiencies do have
some uncertainty band; they can't be estimated precisely. Another
source of uncertainty is that in each type of facility there is
an enormous variation in the different building characteristics,
from modern buildings to old buildings, from very well controlled
buildings to poorly ventilated buildings. So within this range
of variation, we're able to estimate a transfer function range
from each of the facility categories that I showed earlier. Some
samples of the ranges we identified are given in Figure 20. You
can see that they range over many orders of magnitude. We looked
at aircraft and the airport terminal areas. In computer rooms,
for example, you have a fairly low transfer function, anywhere
from zero to about 10 -3 . For residences the transfer function
tends to be high, ranging from 10 -2 to about 0.7 in a situation
where it's summer time and all the windows are open.
Figure 21 gives the failure model for electronic equipment.
By using this exponential failure distribution and vulnerability
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Probability
of Failure
63.2°
E	 Exposure E
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FAILURE MODEL
_ E
Probability of Failure = 1 e €
E = Mean Exposure for Failure
EXPOSURE PERCENT FAILURES
E	 /100 1.0%
E	 /10 9.5%
E 63.2%
10	 E 99.9%
Figure 21
estimates based upon the experimental data that were described by
Mr. Israel Taback, we were able to develop a failure distribution
for each category of equipment that was identified. It's
interesting to note that, on the horizontal axis, at two decades
below E, the mean exposure for failure, the probability of
failure is 0.01; or about to of the equipment exposed at that
level will fail. At one decade below E, about 100 of the
equipment will fail. At E, about 630 of the equipment will fail.
However, at one decade above E, nearly all the equipment exposed
at that level will fail.
Figure 22 gives some examples of the facility categories that
we've identified, along with particular types of equipment that
are present in those facility categories and the mean exposure
estimates which were derived for those types of equipment. Notice
that one column is called "Failure Category". In order to esti-
mate the economic losses, we identified for each type of category
what the function was for the equipment within that facility. In
other words, how would the failure of equipment affect the opera-
tion of the facility as a whole? We identified three such
classes, namely equipment which would require only repair in the
case of failure, equipment which might disrupt the operation of
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SELECTED VULNERABILITY ESTIMATES
Facility Equipment Failure Mean Exposure
Category Type Category (Fiber-Sec./M.3) 
HOUSEHOLDS TV /STEREO REPAIR 6.4 x 108
AIRPORT CONTROL
TOWER ATC CONSOLES REPAIR 7 x 105
AIRPORT CONTROL
TOWER ATC COMPUTER REPAIR 4.9 x 109
SHIPYARDS CRANES REPAIR 4.0 x 105
POST OFFICE ELECTRONIC SORTERS REPAIR 5.0 x 105
AlRPORT TERM INAL CRT DISPLAYS REPAIR 1.6x107
MANUFACTURERS TELEPHONE PBX DISRUPTIVE 7.0 x 105
AIRCRAFT AVIONICS INSTRUMENTS DISRUPTIVE 1.0 x 106
RADIO/TV STATION CONTROL ROOM CRITICAL 3.0 x 105
RETAIL OUTLETS POINT OF SALE TERMINAL DISRUPTIVE 1.0 x 107
BUSINESS SERVICES GENERAL OFFICE EQUIP. DISRUPTIVE 5.0 x 105
HOSPITALS POWER GENERATOR REPAIR 9.8 x 105
EDP SERVICES COMPUTER CRITICAL 4.9 x 109
Figure 22
the facility (called a disruptive failure), and equipment, such as
a control room in a radio/tv station, where, if the equipment
fails, the operation is obliged to shut down until the equipment
can be repaired. This latter is called a "critical failure".
Shown are two types of critical failure: one for the control
room and another for the computer in an EDP service industry.
Notice that the exposure estimates for computers to fail are
fairly high; they're about 5 times 10 9 . The reason is that our
vulnerability estimate for computers included a transfer function
for the computer room. Most facilities have a transfer function
corresponding to the building exterior, but, since computer rooms
tend to be very well protected, there is an additional transfer
function corresponding to the passage of the fibers from outside
to inside the computer room and also corresponding to the cabinet
protection of the computer. In general the vulnerability
estimates tend to range between 10 5 to l0 9 fiber seconds per cubic
meter. Generally speaking these values are well above the exter-
nal exposures that we saw from our dispersion analysis, and, due
to the transfer functions, the inside exposures will usually be
even further below these levels.
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Figure 23 gives economic consequences of the carbon-fiber
problem for industries. Recall that we identified three categor-
ies of failure type. Corresponding to each of these failure
types, we had a different approach towards estimating the economic
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR INDUSTRIES
TYPE OF
FAILURE
DIRECT
LOSSES
INDIRECT
LOSSES
Minor Equipment Repair or
Replacement
Disruptive Equipment Repair or Additional
Replacement Operating Costs
Critical Equipment Repair Shutdown, Loss
or Replacement of Revenue
Figure 23
losses. In the case of a minor failure, which amounts to only
the repair of the equipment, the cost of the failure was assumed
to be the cost of replacing or repairing the equipment. In the
case of a disruptive failure we have the equipment repair costs,
plus the additional operating costs due to alternate procedures
for operating the facility. Although it was assumed that the
facility could continue operation while the equipment was being
repaired, some additional operational procedures would be
necessary. Finally, in the critical failure we assumed a shut-
down of the facility, in which case there would be a loss of
revenue during the estimated downtime for the equipment under
consideration. To get revenue figures and operating cost figures
for the various facilities, we used average financial statements
for an industry based upon each metropolitan area. We were able
to obtain these average financial statements for areas near each
of the major airports that we examined.
We've gone through the sequence of events that was to be
modeled, and I've shown the approach we've taken towards modeling
each step in that procedure, from the initial air carrier
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operation to the potential release of fibers, through the pene-
tration, to the possible failure of the equipment, and ultimately
the economic losses that could result. Now what did we do with
all these data? In her presentation, Dr. Karen Credeur gave
a good description of the simulation approach that was used.
our approach was slightly different, but essentially similar
in character; it was based upon the roulette wheel analogy that
Dr. Credeur described. We used each of the data types that were
generated in each of the steps that I described, and input them to
a Monte Carlo simulation model, illustrated in figure 24, which
performs random draws to simulate the occurrence of an accident.
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION PROCEDURE
Aircraft/Incident Details
Accident	 I	 I	 Delayed	 I	 I CF Release
Location	 Explosion	 Conditions
Dispersion	 Weather
.Model	 HI
Determine	 Calculate
Exposure	 Exposure
By Sector	 Contours
Vulnerable
Facility
Characteristics
Economic
Loss
Model ? Denotes a random draw
Figure 24
We simulated the occurrence of a large number of accidents for
each of the major airports under consideration. We input
frequency distributions for each of the different accident
characteristics: the aircraft/incident details such as aircraft
type, operational category, whether the damage was total destruc-
tion or substantial damage--all these details were derived from
the aircraft accident statistics. For example, there's a cer-
tain chance of total destruction, there's a certain chance
that the destruction will be off-airport, there's a certain
chance that there will be a fire, and there's a certain chance
that there will in fact be an explosion following this fire.
A question mark indicates a situation in which we had a random draw
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from a frequency distribution. We selected the appropriate
dispersion model. For example, if there was a delayed explosion,
we selected the instantaneous release model. The carbon fiber
release conditions were based upon the aircraft/incident details;
these described the mass of fibers that were released. The
weather conditions were drawn from data supplied by the National
Climatic Service, which describes the wind direction and the
atmospheric stability classes at each of the airports under
consideration. Given all these details, we then call upon the
dispersion model to calculate the exposure contours. The
accident or incident location tells us where the exposure contours
originate, and we then determine the exposure by sector for
each of the 40 sectors surrounding the airport. Once the expo-
sure distribution has been determined, we look at the
potentially vulnerable facilities within each of the sectors and
calculate the total expected economic losses.
The simulation that I described establishes a distribution
for the losses given a single accident at a particular airport.
To develop a national risk profile for a single accident, we
combined the incident frequencies, as indicated in figure 25.
Having the national risk profile for a single incident and
knowing the frequency of incidents in the nation, which as I said
was approximately 5 per year, we then can calculate two types of
representations of the total national risk. One representation
DERIVATION OF NATIONAL RISK PROFILE
Incident
Frequencies
In r Individual
Individual Air-	 Airports
port Risk Profiles
for a Single
Incident
National Risk
Profile for a	 National
Single Incident
	
Incident
Frequency
National
Annual
Loss
Frequency
National
Annual
Risk
Profile
Figure 25
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is the national annual loss frequency, which tells us how often
events occur with various levels of damage. For example, how
often would a ten thousand dollar accident occur? How often
would a million dollar accident occur, and so forth? Another
representation of the risks, which is a better representation
for decision-making purposes, is the national annual risk profile
which doesn't look at specific events, but instead gives the
range of loss due to carbon fibers for the nation as a whole.
This risk representation incorporates the assumption that there
may be 1, 2, 3 or more accidents.
Before showing results, however, I want to review the
assumptions that enter into this calculation. There are five
major assumptions that should be mentioned. These five are
shown in figure 26. First, if an aircraft carries composites, we
assume that the composite will always be involved in the fire.
In fact, this assumption is not necessarily true and the airframe
manufacturers are currently investigating the actual probability
of the fiber being involved in the fire and thus being released.
MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS
1. IF AN AIRCRAFT CARRIES COMPOSITE, AND A FIRE
OCCURS, THE COMPOSITE WILL ALWAYS BE INVOLVED
2. ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS REMAIN CONSTANT DURING
DISPERSION OF THE CARBON FIBER CLOUD
3. FOR A GIVEN FACILITY CATEGORY, ALL FACILITIES ARE
EQUAL IN SIZE, EQUIPMENT INVENTORY, AND FINANCIAL
CHARACTERISTICS
4. FAILURES OCCUR IMMEDIATELY AFTER EXPOSURE, WITH
INDEPENDENCE AMONG UNITS OF EQUIPMENT
5. SECOND-ORDER IMPACTS OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE ARE NOT
INCLUDED IN ECONOMIC LOSS (e.g. interruption of telephone service)
Figure 26
The second assumption is that atmospheric conditions remain
constant during the dispersion of the carbon fiber cloud.
However, a cloud traveling 50 miles at a speed of about 2 miles
per hour can take a day or so and, obviously, the atmospheric
conditions are going to change. Therefore, this assumption will
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clearly not hold in practice. Nonetheless, since all the
different atmospheric conditions will occur with the appropriate
frequencies, simulation over a large number of accidents should
yield a risk profile that gives a good indication of the poten-
tial economic losses.
The third assumption is that, for a given facility category,
all facilities are identical in the sense that they have the same
revenue, the same size of operation, and the same types of equip-
ment in the plant. In reality we know that there is a wide range
of facilities; in his presentation, Mr. Ansel Butterfield demon-
strated some of the variation that can occur. However, we assumed
an average type of facility for the purpose of calculating economic
loss. The fourth assumption is that failures occur immediately
after an accident and that the failure of different units is inde-
pendent. Although Mr. Israel Taback discussed the issue of possi-
ble post-exposure vulnerability, we assumed that, if electronic
equipment is vulnerable, then the failure will occur immediately
after the accident. The independence assumption means that we
don't take into account the locations of units within a facility.
If the units are located close to one another, then their failures
may somehow be correlated. The fifth assumption, which is an
important one, concerns the types of losses considered in this
analysis. We considered only that we called primary losses,
namely those that were a direct outcome of the incident,
resulting either in equipment repair costs or in business
interruption costs. We did not consider the potential secondary
impacts, such as the losses incurred by the interruption of
telephone service to a community. In the case of an airport,
for example, we did not consider the potential costs of clean-up
or decontamination following a carbon fiber exposure. We looked
only at the costs of potential failures that would occur.
Figure 27 gives the actual risk profile that was derived.
The axis on the left shows the annual probability of losses
exceeding a certain amount. The axis at the bottom shows the
total losses in dollars. This curve is the risk profile for
a single year for the nation as a whole. This means that, in
1993, there is an 80% chance that we will experience losses in
excess of 10,000 dollars. Further, moving down the curve about
every ten years we would expect to .incur a loss of a million
dollars or more. Following the curve to the right-hand end, we
learn that once about every thousand years, one would expect
losses of the order of ten million dollars or more. We also
extrapolated the curve further and are in the process of
sharpening estimates, so that we can examine the possibility of
higher losses at the very low tail end of the risk profile.
There may, in fact, be probabilities of the order of 10 -4 of
losses exceeding 20 or 30 million dollars.
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ANNUAL RISK PROFILE FOR
CARBON FIBER RELEASES FROM COMMERCIAL AIR CARRIERS
(1993 CF Utilization)
Expected Annual
Loss = $419,000
1
10.4
105
104	105	 106	 101	 108
Total Losses X (Dollars)
Figure 27
Although the curve in figure 27 is an economic loss profile,
it is possible to develop a risk profile showing the potential
fatalities due to shock hazards using a very similar procedure.
The entire methodology that I've described is applicable to that
case, except that, instead of looking at failures of equipment,
we would simply look at the probability of a shock hazard for
each facility that is examined in the exposed area.
The confidence bounds shown on the profile in figure 27
are estimates and we are currently sharpening these estimates.
Although the profile was calculated with 1993 carbon fiber
utilization figures, it reflects the 1972 census figures and is
expressed in 1977 dollars, so it's a hybrid risk profile. It.
shows us what the risk would be in 1977 assuming that the number
of facilities has remained relatively constant and assuming that
airplanes today were carrying the kind of fibers that they would
in 1993.
We feel that this risk profile is conservative, in the sense
that it tends to overestimate the risks rather than underestimate
the risks. There are several reasons for this. One is that in
most of our release assumptions, we attempted to be on the con-
servative side. Another is that the building transfer functions
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used were in every case at the maximum or high end of the range.
On the other hand, although it's a conservative risk profile,
secondary losses are not included. It is conceivable that there
would be additional losses due to some types of impacts, such as
telephone or airport service interruption, which have not yet
been quantified, and these inclusions might tend to move the risk
profile slightly to the right.
Now, in order to compare our results against risks which
have been estimated for other types of disasters or accidents,
let's compare against the curves which Dr. Karen Credeur showed
previously. These curves, shown in figure 28, are taken from
the Reactor Safety Study, the Wash 1400 report. Shown are the
curves corresponding to natural events, man-caused events, and
nuclear power plants. These curves have different meanings than
the risk profile that I showed you a moment ago; they are national
annual loss frequencies. They don't show losses to the US as a
whole in a given year; instead they show how frequently acci-
dents occur involving various levels of loss. The axis on the
left gives the frequency of incidents per year involving dollar
damages greater than a certain amount, X. For example, $10,000
is the lowest level of loss shown and, since a log scale is used,
the plot says that we will have approximately two carbon-fiber
related accidents per year involving losses of more than $10,000.
As you move down the curve, you find that the frequency of
accidents involving losses of greater than a million dollars is
COMPARISON OF RISK PROFILES
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only one in a hundred. In other words, there's a one hundredth
chance of an incident each year involving a loss greater than a
million dollars.
If you compare the CF curve against the other curves shown
in figure 28, you find that it falls well to the left of those
curves, indicating that at the same level of frequency the poten-
tial losses due to aircraft accident carbon fiber releases are
significantly lower. For example, at the 10
-2
 level, in other
words, the one accident in a hundred, the estimated damages from
carbon fiber are a million or more, but, in the case of the man-
caused or natural events, they are considerably more, on the
order of $1 billion. The same is true of the Reactor Safety
Study curve for a hundred nuclear power plants. Although there
isn't much overlap between the ranges of these two curves, where
there is some overlap we again see that for an equivalent low
frequency of occurrence, the damage cost is higher for nuclear
power plants. For example, for the one accident in a thousand,
the damage from carbon fibers is about ten million dollars,
whereas an accident involving a nuclear power plant would have
damage in excess of a billion dollars.
Figure 29 gives the areas of future effort which will improve
the risk estimates that I've shown. These estimates must be con-
sidered preliminary due to some of the assumptions that have been
AREAS OF FUTURE EFFORT
1. REFINEMENT OF RELEASE AND DISPERSION ANALYSIS
2. DETAILED ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR SPECIFIC BUSINESS CATEGORIES
3. PROJECTING IMPACTS OF GROWTH IN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY
4. DETERMINATION OF CONFIDENCE BOUNDS FOR RISK PROFILE
5. PERFORM ANALYSIS OF WORST CASE SCENARIO
6. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS AT AIRPORTS
Figure 29
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made. However, there are a number of areas that will assist us in
refining the estimates. Note that the expected annual loss on the
risk profile is $419,000 for the nation as a whole due to any
accidents that might release carbon fibers. The standard devia-
tion of that risk profile is $785,000. This large deviation
shows a fairly wide variation, and,for this reason, we need a
risk profile to examine the possible range of damage that might
result.
In the areas of possible future effort, the refinement of
the release and dispersion analysis is important, particularly
with respect to the release conditions at the time of the
accident. In addition, the economic analysis for business
categories could be improved by examining specific industries
more carefully and by looking at the variation within industries.
The impacts of growth in the electronic industry should be
accounted for so that we can have a better feeling for what the
potentially vulnerable equipment will look like in 1993.
The confidence bound shown on the risk profile can be
improved through sensitivity analysis and we're currently in the
process of doing that. The sensitivity analysis examines the
effect of the uncertainty in each of the variables which enter
into the risk profile calculation. We are also in the process
of analyzing the worst case scenario. It is possible that there
are extremely costly accidents with extremely small probabilities,
but which are still realistic and might occur. We will identify
the potential worst case which may, in fact, exceed the current
value that we estimate for the maximum loss due to any one
accident, which is about 10 million dollars. In fact, we may
identify accidents which potentially could cause a greater loss,
perhaps 20 million dollars or more. Finally, the economic
analysis at the airports needs to be improved. In particular,
the cost of prevention and decontamination, and the question of
the potential failure of airplanes after exposure are still open
issues. That concludes our presentation.
QUESTIONS
Question: Question related to (1) differences in the ORI
and A. D. Little risk analysis and (2) the sensitivity of
the estimates to the amount of fiber released.
Response: With respect to the differences between our
estimates, there is some uncertainty, and different methods
were used. We feel that our estimate is an accurate reflection
of a conservative risk profile. There are confidence bounds
on our estimate and I think it's possible that the results
shown by the other organization will fall within those
confidence bounds. With respect to the second question, the
purpose of the sensitivity analysis is to identify the possible
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variations in risks that might be due to uncertainty in the
variables of interest, for example, the percentage of fibers
released. This is still a question, and it is being
investigated. We are attempting to see what the effect
would be on a risk profile of varying the inputs. You can
assume a 20o fiber release or you can assume a to release;
the question is: What is the impact upon the total risk?
As Dr. Kalelkar mentioned earlier, even with substantial
uncertainty bounds, the risk profile still allows you to say
something about the risks. It still may allow decisions by
the appropriate decision makers regarding the risks.
Comment: . . . the risk analysis says the problem falls
somewhere between no problem and a major problem.
Response: I don't think we ever said that there was a major
problem. We're showing that with some probability you could
do a million dollars worth of damage. As to whether that's
a problem that we should be concerned about or not, we haven't
judged.
Response by Israel Taback: I thought the point of the comment
was that one of the computations indicated no problem, and
the other one did indicate somewhat of a problem. Actually, I'm
surprised that the two answers are so close. If you take the
ORI Washington statistics and multiply by the ratio of oper-
ations in the nation to those in Washington, and then multiply
by 10, the difference between 1985 and 1993, the expected val-
ues per year come out to be about the same as the ADL number.
Question: Which of the variables which enter into the risks
has the greatest effect upon the risks?
Response: We are currently investigating that in a sensitivity
analysis and in our final report we will try to indicate
which of the variables has the greatest impact. It's a little
early to say at this point, but you got some indications
from what was shown. For example, the transfer functions vary
over 3 to 4 orders of magnitude. As we've indicated, we've
always used the highest transfer function in the spirit of
trying to be conservative, and get an overestimate initially
rather then an underestimate. So that is one area which can
influence it. The other is that economic analysis was done
in a relatively straightforward manner and requires substantial
additional work. The actual losses that might be encountered
could be quite different.
We have done some sensitivity analyses on the transfer function,
and it turns out that if you go down to the minimum of the
range, the expected value of the risk is diminished by about
800.
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Question: I realize for purpose of the analysis that it is
necessary to assume as you did, (1) all failures occur
immediately, and (2) you can't start out by trying to assess
the cost of the secondary failure downstream, such as the
cost of being without telephone service or computer service.
Yet it seems to me a very real possibility that several hours
after the accident or even a day after the accident the
redistribution is a very significant problem. You may have a
small immediate cost of 10,000 dollars whereas the secondary
down the line costs might be millions. Is somebody pursuing
that type of analysis to see how severe those problems can
be?
Response: Yes, we intend to give that additional thought.
We just haven't had a chance to do it all yet. We are pursuing
that.
Question: On your third curve from the last, that showed the
possible dollar value of each incident, you showed a rather large
spread from each of the points. I notice you took the zero
as your starting point and for your first spread you went
very near the top of the spread and for the second spread
you were at the middle. If you had redrawn that curve so
you would cross those spreads towards the center of both you
would come out more with a straight line so that the future
accidents could have amounted to somewhat higher levels of
money, instead of one times ten to the sixth perhaps closer
to ten to the seventh or eighth. I was just curious why you
chose to draw more a downward pointing curve rather than
more of a straight line?
Response: Well, there are two parts to that answer. If
you're talking about the risk profile itself, you realize
that on the left-hand side, it can never go above one. So,
there is a constraining factor there. Then, as Dr. Karen
Credeur pointed out, there is a different amount of conservatism
applied to different portions of the curve. So sometimes we
might have an estimate that could err larger in the upside
risk if you will, than in the downside risk, and sometimes
the other way around. They don't have to be centrally
located in respect to their actual value as shown. It is
properly adjusted for that and the curve you saw was our
best estimate of the risk.
Question: Question related to the effect of the size of the
carbon fibers.
Response: In actuality, fiber size makes some difference in
the amount of damage that can occur, the way they disperse,
and so on. In this analysis, we assumed that they were
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between 7 and 10 millimeters long.
Another open area which I guess we neglected to mention is
the fact that we were dealing really with dispersion of sin-
gle fibers. It was pointed out in previous presentations
that you can have lint or clumps; this has not been looked
at.
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CONCLUSIONS
Robert J. Huston
Manager, Graphite Fibers Risk Analysis Program Office
NASA Langley Research Center
I would now like to summarize. Referring to figure 1,
we have developed and exercised a risk analysis method. You
should recognize, and I want to emphasize, that our risk
estimates are very preliminary. Sensitivity analysis has
not been done. Only civil transport aircraft accidents have
been considered as a source of accidentally released graphite
fibers. We intend to study the question of the potential
release of graphite fibers from accidents with general
aviation, including helicopters, which is the remaining
category of civil aircraft to be considered. Let me add
that we do not anticipate a large increase in risk due to
this additional source. In fact, I doubt very seriously
that it is going to increase by even a factor of two. We
have already completed a survey of fire accidents in general
aviation. We find that the total empty weight of general
aviation aircraft that are involved in fire accidents, which
represents an upper boundary on the potential carbon fiber
released from general aviation, is approximately one-fifth
of the empty weight of civil transport aircraft involved in
fire. Unless there are some unusual circumstances when we
consider a large number of small sources, we may already
have at least an order of magnitude estimate on the total
risk by studying air transport aircraft alone.
CONFERENCE SUMMARY
A RISK ANALYSIS METHOD HAS BEEN EXERCISED
RISK ESTIMATES ARE VERY PRELIMINARY
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS HAS NOT BEEN DONE
ONLY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AS A SOURCE
DATA BASE IS STILL SPARSE - FURTHER STUDY NEEDED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS
FIBER RELEASE FROM LARGE FIRES
POWER GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION VULNERABILITY
EQUIPMENT VULNERABILITY (WITH REALISTIC FIBER LENGTH SPECTRA)
INDUSTRIAL FACILITY VULNERABILITY
COSTING TECHNIQUES
SOME ELEMENTS ARE STILL UNDER DEVELOPMENT. I.E.:
FIRE PLUME - DISPERSION MODELS
FIBER LIFE - REDISPERSION DATA
Figure 1
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With reference to our data base, further study is
needed in a number of areas. For example, both ORI and
A. D. Little assumed that from 5 to 25 percent of the carbon
fiber in an aircraft would be released in a crash. However,
in Dr. Bell's presentation, he points out that, in the case
of fire accidents, approximately 1 percent or less of the
fibers might be released. In the case of fire followed by
an explosion, 10 percent of the weight of carbon might be
released as free fibers. Therefore, we should note that
considerable conservatism has been included in the current
A. D. Little and ORI analyses. As we acquire further data,
we may see a further reduction in the risk profiles from
this one area alone.
We do not have enough information on power generation
and distribution vulnerability. Ansel Butterfield pointed
out in his presentation that power distribution was a key
item in assessing cost impacts on factories. We at NASA are
heavily dependent upon the activity of the Department of
Energy who has responsibility for evaluating carbon fiber
effects on power distribution systems. We need to
evaluate equipment vulnerability with a more realistic fiber
length spectrum. Most of the fiber chamber testing has been
done with rather moderate length fibers. Israel Taback
showed you the effect on vulnerability of short, medium and
long fibers for a very limited sample of equipment. The
available vulnerability test data is primarily based on a
range from six to ten millimeters. We note that the mean
exposure level goes up drastically when short fibers are
used in the tests, which, by itself, infers that the probability
of damage is less but there may be more fibers. We need to
continue studying industrial facility vulnerability to
identify key areas for further tests. We need to look at
the different approaches to costing in order to have better
confidence in the cost impacts of our risk estimates.
Some elements are still under development. Up to now,
we are using some simple fire plume models, and they may be
adequate in the long run. However, we recognize that a
combined fire plume dispersion model, that would also allow
computation of the amount of fiber that may be consumed in
the actual fire, may show a further reduction in potential
damage. To date, the only large outdoor test data we have
is the China Lake experiment and it appears that we have had
a large amount of fiber burned up in that particular experiment.
The question of fiber life and redispersion was covered
in Dr. Elber's presentation. We have to establish what would
happen if a small precentage, say one percent of the released
fibers, continue to be redispersed from an accident site for a
period of time. That effect has not been included in our
risk assessment estimates to this point.
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Now I am going to go out on a limb and make a judgement
about the risk. Our preliminary estimate indicates that
the public risk due to accidental release of carbon fiber
from air transport aircraft is small. You may judge it in
your own way, but I believe that the risk is small with
respect to the national benefits that can be obtained from
carbon fibers. We should recognize that there is a balance of
payment issue involved in terms of foreign sales of commercial
aircraft and a significant fuel import and cost savings
offered in the application of graphite composites. 	 We
do need further work to increase our confidence in this
estimate. To reemphasize our schedule, we anticipate completing
our "final" risk assessment in 1 year. These conclusions
are summarized on figure 2.
CONFERENCE CONCLUSIONS
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES INDICATE THAT THE PUBLIC RISK DUE TO ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF
CARBON FIBER FROM AIR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IS SMALL
FURTHER WORK IS REQUIRED TO INCREASE OUR CONFIDENCE IN THESE ESTIMATES
Figure 2
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PANEL RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS
Question: Regarding exterior exposure... where can you draw a line
between this area as being contaminated and an area outside
that for which you need not be concerned?
Response: Israel Taback
If you do it on a computer there's no limit; that is, if you
really believe the exponential model, then all the way down to
where you drop one fiber on a piece of apparatus, there is some
probability of doing some damage. In the real world when the prob-
ability of damage gets so small compared to the normal failure
rates of equipment, then I think you have to forget it - the equip-
ment would be normally repaired anyhow and the damage would not be
noticed. It's a rather difficult question really; as you saw for
some of the exposures the failure rates go down as the areas go up,
so as you try to extrapolate the total damage you really don't know
where to end the computation. Eventually, we know the computations
will converge. The answer to your question however, is that with
the concept that a single fiber can do damage, you must at least
numerically extrapolate it all the way out to where fibers can
land.
Question: Question related to describing risk in terms of criti-
cality (i.e. loss of communications say in White House) rather
than in terms of dollars.
Response: Bob Huston
We are currently only trying to quantify the risk in terms of
cost for the civil community. However, we do need to assess the
cost to protect any kind of activity that we think is critical.
Israel Taback
I just wanted to remind the audience that there was a third
study underway with respect to other measures of risks, which is
being done by George Washington University. We don't have those
results in yet but we are going to look at that study to see what
other measures should be used in evaluating the risk.
Dr. Karen Credeur
My comments would be to echo these two comments, and also to
say that Dr. Kalelkar pointed out in his talk that he will be look-
ing at secondary costs and perhaps some of those secondary costs
will get into just the issues you're talking about.
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Question: Question regarding relationship of vulnerability to
deposition and exposure.
Response: Dr. Wolf Elber
I think in most cases that we've looked at, if you go through
an analysis, you'll find that first of all deposition is usually
proportional to exposure so that they are related--in most cases
they are proportional, so that if we measure the vulnerability in
terms of exposure even if inside the box might be deposition
critical, we're getting a number which is proportional to the cri-
tical term.
Question: There is a substantial amount of fiber that is manu-
factured overseas. A logical way of shipping it into the
United States might be by air and therefore has the case of
an accident involving raw unprepregged or raw carbon fiber as
a cargo been considered?
Response: Dr. Credeur
We are considering exactly that scenario for a worst case.
Question: Question related to vulnerability of civil aircraft.
Response: Bob Huston
One of our objectives is to look at the need for protection to
civil aircraft. We have right now Boeing, Lockheed, and Douglas
working with us analyzing all of their air transport aircraft to
see if there is a need for protection to air transport aircraft.
That is being evaluated right now, not as a part of the input to
our risk assessment, but as a separate issue.
Israel Taback:
There is one thing that is in work that I don't think we
emphasized previously - that was our concern about general avia-
tion aircraft as well as the larger scheduled commercial aircraft.
We are evaluating some of the electronic components that are in
the lighter aircraft to see what the extent of risk might be for
airplanes parked on the apron. To date, what we've tested hasn't
failed, but I suspect that some day we will run into a box that
does, then we'll evaluate it.
Question: Is there a size effect below which you would not worry
about the vulnerability of electronics?
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Response: Israel Taback
Yes, there is a critical size, but I'm afraid it varies with
the electronics. First, you always have to worry because of the
fact that if you put a lot of fibers into a piece of apparatus,
you may bridge the gap with more than one fiber. On the basis
that those probabilities are much lower than the bridging of a
gap with a single fiber; however, you must usually worry about
the relative length of the gaps and the single fibers. For most
commercial apparatus where people aren't worried about space,
these gaps typically range from a sixteenth of an inch to a quar-
ter of an inch. In military equipment and in space work, where
you kind of build the devices from the outside in and room is
very important, many of the circuit traces on circuit boards may
be as little as ten thousandths of an inch apart, and you must
then worry about very short fibers.
Question: Question related to vulnerability sensitivity to fiber
length.
Response: Israel Taback
I can only give you a guess at the present. I think the
longer fibers would not be a problem for any internal equipment
because it's very hard for them to get through filters or even
window screens. Short fibers of millimeter length are probably
of no concern because they are too short. My guess is that equip-
ment will generally be most vulnerable to fibers ranging in length
from 1 to 4 millimeters.
Question: Question related to dispersion sensitivity to fiber
length.
Response: Israel Taback
The dispersion doesn't vary much with length. These fibers
tend to fall parallel to the ground; and independent of length,
they have the same fall velocity.
Question: Question related to fall velocity of fibers.
Response: Bob Huston
They always fall at terminal velocity, if that's what you
mean.
Israel Taback
Well I wouldn't say always. I think when the fibers get long
enough so that they are essentially not straight lines, so that
they have some curvature to them, they'll fall at various velocities
with a spectrum of fall rates. As long as they're short and stiff
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they seem to be stable in a horizontal attitude and fall at a
rate which is independent of length.
Question: Question related to whether or not electrical util-
ities and substations were considered in the risk assessment.
Response: Dr. Fiksel
In our description of vulnerable facilities I attempted to
summarize the categories we looked at and we failed to show the
fact that we did look at gas and electric utilities. Those were
included.
Question: Is the length of the released fiber related to the
length of the fiber in manufacture and would manufacturing
techniques affect the lengths of released fibers?
Response: Dr. Vernon Bell
I believe the only evidence we have seen that that might be
so, first of all, is in the burning and explosion of woven com-
posites where you have crossovers during the weaving process and
there may be weaknesses built into the fiber, thus causing it to
break up prematurely into short fibers. The other exception
seems to be the long fibrous particulate strips which came off in
the outdoor spoiler fire at China Lake where the long strips seem
to be quite closely related to the lengths and dimensions of the
composites in the spoilers' skins.
Question: Have you done any tests on chopped fibers?
Response: Dr. Vernon Bell
No, we have not. We have sure thought about it because many
applications will involve chopped fibers. The fiber is already
cut to size once you have burned the resin off. There are some
problems with mounting such a type of composite and holding the
fibrous residue before you can impact in some fashion. But we
are still thinking about doing that.
Question: Have you tried to compare the incident with the incin-
erator incident of several years ago?
Response: Bob Huston
The answer is no, but we have thought of it and we would
like to get the appropriate data. We believe that if we could
get the appropriate data from the incinerator incident that we
could make a good attempt at predicting what happened.
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Question: The statement was made that you did look at the power
generation--distribution systems. Could you give us some
idea of the. . (vulnerability estimates). . in terms of
transfer function or the sensitivity of this type of equip-
ment?
Response: Dr. Fiksel
I do not have the detailed figures in my head, but I could
show them to you afterwards. We considered several different
types of equipment, including the switch room and switching
apparatus.
Dr. Kalelkar
As far as outdoor equipment is concerned, the clumps and
the larger pieces are the ones to be more concerned about. As
yet, those have not been incorporated in our analysis.
Question: There has been very little mention of ground trans-
portation vulnerability in the risk assessment. The impli-
cation is that ground transportation is not vulnerable. Is
that true?
Response: Dr. Leon Pocinki
We did not include it in the calculations we showed, pri-
marily because of the tremendous impact on our thinking of a
recent strike of the metro system in Washington. This strike
ended up causing some inconvenience to the public, but not much
else.
Dr. Fiksel
In our study, the major ground transportation systems that
we had identified as being vulnerable were the modern mass . tran-
sit systems which have electronic controls, such as the Washington
subway. There is also a subway system in Boston, where we did
include some estimates for vulnerability of the control apparatus.
Question: Is it possible that we can expect soon to have some
sort of standardized test plans so the manufacturer can say
"Here is my gadget or what have you. I would like to get it
tested." Can I then take the results of that (to determine
the source potential of the part) and feed it into all
these models and what have you?
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Response: Dr. Vernon Bell
Yes, at one time the military services had a little gadget
which they hoped to use for detection of carbon fibers that were
on the loose. I'm not sure what the status of that is. I think
it is available. Whether it's been developed sufficiently to pass
on, I'm not sure. We do have an activity going within the NASA
program, in particular with Jet Propulsion Laboratory, who is try-
ing to come up with a small, fairly portable device which could
hopefully be used to not only detect and count but also perhaps
measure the sizes of fibers. It was not intended for that purpose
and it's still in the very early stages, but, if we're very fortu-
nate, perhaps it could lead to something of that nature.
Bob Huston
Let me also point out that in the alternate materials program
there is an intent to provide a standardized burn test, so that
material A and material B, tested at two different places, give
comparable test results.
Question: Question for Dr. Bell. Correct me if I have this wrong.
The woven fabric panels worked very good from a burn only and
burn plus a moderate explosion but in a severe explosion they
looked worse than the unidirectional and cross ply laminates.
Response: Dr. Vernon Bell
For the woven fabric, the woven material seemed to resist burn
and burn plus small impact reasonably well. However, the case of
the burn and the high impact or explosion seemed to lead to more
individual fibers.
Question: Question related to the fiber lengths used in the
vulnerability testing.
Response: Israel Taback
Regarding the fiber lengths, I tried to give you some idea
on the slide - they range from about 3 at the low end to about
12 millimeters at the high end. I designated them as being small,
medium, and large. Those tests were performed, quite a number of
them, here at Langley Research Center. We have a small test cham-
ber. They were performed by carefully injecting fibers that were
cut to size into a room at the best uniform concentration we could
and testing the equipment in as close to the use condition as we
could. That is, if it had a ventilating fan, that was on; if it
was thermally ventilated, that's the way it was tested.
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Question: What were the sample sizes?
Response: Israel Taback
i
f	
Actually its the test numbers that I think you're interested
in. After any failure the equipment was cleaned and repaired if
it needed a repair. The normal number of tests was of the order of
six and ranged to as much as perhaps 20 or so on one specific type
of equipment.
Question: Was vulnerability testing conducted with a spectrum of
fiber lengths?
Response: Israel Taback
At present, we have never used a mixed spectrum. The fibers
have been cut to specified lengths and then tested one length at a
time.
Question: You mentioned the maximum anticipated cost for an
accident worst case situation as 12 million dollars possibly.
Looking at the Tenerife situation where the damage cost of
one of the airplanes involved was substantially less than the
insurance associated with the problem, I am wondering if it
would be worthwhile to plot on your last plot, where you show
the effect of tornadoes and other weather conditions, etc,
the total cost of an airplane accident so that you might get
a barometer for the insurance rate increase and also possibly
show better the real effects of graphite fibers.
Response: Dr. Kalelkar
In other words, you would like to see the incremental addition
in loss of carbon fiber being utilized in connection with an air-
plane accident. Certainly we can do that and you will see something
like that before we get finished with our study. However, I want
to point out to you that from the point of view of the people who
suffer the risk, the people who fly in an airplane that gets in an
accident do so on a voluntary basis, but the people who get hit by
the carbon fiber in the aftermath of such an accident take on that
risk on an involuntary basis, so that the comparison has to be made
rather carefully. From the point of view of people who live miles
away from that accident, the only reason that accident affected
them is because of carbon fiber composites and, from their perspec-
tive, they wouldn't be that interested in the differential between
the carbon fiber cost and the total cost.
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Dr. Karen Credeur
There's another point, and that is that sometimes when you
get into insurance costs and liability suits, you get into the
question of costing human life. That question gets into a lot
of problems, as some of you may have seen on 60 Minutes some time
in the last few months.
Questions: I assume that DOT is following your work and will use
your data. How are you interfacing with DOT-automotive,
and what are they doing?
Response from the floor: William Leavitt, Department of
Transportation
What we're doing is getting acquainted with the problem of
expected loadings of cars, vulnerability of the ground transporta-
tion system, etc. Hopefully we will get to a point that we can use
all the risk techniques that have been developed here and by others
that Bob mentioned and feed our inputs into this set of models, if
you will. We are probably a year behind Bob's effort.
Bob Huston
Let me say that we are working together. Let me also make
a general statement, that may or may not be obvious. In my origi-
nal list of activities, I mentioned the various DOD laboratories
that are supporting us and, of course, we are aware of some of the
technical things that they are doing. We've had contact with the
Department of Energy. They have some contracted activity. The
National Bureau of Standards is doing some work for us and at
least one of their people is here today. We hope to mutually sup-
port these efforts.
The risk assessment methodology that was presented this morn-
ing for commercial aircraft is not going to be terribly different
from that for automobiles. Therefore, once the Department of
Transportation can define the automobile parameters as inputs to
the source data, I think they can generally use the remaining
methodology.
Question: Is there any indication as to when the automobile indus-
try will be planning to start utilizing carbon fibers, and
secondly is there any indication of where, by virtue of the
liability associated with fibers?
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Response from the floor: William Leavitt, Department of
Transportation
The best input we have so far, and most of this has been from
Ford, is that they are looking forward to a flange. In particular,
the thing that people are talking about is an air conditioning
mounting flange in the next couple of years. Bill Burlant has told
me that his best guess would be something like five pounds of com-
posites by 1985 or 1990. In other words, it is not very much as
things stand right now. If the picture would change, if someone
came through with a real breakthrough in terms of cost or in terms
of techniques for fabricating the automotive type component, it
could be a different ball game. I should also mention that Ford
has what they call an experimental lightweight car that has a lot
of carbon fiber composites - I think it is 400 pounds: leaf
springs, drive shafts, hoods, door reinforcements, a lot of gad-
gets inside. This is completed. They plan to show it at the
SAE show in February in Detroit. But right now it looks like
there isn't going to be much carbon fiber composite loading.
Comment from the floor: Four or five pounds per car times
the number of cars produced per year is more pounds than
are projected for aircraft.
Continent from the floor: This subject has come up in two composite
sessions that have been held by the Society of Manufacturing
Engineers. In each case, the manufacturer points out very
clearly that they are doing a great deal of experimenting
with composites in cars, hoods, doors, drive shafts, and push
rods. Although this experimentation is very interesting from
a test stand point, the key parameters that are affecting the
automotive industry are (1) fifty dollars a pound, which is
several orders of magnitude higher than the automobile people
wanted to pay right now, and (2) gasoline mileage require-
ments for the year 1985 and subsequently are driving them in
the direction of composites, so they are kind of straddling
that horse. I don't think we are going to see a large intro-
duction of composites in cars in the very near future.
Question: Is the soot produced by the incomplete combustion of the
matrix an electrical problem?
Response: Richard Pride
In the Dahlgren shock tube, we have exposed two of the
amplifier units that are on display in the back of the room
to approximately one hour of smoke and soot, not from the
epoxy matrix, but from the incomplete combustion of the JP-1
fuel, and had no problems whatsoever from that source.
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Bob Huston
Dick Heldenfels mentioned yesterday morning at least one
incident involving an aircraft that burned and apparently there
were some electrical problems downwind of that aircraft. There
was no carbon on that aircraft. Apparently there is a potential
problem (from other than carbon fibers).
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